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This book is based on the 2010 conference of the European Network for 
Research on Supplementary Pensions (ENRSP), held at the Economic Policy 
Institute in Washington, D.C., on September 10, 2010. The ENRSP is a re-
search network for independent researchers in the field of private pensions. 
This conference was the first conference of the network held outside Europe. 
Financial support for the conference was provided by the Stephen M. Ross 
School of Business at the University of Michigan and IBIS Advisors Co., as 
well as from funds from the network. 
In part because of population aging, many countries are considering re-
forms of their pension systems. For that reason, the conference addressed the 
issue of what pension experts in different countries thought would be the ideal 
pension system for their countries. As discussed in the overview chapter and in 
the individual country chapters, it is clear that the authors differ as to the role 
of the government and capital markets in providing retirement income, as well 
as on issues relating to what age retirement benefits should be available. 
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Constructing the Ideal 
Pension System 
The Visions of Ten Country Experts 
Dana M. Muir 
Stephen M. Ross School of Business, 
University of Michigan 
John A. Turner 
Pension Policy Center 
At a time when many countries have aging populations and econo-
mies continue to struggle in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, 
the improvement of pension systems is especially important. Pensions 
often are critical in preventing retirees from living in poverty. Pensions 
enable older workers to retire. In order for retirees and workers to rely 
on pensions, the funding and administration of those pensions must be 
affordable and sustainable for workers, business, and society. 
The theme of the 2010 conference of the European Network for 
Research on Supplementary Pensions (ENRSP or the Network) was an 
exploration of how and why the image of the ideal pension system dif-
fers across countries. The organizers recognized that views on the ideal 
pension system for a country may evolve in reaction to changes in the 
economic and demographic environment. The conference recognized 
the importance of the various long-run goals that different actors have 
for the pension system. The conference focused on country-by-country 
studies. It was expected that the conference authors would have very 
different approaches to thinking about the characteristics of the ideal 
pension system, and the authors did not disappoint. 
This introductory chapter begins with a brief overview of the coun-
try studies. By necessity this overview omits much of the nuance of the 
chapters—the goal is to provide a short explanation of each country’s 
1 
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2 Muir and Turner 
pension system and summarize the reforms proposed by the author of 
the country study. 
The summaries are intended to establish some background for the 
second section of this chapter in which we address some broad themes 
drawn from the country studies. We consider the authors’ views on the 
importance of culture in explaining differences in approaches to pension 
issues. We also reflect on four primary goals for any pension system: 
1) coverage of the population so that pensions are broadly 
available, 
2) risk sharing so that the many risks inherent in any pension sys-
tem are appropriately shared, 
3) adequate benefits to meet the country’s goal of sufficient retire-
ment standards, and 
4) approaches to respond to increases in longevity. 
Given our backgrounds, we view the complex pension systems de-
scribed in this chapter through a U.S. lens. 
To decrease the confusion that results from using different terms 
for essentially similar pension concepts, we adopt U.S. terminology in 
this chapter and throughout the rest of the book, even when different 
terminology would typically be used elsewhere in the world. So, for 
example, pension schemes (British terminology) are referred to here as 
pension plans or pension systems. And the government-administered 
portion of a country’s pension system is typically referred to as social 
security. 
NORTH AMERICA
United States, John A. Turner and Dana M. Muir 
The U.S. pension system is the only North American system cov-
ered in this book because, given the focus of the Network, the emphasis 
is on European pension systems. The U.S. and Japanese systems are 
included in the volume as points of comparison and discussion. 
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Constructing the Ideal Pension System 3 
The U.S. pension system requires nearly all workers to participate 
in the social security system, which provides a defined benefit pension 
to workers who meet minimum criteria. In addition, the U.S. provides 
tax incentives for employer-sponsored pension plans, which may be de-
fined benefit or defined contribution plans, and for individual retirement 
savings in accounts such as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). 
The social security plan is the only mandatory plan. Sponsorship of de-
fined benefit or defined contribution plans by employers is voluntary, as 
are individual savings accounts. Employer-sponsored plans have been 
heavily regulated since 1974. In spite of various incentives intended 
to increase coverage of employer-sponsored plans, however, coverage 
rates have never exceeded much more than 50 percent. 
Numerous interest groups recognize that planned and potential 
reductions in the social security system, limited coverage of employer-
sponsored plans, poor uptake of individual plans, and the transition 
from defined benefit to defined contribution plans means that the U.S. 
pension system needs reform. Turner and Muir briefly discuss some 
of those proposals, which advocate very different approaches. Turner 
and Muir conclude that the importance of individual freedom in U.S. 
culture means that the voluntary nature of the employer-sponsored pen-
sion system should be retained. Still, Turner and Muir believe that the 
current system can be modified to enhance coverage, better allocate 
risks, and increase adequacy of benefits. As an example, they advocate 
measures, including changes in tax and funding rules, that would help 
equalize the attractiveness to employers of defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans. One example is a recommendation to permit em-
ployee tax-deductible contributions to defined benefit plans. They also 
suggest that the demographic issue of an aging population that is so 
costly to employer-sponsored defined benefit plans could be addressed 
in part by reallocating some of the demographic risks. The plans could 
retain the idiosyncratic risk of longer than average life expectancies 
for individual workers, while the cohort risk could be shifted to plan 
participants as a group. 
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4 Muir and Turner 
EUROPE 
Although the eight European countries studied in this volume (ex-
cept Switzerland) all are members of the European Union (EU), the 
pension systems vary considerably in terms of structure, coverage, risk 
sharing, adequacy, and approach to increasing longevity. 
United Kingdom, Bryn Davies 
The United Kingdom (UK) has a two-part mandatory pension 
system administered by the government (social security) that in com-
bination applies to all employees, is earnings related, and provides a 
defined benefit pension. A move is under way to transform the earnings-
related benefit to a flat-rate benefit (not related to earnings but increas-
ing with years of contributions) and to increase the retirement age. The 
United Kingdom also has a system of voluntary employer-sponsored 
pension plans, which may be either defined benefit or defined contri-
bution plans. Beginning in 2001, most employers that do not offer a 
pension plan meeting minimum standards must designate what is 
known as a “stakeholder” plan to receive employee contributions from 
those employees who wish to contribute, although neither employers 
nor employees are required to contribute to these plans. The UK pen-
sion system, other than the social security pension, essentially remains a 
voluntary system of defined benefit or defined contribution plans where 
risks are borne almost completely by the employer or the employee 
depending on the type of plan. 
Davies advocates a four-part system. The first two parts would be 
mandatory systems administered by the government (social security). 
Together they would provide a flat-rate benefit at 60 percent of me-
dian household income for a single person and an additional amount 
depending on the individual’s lifetime earnings. In addition, Davies 
proposes an incentivized pension at the occupational or other collective 
level. The combination of this collectively based earnings-related pen-
sion and the social security benefits would provide individuals with a 
pension that would meet the target replacement ratio. Finally, Davies’s 
proposal calls for a fourth component for individuals who desire a more 
generous pension. The government would facilitate that component 
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Constructing the Ideal Pension System 5 
through regulation but would not necessarily encourage savings into 
that component. 
Ireland, Gerard Hughes and Jim Stewart 
Ireland’s pension system has a mandatory government-administered 
pension (social security) that is paid as a flat-rate defined benefit. It has 
an additional two-part system for private sector employees. Employ-
ers may provide either defined benefit or defined contribution plans for 
their employees. The trend has been for employers to shift their spon-
sorship from defined benefit to defined contribution plans. Individuals 
not covered by an employer-sponsored pension plan may establish an 
individual pension plan. Over the past 10 years, the pensioner poverty 
rate has been volatile. In recent years, the social security benefit has in-
creased more quickly than workers’ earnings, and the at-risk-of-poverty 
rates for pensioners decreased to slightly more than 11 percent in 2008. 
Hughes and Stewart propose a universal social security system 
that would further decrease or eliminate the risk of poverty for pen-
sioners in Ireland. They show that the current social security system 
provides most of the income for most pensioners, and only those in the 
top quintile of the income distribution derive a significant portion of 
their total pension income from an employer-sponsored or individual 
pension plan. Hughes and Stewart advocate decreasing the tax relief for
employer-sponsored and individual pension plans and suggest reallo-
cating those resources into the social security system to improve that 
system’s ability to support pensioners in an equitable and sustainable 
manner. 
Denmark, Finn Østrup 
The government of Denmark administers a universal social security 
pension system that provides defined benefits. Also, the Danish pen-
sion system includes employment-based defined contribution plans that 
cover nearly all employees. These plans arise from centralized wage 
agreements or company policies and have guaranteed minimum rates of 
interest. In addition, workers are encouraged to participate in personal 
pension plans by tax incentives. 
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6 Muir and Turner 
In addressing risks to pensioners, Østrup observes and criticizes 
the political uncertainty in the Danish pension system. He explains 
multiple instances where the government of Denmark has changed the 
taxation of plan benefits and sought to use pension plan assets to fund 
business enterprises, including troubled financial institutions in 2008. 
Østrup points out that, compared to other industrial countries, Denmark 
has a very low household savings rate. Østrup also concludes that the 
complexity of the Danish pension system results in a lack of transpar-
ency. After detailed analysis comparing funded and unfunded pension 
systems as well as defined benefit and defined contribution benefit 
structures, Østrup concludes that there is no single optimal pension sys-
tem. In his view, optimality in a pension system depends on the broad 
spectrum of goals of the pension system, including not just income re-
placement after retirement but also effects on labor supply and financial 
markets. 
Germany, Markus Roth 
Germany has the oldest social security system in the world. It pro-
vides an income-related defined benefit. It also has a voluntary system 
of pensions that is made up of employer-sponsored plans and individ-
ual pensions, but that system is moving from an employer-sponsored 
system to one that has elements of employee financing. The voluntary 
system covers approximately 60 percent of the German workforce but 
often provides only a small benefit. New forms of plans have been in-
troduced in Germany, such as a defined benefit with a guaranteed return. 
Roth observes that the German law on both individual and occu-
pational pensions needs to be systematized. His view is that defined 
benefit plans are not categorically more appropriate than defined con-
tribution or hybrid plans for individual and occupational pensions. 
Roth advocates use of a pension protection triangle and a loyally ad-
ministered separate fund to model protective principles. Roth’s pension 
protection triangle is formed by consideration of exit (termination of 
a pension contract), voice (consultation), and guarantees. He makes 
a number of specific suggestions to improve Germany’s occupational 
pensions, including recommending the use of automatic enrollment in 
defined contribution occupational pension plans. 
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Constructing the Ideal Pension System 7 
Belgium, Kim De Witte 
Belgium’s pension system has a mandatory government-
administered component (social security) that covers all workers, is 
income-based, and is paid as a defined benefit. In addition, employers 
may, but are not required to, sponsor defined benefit or defined contri-
bution plans for their workers. Approximately 60 percent of workers 
are covered by a work-related pension plan. Many of these plans are 
industry-wide plans that arise from collective bargaining rather than 
plans that are sponsored by individual employers. One somewhat un-
usual provision of Belgium’s pension regulation is a requirement that 
defined contribution pensions include a minimum guarantee rate, cur-
rently 3.25 percent for employer contributions and 3.75 percent for 
employee contributions. Finally, in addition to the social security and 
work-based pension plans, Belgium permits voluntary individual pen-
sion savings arrangements on a defined contribution basis. 
After discussing the shortcomings of the current pension system 
in Belgium, De Witte explains the reform proposals advocated by the 
main social and political groups. De Witte then develops a compre-
hensive set of criteria to evaluate the reform proposals and evaluates 
various approaches to pension accrual against the broad categories of 
• degree of redistributive solidarity, 
• scope of risk sharing, and 
• protection of pension rights. 
Each of these broad categories is defined by subcategories. So, 
for example, longevity is an explicit factor in the scope of risk sharing 
category and an implicit factor in the protection of pension rights cat-
egory through subcategories that differentiate between lump sum and 
annuitized benefit entitlements. De Witte advocates an ideal system for 
Belgium that would include a social security benefit of 60 percent of
final salary and an additional amount of up to 15 percent (for a maxi-
mum total of 75 percent of final salary) from tax-incentivized individual 
or work-related pensions. 
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8 Muir and Turner 
France, Lucy apRoberts and Pierre Concialdi 
The French pension system is a government-administered man-
datory system that covers all private sector workers by providing a 
means-tested minimum pension and work-related pensions as defined 
benefits (social security). Fewer than 8 percent of retirees receive the 
minimum means-tested benefit. Mandatory work-related supplementary
plans provide about one-third of the pension benefits received by the 
average retiree. The supplementary work-related plans are organized 
along occupational lines, but the plans have been increasingly consoli-
dated. The replacement rate achieved by the French system is among 
the highest in Europe. 
apRoberts and Concialdi preface their discussion of prospective 
changes in the French social security system with a concise history of 
the development of the current system. They then take issue with the 
French government’s projections for the future of the country’s pension 
system and state that the government believes that it is not possible to 
increase pension contributions. apRoberts and Concialdi believe that 
the cumulative nature of the many changes that have taken place in the 
French pension system will, if left unchanged, result in drastically re-
duced pensions in the future. They argue that the French social security 
system can and should be reinforced to receive increased revenues and 
pay appropriately generous benefits. They also point out the linkage be-
tween full and well-paid employment and levels of retirement income 
security. In any pension system with a work- and income-based pension 
component, unemployed and underemployed individuals will not earn 
the pension benefits they would in a system of full employment with 
well-paid jobs. 
Switzerland, Matthieu Leimgruber 
Switzerland has two mandatory components to its pension system 
and a voluntary third component. The Swiss government adminis-
ters a mandatory social security plan that covers all workers and pays
earnings-related defined benefits. In addition, the mandatory work-
related benefit plans cover approximately 90 percent of the workforce 
and constitute an increasingly large proportion of the expenditure in 
Switzerland on pensions. Coverage by this component of the Swiss sys-
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Constructing the Ideal Pension System 9 
tem is less than universal because there is a wage floor, which results 
in the exclusion of low-wage and temporary workers. The work-related 
plans are required to provide a minimum guaranteed return on invested 
assets. The third component of the Swiss pension system is made up of 
voluntary individual pensions. 
Leimgruber engages in a historical analysis of the Swiss pension 
system, concentrating on the work-related pensions that have attracted 
significant controversy in recent years. He argues that specific pension 
reforms that may appear merely technical matters must be understood 
in the larger context of the multiple components of the Swiss pension 
system and the dynamics that affect that system. In early 2010, Swiss 
voters rejected a proposal that would have reduced those benefits. 
Leimgruber observes that the development of the mandatory work-
related pension system was designed in part to improve the levels of 
pension benefits and in part to discourage the enhancement of the so-
cial security system. He explains the important role he believes that 
business forces, including the providers of pension investments and ser-
vices, such as life insurers that provide group pension contracts, have 
played in the structure of the Swiss pension system. Leimgruber expects 
that the work-related component of pensions will become increasingly 
important in debates over the provision of pensions. 
Poland, Marek Szczepański 
The pension system in Poland underwent significant reform in 
1999, resulting in two side-by-side systems. Szczepański addresses 
only the structure of the pension system as it applies to individuals who 
were below age 30 at the time of the reform. The government of Poland 
administers a mandatory notional defined contribution system (social 
security). A second component provides funded defined contribution 
benefits and a third component that is voluntary also is defined con-
tribution. The pension system is made up of both work-based pension 
plans and individual pension plans. The voluntary third component cov-
ers only about eight percent of the workforce. Szczepański concentrates 
his analysis on the problems associated with the voluntary defined con-
tribution component of the Polish pension system. He establishes an 
analytic framework that divides the barriers for development of the 
occupational portion of the voluntary component into exogenous and 
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10 Muir and Turner 
endogenous factors. He further divides exogenous factors into variables 
of institutional or noninstitutional character. Szczepański divides the 
endogenous factors into employer- and employee-related variables. He 
concludes with specific recommendations for improving pension cov-
erage, improving adequacy of pension benefits, and mitigating both 
financial market and longevity risks. For example, he suggests that 
workers could be automatically enrolled, with an opportunity to opt 
out, into voluntary work-based plans to increase coverage. To increase 
the adequacy of pension benefits, he suggests equalizing the statutory 
retirement age of women with the retirement age for men, which cur-
rently is 65. Finally, he observes the importance of limiting fees and 
charges in a defined contribution system. 
ASIA 
Japan, Noriyasu Watanabe 
Understanding the Japanese pension system provides context for the 
views of the European contributors to this volume. Japan administers a 
compulsory earnings-related pension plan paid as a defined benefit that 
supplements the basic pension, also provided through the government 
(together forming social security). Two different types of work-related 
pension plans may be established by employers. Both types are defined 
benefit and played an important role until 2001, when pension reform 
first permitted defined contribution plans, amended work-related pen-
sion systems, and introduced a new corporate defined benefit plan. The 
new defined contribution plans may be either work related or set up by 
an individual. 
Watanabe’s analysis shows a number of weaknesses in the 2001 
reform. For example, he notes two problems with defined contribution 
plans. First, Japan does not have the strict fiduciary responsibility regu-
lations that are important in maintaining the integrity of any defined 
contribution system. Second, the lack of transparency and fairness in the 
Japanese financial markets is dangerous for defined contribution plans. 
Watanabe particularly criticizes the past approach to corporate pension 
policy for its concentration on addressing minor technical issues instead 
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Constructing the Ideal Pension System 11 
of the broader structural issues. His recommendations include a call for 
greater understanding of the importance of strong employee welfare 
systems in contributing to profitable corporations and the role for pen-
sion plans in those systems. Among other recommendations, he also 
calls for a full review and reconstruction of all social security systems 
in Japan. 
BROAD THEMES DRAWN FROM THE COUNTRY STUDIES 
Although the country studies are intended to stand alone, in this 
section, we draw some broad themes from the country studies. One of 
the many advantages of the Network is the ability to exchange ideas 
on common approaches, issues, and solutions. Similarly, the Network 
provides a forum for respectful professional debate and disagreement. 
Importance of Culture in Explaining Differences in Approaches 
Underlying pension systems is a complex web of cultural consid-
erations. Those considerations may affect the technical choices of a 
pension system, and they may also affect the broader policy goals that 
are inherent in the structure of pension systems. A careful reader will 
see, sometimes explicitly, but more often implicitly, the effect of culture 
on the various country systems studied here. 
For example, Turner and Muir believe that the high priority placed 
on individualism in U.S. culture should constrain the mandates imposed 
on U.S. employment-based and individual retirement plans. In contrast, 
in Watanabe’s study of Japan, he observes the importance of the large 
number of companies that have been in business for hundreds of years. 
This pattern of business longevity is often attributed to harmony between 
a company and its employees (as well as between the company and its 
customers and society) and a history of lump-sum severance payments 
that dates from the seventeenth century. The importance placed on the 
relationship between a company and its current and past employees can 
be seen in Watanabe’s recommendation that stable employee welfare 
systems, particularly pension plans, contribute to corporate profitability. 
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12 Muir and Turner 
These cultural norms of individualism in the United States and of 
corporate responsibility in Japan stand in stark contrast with the current 
and ideal systems discussed in some of the European country studies 
in which government programs are recognized as being the primary 
route to reliable and reasonably generous pensions. In France, the 
government plays the primary role in the provision of pension ben-
efits. The mandatory defined benefit pensions provided through the 
programs of the French government, combined with marginal employer-
provided and individual pensions and property income, provide a 
standard of living for pensioners equivalent to that of other French 
households. apRoberts and Concialdi argue that the French system of 
governmental pension provision should be retained and cutbacks that 
have occurred over time should be rescinded. 
Similarly, Hughes and Stewart show that the government-provided 
social security pension in Ireland provides the largest share of income 
for households headed by a person aged 65 and over. Not only are
government-provided pensions viewed as an acceptable source of pen-
sion income in Ireland, Hughes and Stewart argue that resources from 
the current tax support of nongovernmentally provided pensions should 
be shifted to government pensions because it would result in a fairer 
and sustainable pension system. 
Even in the United Kingdom, which perhaps has the closest his-
torical and cultural position to the United States among the countries 
considered in this book, the Pension Commission suggested in 2005 
that the government should provide a flat-rate pension at a level that 
would prevent pensioner poverty. The Pension Commission then sug-
gested an opt-out earnings-related pension for the next supplemental 
tier of the pension system. The findings to date of behavioral economics 
teach us that in operation an opt-out system comes very close to being a 
mandatory system. Davies goes even further and argues that second tier 
earnings-related pensions should be mandatory. 
In contrast with these other European countries, Szczepański argues 
that Poles do not want to rely on the government of Poland exclusively 
for pension provision in part because of historical experience. In 1999, 
Poland put into effect a complicated new pension system, leaving in 
place the old system for individuals who were aged 50 or older on the 
date of implementation. The new individual and work-related pensions 
authorized and encouraged by that reform have not resulted in signifi-
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cant rates of coverage by those plans. The Polish people, thus, appear to 
have become skeptical of relying too heavily on government involve-
ment in the pension system. 
In addition to the European cultural acceptance of a larger role of 
government in pension provision than in the United States, solidarity is 
also an important norm in many European countries. This norm can be 
seen in the Belgian system. Solidarity across workers is reflected in the 
industry-wide pension plans that cover approximately 60 percent of the 
workforce in Belgium. De Witte identifies three types of redistributive 
solidarity and categorizes alternative types of pension accrual, in part, 
according to the type of redistributive solidarity provided. Ultimately, 
redistributive solidarity is one of the evaluative criteria De Witte sug-
gests be used in identifying an ideal pension system for Belgium. Davies 
states that some redistribution is appropriate for pension systems and 
that it plays an especially important role in pensions for women because 
of their lower average wages. 
Insights on Specific Topics 
Improving coverage 
Although widespread pension coverage through nongovernmental 
pension programs is not unheard of, most of the countries studied in this 
book have voluntary employment-based pension systems that achieve 
only moderate levels of workforce coverage. Switzerland, however, 
mandates work-based pension systems and has achieved coverage of 
about 90 percent of its workforce. The exceptions are low-wage and 
part-time workers because the Swiss mandate has a wage floor. Bel-
gium also appears to have one of the strongest systems of workplace 
pension provision. De Witte attributes its high coverage rate at least 
in part to the fact that many of the plans are industry-wide collectively 
bargained plans. 
In contrast to Switzerland and Belgium, less than half of Irish retir-
ees over age 65 reported receiving a work-related pension. Poland is an 
even more extreme example of the low end of the coverage spectrum— 
only 2 percent of workers are covered by work-related pension plans. 
The country experts appear to be in general agreement that there are 
three ways to increase coverage rates in work-related pensions. Pension 
systems could do three things: 
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1) make work-related pension provision mandatory, 
2) make participation in work-related pensions the default with an 
opt-out opportunity, or 
3) increase the incentives for sponsorship and participation in 
work-related pensions. 
A number of countries, including Ireland and the United States, 
have tried the third approach (i.e., tax incentives) for a number of years. 
The problems observed with this approach include that tax incentives 
are of less value to lower paid workers than to higher paid workers and 
that lower paid workers have less disposable income to contribute to 
retirement plans. 
Not surprisingly, then, given the cultural norms against mandates 
in some countries, multiple country experts suggest that the second 
approach, that of coverage defaults with opt-out opportunities, could 
be an appropriate way to increase pension coverage. Interestingly, this 
approach is suggested in countries that have quite different pension 
systems and cultural histories. For example, Szczepański believes that 
defaults may be useful in Poland, and Turner and Muir make a similar 
suggestion for the United States. Turner and Muir also acknowledge, 
though, that there is a danger in defaults in the United States because the 
system permits distributions from plans for hardships or when workers 
change employers. If individuals are not committed to pension savings, 
they may decide to take early distributions, even though they are penal-
ized by the U.S. tax system. 
Sharing risks 
The global financial crisis reinforced the importance of risk in pen-
sion systems. All of the country experts raised concerns about a broad 
spectrum of risks. The global financial crisis highlighted the risk that an 
employer might voluntarily, or upon its bankruptcy, terminate a defined 
benefit plan, resulting in reduced benefits for current or future retirees. 
In defined contribution plans, the decline of financial markets has re-
sulted in lower account asset levels and dropping interest rates. 
Financial market risks and reform proposals related to the benefits 
provided by defined benefit and defined contribution plans are some-
what difficult to categorize because, in part, they are specific to the 
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details of a country’s pension system. Nuances that are important in a 
given country are lost as this summary becomes quite general. As an 
example, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan 
are the only countries with a formal insurance program for defined ben-
efit plans, and those programs decrease the employee risk of employer 
bankruptcy in those countries. But other countries widely use insurance 
contracts that are quite stable to prefund work-based defined benefit 
plans, and these contracts also reduce plan risks. Roth discusses the 
use of book reserves recorded on a company’s balance sheet in lieu of 
a separate fund for occupational pensions in Germany. This is changing 
as German companies, especially large ones, revise their approach to 
meet international accounting standards. 
Financial market risks are not the only pension plan risks observed. 
Both Szczepański and Watanabe suggest that financial market regula-
tions in their respective countries, Poland and Japan, are insufficient to 
appropriately protect individuals who depend on defined contribution 
plans for their pensions. Szczepański and Østrup note that a history of 
governmental amendment or proposed amendment of pension regula-
tions in Poland and Denmark, respectively, imposes risks on the pension 
systems. Szczepański explicitly recognizes the skepticism of Poles 
toward government policymakers and states it is a source of Poles’ pref-
erence not to be entirely dependent on a government-provided pension 
system. apRoberts and Concialdi discuss the series of technical changes 
made by the French government to its pension system that are projected 
to significantly reduce future pensions. They counter this risk by argu-
ing that the governmental system is the safest and most appropriate 
choice for France, but that it needs to be restored to prior levels. Relat-
ing to the political risks affecting benefit levels, Leimgruber recounts 
the recent rejection by Swiss voters of provisions that would have de-
creased pension benefits. 
Providing adequate benefits 
Most if not all of the country studies discuss the question of how 
much pension is required to provide adequate benefits. In accordance 
with traditional concepts in pension policy, most country experts write 
in terms of replacement income. That, of course, simply rephrases the 
real question as: what level of replacement income is necessary to pro-
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vide adequate benefits? The authors consider the answer to that question 
as a percentage, often relying on policy documents or studies in their 
home countries to set an approximate appropriate standard. Davies’s 
discussion for the United Kingdom is reasonably indicative. He looks 
to World Bank policy and a 2004 UK Pensions Commission report to 
conclude that replacement rates should be between 65 and 75 percent 
for those earning median incomes. In the proposed system, replacement 
percentages would be set to provide higher percentages for low-income 
earners, and there would be a flat-rate floor to prevent pensioner poverty.
Østrup, in comparison, approaches the question from the perspective of 
the goals of the pension system and Danish culture. He points out that 
consumption goals in retirement may be highly individualized, may de-
pend on a standard of living relative to a reference group such as those 
who practice the same profession as the retiree, or may depend on the 
standard of living the retiree enjoyed while employed. 
Even to the extent that country experts agree as a general matter 
with this approach, they do not necessarily agree on how to calculate 
the replacement percentages and what should happen after the pension 
begins. Should replacement percentages be determined on the last wage 
earned, or should there be some averaging of earnings over a prere-
tirement period? And, if the pension is indexed once payments begin, 
how should that indexation occur? apRoberts and Concialdi argue that 
France’s change from indexing to current wages to indexing to current 
prices will result in lower pension payments and will deprive French 
retirees of their fair share of gains in labor productivity. 
Responding to increased longevity 
Increased longevity may affect pension plans on the previously dis-
cussed aspects of dimensions of risk and provision of adequate benefits. 
From a risk standpoint, in a defined benefit plan where the pensioners 
outlive the expectations under which the plan was funded, costs will be 
higher and additional funds will need to be contributed to the plan. In an 
unfunded defined benefit plan, costs similarly increase, perhaps beyond 
the ability or willingness of the funding entity to maintain the plan and 
benefits. In a government-funded plan, this may raise the specter of 
political risk. And, if indexation is insufficient, pensioners receiving de-
fined benefits will see their pension income whittled away by inflation. 
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In a defined contribution plan, the risk is that an especially long-
lived pensioner might outlive the account assets even if the pensioner 
is reasonably conservative in making account withdrawals. That, of 
course, overlaps with adequacy risk. Similarly, since many defined 
contribution plans permit benefits to be paid as a lump sum, pensioners 
may have the choice to be the opposite of conservative, resulting in a 
decreased or completely exhausted pension in later years. 
Turner and Muir offer a proposal to help counter the longevity risk 
of increased defined benefit plan costs. They suggest that U.S. law be 
amended to permit defined benefit plans to shift the cohort risk to plan 
participants, who are better able than employers to bear that risk. They 
observe that the idiosyncratic risk of longer-than-average life expectan-
cies should remain on the plan, which is better able than individuals to 
bear that particular risk. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we briefly summarized the pension systems of the 
countries studied as well as examined some of the most significant 
themes that we observed in the studies. We provide these summaries 
not as a digest of all of the important ideas that can be drawn from the 
individual chapters, because the country experts provide a wealth of 
insights and thoughts about the ideal pension system for each of their 
countries. Instead, we hope the themes provide a basis for our readers 
to delve deeper into this book and a platform to compare the proposals 
and perspectives of this group of pension experts. 
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Pension systems evolve over time as the economic and demographic
environment in which they operate changes and as human institutions 
and ideas develop. Their structure is influenced by competing politi-
cal forces, with differing ideological goals and economic interests. The 
ideal pension system from the perspective of workers may differ from 
that of employers, and indeed, not all workers nor all employers hold 
the same views. Systems in different countries may differ because of 
different national values, philosophies, and economic histories. 
This chapter focuses on the long-run goals that different actors have 
for the U.S. pension system and the differing views on the ideal U.S. 
pension system. It examines the underlying values and philosophies of 
different actors affecting the U.S. pension system, with a focus on pen-
sions in the private sector that supplement the national social security 
system, which are referred to as the private pension system. This private 
system includes both employer-provided pensions and individually pro-
vided pensions. The chapter critiques the current system and suggests 
policy options for improvements that would move the current system 
toward an ideal system. 
The primary goals of the U.S. pension system from the perspective 
of workers arguably are to provide secure and adequate retirement in-
come and to cover most workers. In all three respects, the U.S. system 
needs better solutions. With the decline in defined benefit plans and the 
increasing reliance on defined contribution plans, some analysts believe 
19 
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20 Turner and Muir 
that future retirees will have less secure and less adequate retirement 
income than current retirees. 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, it discusses the neces-
sity of balancing the interests of workers and employers in a voluntary 
pension system. Second, it examines several recent pension policy 
initiatives. Third, it discusses policy issues relating to the goals of in-
creased coverage, sharing of risks, and adequacy in the U.S. pension 
system. Fourth, it examines the extent to which other goals play a role 
in policy debates. Fifth, it presents specific proposals for reforming 
defined benefit plans and 401(k) plans, the major type of defined contri-
bution plan. Sixth, it presents conclusions. 
U.S. PENSION POLICY IN A VOLUNTARY PENSION SYSTEM 
American exceptionalism is the concept that the American culture 
places a much higher weight on individualism—individual freedom 
and individual responsibility—than do the cultures in most other 
high-income countries. In those countries, social solidarity, shared re-
sponsibility of workers and employers, and the responsibility of the 
state are given more prominence (Muir 2006). This difference causes 
the American pension system to differ in some ways from those in other 
countries, with a greater emphasis on individual choice and individual 
responsibility. 
The United States has a voluntary pension system, which limits the 
ability of policymakers to make changes that would be in the interest of 
workers but would increase the costs or risks borne by employers. Em-
ployers are not required to provide a pension plan. Any change within 
this voluntary framework that reduces risk for workers while increasing 
risk for employers, or that makes benefits more generous for workers 
while raising costs for employers, may ultimately not serve the inter-
est of workers because it may lead employers to not offer pensions. 
Employers, however, have other ways of adjusting to increased risks 
or increased costs in pension plans, but these adjustments also may be 
adverse to the interests of workers. For example, employers may hire 
fewer workers, pay less generous wages, or provide less generous ben-
efits in other forms. 
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Public policy in a voluntary system thus can have the adverse effect 
of causing employers not to provide pensions. However, these consid-
erations do not imply that no changes should be made that raise costs to 
employers or that increase the risks they bear. Often, such changes can 
be made within a balanced package that takes into account the interest 
of employers by reducing their risks and costs in other ways. Thus, 
when considering policy options, an option should not be considered in 
isolation and rejected because of its particular allocation of costs and 
risks. Such an option could be part of a balanced package of changes 
that takes into account the interests of both employers and employees. 
INITIATIVES FOR THE IDEAL PENSION SYSTEM 
In recent years, a broad consensus has emerged that changes are 
needed in the U.S. pension system, though a consensus as to what those 
changes should be has not developed. Several organizations have been 
active in encouraging discussion of the ideal pension system. The So-
ciety of Actuaries’ Retirement 20/20 initiative (Retirement 20/20 2011) 
has established principles for the ideal pension system. The Pension 
Rights Center, which is a pension participants’ rights organization, 
along with a number of other organizations, has established the Retire-
ment USA initiative, which has also established principles for an ideal 
pension system (Retirement USA 2011). Both groups have held con-
ferences and have issued calls for proposals for new types of pension 
plans. The ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC), an employers’ group, 
has also issued a proposal for reform—a report titled A New Benefit 
Platform for Life Security (ERIC 2009). The Retirement Security Proj-
ect, associated with the liberal think tank the Brookings Institution, has 
focused on reforming 401(k) plans using insights from behavioral eco-
nomics about the importance of the choice of defaults by plan sponsors 
(e.g., Iwry and Turner 2009). 
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22 Turner and Muir 
Retirement 20/20 
Retirement 20/20 has focused on the development of new types of 
pension plans. To evaluate proposals for new types of plans, it has an 
elaborate rating system with four key criteria: 
1) The plan is self-adjusting to maintain adequate funding 
and automatically adjusts to changing economic and de-
mographic conditions. 
2) The plan aligns roles of different stakeholders with their 
skills. 
3) The plan recognizes new norms for work and retire-
ment, so that it could support flexible work arrangements, 
such as phased retirement or return to work after a trial 
retirement. 
4) The plan is appropriately aligned with markets and uses 
market mechanisms effectively to hedge risks. 
The Retirement 20/20 initiative recognizes four stakeholders: par-
ticipants, employers, markets, and society. 
Retirement USA 
The Retirement USA initiative has three key principles—the re-
tirement system should provide universal coverage, pension benefits 
should be secure, and pension benefits should be adequate. It has nine 
other core principles. 
1) Shared responsibility. Retirement should be the 
shared responsibility of employers, employees, and the 
government. 
2) Required contributions. Employers and employees 
should be required to contribute a specified percentage of 
pay, and the government should subsidize the contribu-
tions of lower income workers. 
3) Pooled assets. Contributions to the system should be 
pooled and professionally managed to minimize costs and 
financial risks. 
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4) Payouts only at retirement. No withdrawals or loans 
should be permitted before retirement, except for perma-
nent disability. 
5) Lifetime payouts. Benefits should be paid out over the 
lifetime of retirees and surviving spouses, domestic part-
ners, and former spouses. 
6) Portable benefits. Benefits should be portable when 
workers change jobs. 
7) Voluntary savings. Additional voluntary contributions 
should be permitted, with reasonable limits for tax-
favored contributions. 
8) Efficient and transparent administration. The system 
should be administered by a governmental agency or by 
private, nonprofit institutions that are efficient, trans-
parent, and governed by boards of trustees that include 
employer, employee, and retiree representatives. 
9) Effective oversight. Oversight of the new system should 
be by a single government regulator dedicated solely to 
promoting retirement security. 
ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC) 
In its proposal, ERIC argues that the issues of health security and 
income security in retirement are so deeply intertwined that any broad 
revisions should address both components of retirement security. ERIC 
uses 11 basic principles to evaluate potential benefit plan systems. 
Employers could continue to offer their current plans rather than devel-
oping plans to fit within what ERIC terms a “new benefits platform.” 
The platform for retirement benefits has three parts: a guaranteed ben-
efit plan (modeled on defined benefit plans and including the possibility 
of hybrid plans), a retirement savings plan (modeled on 401(k) plans), 
and a short-term security account (which could be used for life event 
expenses or saved for retirement). 
ERIC’s proposal envisions benefit administrators who would com-
pete at an individual participant level to provide plan services. This 
structure is intended to create economies of scale by developing larger 
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pools of plans than individual employers, particularly small employers, 
could develop on their own. The benefit administrators, not employ-
ers, would assume the primary fiduciary and contractual obligations to 
employees. This feature would reduce legal and administrative burdens 
on employers. Tax treatment of benefits would be uniform for all work-
ers. Employers would be permitted to retain their current benefit plans 
rather than being required to switch to the new benefits platform. 
COVERAGE, RISK SHARING, AND ADEQUACY 
This section examines policy issues in the U.S. pension system 
concerning extending coverage, risk sharing between employees and 
employers, and the adequacy of benefits. 
Increased Coverage and Participation 
A worker is covered by a pension plan if the worker has the option 
of participating in the plan. A worker is a plan participant if the worker 
actually is accruing future pension benefits. The distinction between 
coverage and participation arises in 401(k) plans, where not all workers 
who are covered participate because they do not contribute, which some 
plans require for participation. 
Few countries with voluntary pension systems similar to the U.S. 
system have achieved participation rates greater than 50 percent of the 
workforce. Countries that have higher participation rates generally have 
mandates (Australia, Switzerland) or widespread collective bargaining 
(Sweden), neither of which applies in the United States (Turner 2010). 
Only about half of the U.S. private sector workforce participates at any 
point in time in an employer-provided pension. 
Workers not covered tend to be low-wage, part-time, young, non-
unionized, and work for small employers and in the service industry. 
Women and minorities tend to have lower coverage rates than men and 
whites. 
Many U.S. policymakers and policy experts have long wished 
to improve the coverage provided by the private sector employer-
sponsored pension plans. The federal government has enacted numer-
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ous reforms having that goal over the past 30 years. A variety of policy 
issues apply to reforms targeted at increasing coverage. 
The following sections consider policy options for increasing pen-
sion coverage and participation. 
Mandates 
The policy value placed on individualism and individual respon-
sibility is held by many people and limits the options for raising 
coverage. Underlying many of the policy debates in the United States 
is the issue of mandates versus free choice. Some people oppose man-
dates on employers and favor a labor market with less intervention by 
the government. Those opposing mandates argue they are an unwanted 
government intrusion in the labor market, interfering with the ability of 
workers and employers to freely negotiate employment contracts. 
Some policy experts argue that universal coverage is neither neces-
sary nor desirable because Social Security provides a high replacement 
rate for low-wage workers. They argue that the low level of benefits 
paid to these workers by Social Security is due to the low wages on 
which the Social Security benefit is based. Thus, according to this view, 
the proper focus for reform should be on improving wages. 
Others, such as the Retirement USA initiative, argue that the goal of 
the private pension system should be universal coverage, based on the 
rationale that everyone needs a supplement to Social Security. The gen-
erosity of Social Security is being reduced, with benefit cuts due to the 
legislated increase in the Normal Retirement Age (rising to 67 in 2022) 
for Social Security, and with Medicare tax increases that are paid out 
of Social Security benefits. The reductions in Social Security benefits 
increase the importance of supplemental pension benefits. 
Those favoring mandates argue that mandates are the only way to 
achieve a substantial improvement in pension coverage. Some argue 
that the mandate should include mandatory annuitization of account 
balances and no preretirement withdrawals. 
Mandates can have different options, including whether employ-
ers should be mandated to provide a pension, whether they should be 
mandated to contribute to a pension or just offer one for employee 
contributions, and whether mandates should exclude small employ-
ers including household employers of domestic help, such as nannies 
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and housekeepers. Often, proposed mandates exclude small employ-
ers because the administrative burden on them is greater than on larger 
employers with human resources departments and benefits specialists. 
Some people who work at small employers may be covered by pension 
plans if they are employees of a larger company that provides a service 
instead of being employed directly by the small employer. 
Given that the entire U.S. workforce has access to a tax-favored 
pension plan—those not covered by an employer plan can contribute 
on a tax-deferred basis to an Individual Retirement Account (IRA)— 
the question arises as to what the justification is for more aggressive 
government policies on coverage by plans sponsored by private sector 
employers. The counterargument is that few people who lack a pension 
plan actually set up IRAs. 
Paternalism ultimately is a justification for much of retirement in-
come policy. Many people do a poor job of saving for retirement on 
their own. Even if they have the opportunity to participate in a tax-
favored pension plan, such as an IRA, they do not voluntarily do so. That 
argument takes on greater weight as a reason for aggressive government 
policies intended to increase pension coverage with the cutbacks in So-
cial Security. 
One soft mandate in the United States is found in what are referred 
to as nondiscrimination rules. These rules require firms that provide a 
pension to treat lower paid and higher paid workers similarly in terms 
of percentages of both groups covered and the generosity of the benefits 
provided relative to wages. 
Incentives 
Raising pension coverage has proven to be more difficult than once 
thought by policy experts. Tax incentives to encourage participation in 
a pension have long been an aspect of the pension system. With the pas-
sage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 
all workers have had access to a tax-favored pension in that any worker 
not otherwise participating in a pension plan can make a tax-deductible 
contribution to an IRA. In the late 1990s, the Roth IRA was established. 
This type of IRA expanded the options available to some workers, who 
pay taxes on their contributions but receive their benefits tax free. In 
a traditional IRA, the pattern is reversed, with qualifying workers not 
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paying taxes on contributions, but receiving taxable benefits. Yet, even 
with this expansion in options, relatively few workers have set up ac-
counts in either type of IRA for the purpose of contributing to them. 
Account balances in IRAs have grown considerably, but that is largely a 
result of contributions from rollovers from 401(k) plans made by work-
ers changing jobs. 
Many employers have added a further incentive for workers to 
participate in the defined contribution plans they provide by match-
ing contributions in 401(k) plans. Some employers do this because of 
nondiscrimination rules, which require that a minimum percentage of 
low-wage workers participate or that the employer provide either a con-
tribution to all employees or a minimum matching contribution. Still, 
roughly a quarter of workers who have the opportunity to participate in 
those plans forgo both the tax incentive and the matching contribution 
(Turner and Verma 2007). 
New types of plans 
A major example of reforms to improve coverage has been the en-
ablement of new types of pension plans. Some reforms have provided 
new types of pensions for small employers, such as the Simplified Em-
ployee Pension and the Savings Incentive Match Plan, recognizing that 
the pension coverage rate for small employers is low and that the ad-
ministrative and compliance costs per employee of providing pensions 
are higher than they are for large employers. These reforms have sought 
to reduce the regulatory burden placed on small employers relative to 
large employers. Based on limited data available, it appears that the 
rate of participation in Simplified Employee Pension plans has never 
exceeded 2 percent of all employees who participate in pension plans at 
small employers (EBRI 2009, Table 10.1c). 
Ironically, the most popular type of pension plan currently in the 
United States in terms of the number of workers participating, the 
401(k) plan, was not established to improve coverage. Instead, it was 
an unexpected outgrowth of a technical amendment expected to have 
limited consequences. When employers provide a defined benefit plan, 
workers are automatically covered, but when they provide a 401(k) plan, 
worker coverage generally depends on the willingness of the worker to 
contribute to the plan. Thus, the problem of workers not participating in 
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a pension plan is due both to employers not offering plans and workers 
not always participating when offered. 
Automatic enrollment and defaults in 401(k) plans 
In recent years, as an outcome of the development of behavioral 
economics, attention has focused on psychological, rather than eco-
nomic, reasons for why some workers do not participate in pension 
plans. This approach has led to the development of the use of defaults 
to encourage participation in 401(k) plans. With this approach, workers 
are covered by default, with the option to opt out, rather than the tradi-
tional approach, where the default is that workers are not covered unless 
they take an action to enroll. Once covered, inertia may keep workers 
covered, though the long-term effects of defaults are not known, and 
may be considerably less favorable than expected, especially for low-
income workers, who tend to cash out their pensions at job change. 
In recent years, legislation (the Pension Protection Act of 2006) and 
regulations have facilitated employers’ ability to offer automatic en-
rollment, where newly hired employees are automatically enrolled but 
have a period of time in which they can opt out without penalty. While 
some data for a few firms show a large short-term effect of automatic 
enrollment increasing the percentage of workers participating, longer 
term studies taking into account leakage due to cash-outs at job change 
have not been conducted to analyze the longer term effects. Automatic 
enrollment may result in some low-wage workers paying tax penalties 
because they accumulate account balances that they did not really want 
and that they liquidate at job change. 
Recent discussion has focused on requiring that employers offer 
pension plans and that those plans have automatic enrollment. 
Conflicting goals 
Other policy goals have conflicted with the goal of raising cover-
age. The effects of these goals on policy outcomes may account in part 
for the failure of reforms that were intended to raise coverage. 
First, the government has attempted to limit the tax loss (sometimes 
called tax expenditure) for providing pensions, in particular by limiting 
contributions to fund defined benefit plans and limiting the generosity 
of benefits provided to higher income workers, typically high level ex-
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ecutives. Because of the limitation applicable to high-income workers 
in tax-favored defined benefit and defined contribution plans, employ-
ers have developed nonqualified plans (plans with more limited tax 
preferences) for those workers. As a result, company executives have 
less of a stake in the plan for rank-and-file workers, and the rank-and-
file plans may be less generous than they otherwise would be. In an 
ideal pension system, the interests of the executives of a company with 
respect to the company pension plan would be aligned with the interests 
of the rank-and-file workers. 
Economists argue that the cost of providing pension benefits is ulti-
mately borne by workers through reduced wages and other nonpension 
compensation, even if the expense is directly paid for by employers. 
This concept is viewed with skepticism by many non-economists. 
While that relationship between wages and pensions is clearly visible 
in the context of collective bargaining, where negotiators bargain for 
more generous pensions in exchange for less in other forms of com-
pensation, most economists believe that it also occurs in other labor 
market contexts as well. Thus, if low-wage workers were covered by a 
pension, their already low wages would be reduced even further, only 
constrained by minimum wage laws. Raising the costs of employing 
workers by providing them with pension benefits could lead to a reduc-
tion in employment for low-wage workers to the extent that their wages 
could not be reduced due to minimum wage laws. It could lead to a 
reduction in other benefits, such as vacation time or health benefits for 
those who have those benefits. 
To deal with these potential problems, proposals to extend coverage 
to low-wage workers often involve a government subsidy of the cost of 
the coverage, so that the cost would not be borne by either the employee 
or the employer, but by taxpayers. The United States currently has the 
Saver’s Credit for low-wage workers. It is a tax credit that benefits low-
wage workers who have a tax liability, but it does not benefit the many 
low-wage workers who are exempt from paying income taxes because 
of their low income. For this reason, advocates have long argued for a 
refundable Saver’s Credit that would be paid even to workers who owe 
no personal income taxes. 
In sum, increasing pension coverage in the United States has proven
to be difficult. The difficulties arise in part because of the voluntary 
nature of the U.S. pension system. Conflicting goals have doubtless 
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also played a role. However, the ideal U.S. pension system would have 
higher coverage than that provided by the current system. 
Risk Sharing 
Risk is a fundamental aspect of pension systems. Because pension 
plans promise to pay benefits at a future date, risk is inherent. The risks 
include financial market risk associated with the investments of the 
plans, portability risk experienced by job changers and workers who are 
laid off, interest rate risk associated with converting investments into 
annuities, longevity risk associated with the length of life after retire-
ment, and inflation risk for the accrual of pension benefits and the value 
of pension benefits in payment. Also, in the context of a voluntary pen-
sion system, participants face risks as to plan terminations or freezes, 
and other plan amendments by employers. 
The policy goal of risk sharing is to allocate risks between workers 
and plan sponsors in a way so that they are borne by the party best able 
to do so, taking into account the costs of risk bearing and the degree of 
risk aversion of workers and employers. Diversification is a fundamen-
tal concept in the sharing of risks. By diversifying through combining 
risks that are not perfectly correlated, risks can be reduced. This applies 
both for financial market risks and demographic risks. 
One aspect of diversification of risks for workers in pension sys-
tems is to increase the number of workers who participate in both a 
defined benefit and defined contribution plan. Workers are subject to 
different risks in defined benefit and defined contribution plans. In de-
fined benefit plans, they are subject to labor market risks, such as that 
of being laid off. This is a risk because the wages used to calculate 
benefits in the United States are not price indexed up to the point of 
retirement, so they erode in value with inflation. In defined contribution 
plans, workers are subject to capital market risks on the investments in 
their account. By participating in both types of plans, they are able to 
diversify and reduce the total amount of risk that they bear. 
Another concept in risk bearing is that risks should be borne by the 
party who can most easily bear them. Idiosyncratic life expectancy risk 
is the risk that an individual will live longer than expected. Idiosyn-
cratic life expectancy risk is a major risk for individuals in defined ben-
efit plans that are not indexed for inflation. Sponsors of large defined 
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benefit pension plans, however, can more easily bear this risk through 
having a pool of many participants. 
Cohort life expectancy risk is the risk that on average people in 
a birth cohort will live longer than expected. Cohort life expectancy 
risk is expensive for defined benefit plan sponsors to bear because they 
cannot diversify it away. However, it can relatively easily be borne by 
individual workers because improvements in life expectancy tend to 
occur gradually over time and because workers are the prime benefi-
ciaries of the improvements. This risk is not borne by plan sponsors in 
defined contribution plans because those annuities are determined by 
taking into account cohort improvements in life expectancy. Cohort life 
expectancy risk is currently borne by plan sponsors in defined benefit 
plans, but defined benefit plans could be structured so that it is borne 
by participants. 
In sum, risk sharing is a complex topic involving issues of risk di-
versification and consideration of which party is best able to bear risks. 
Policies relating to risk sharing need to take into account the voluntary 
nature of the U.S. pension system and that shifting nondiversifiable 
risks to employers reduces specific risks that workers bear but may in-
crease the risk that employers will terminate plans, reduce employment, 
or decrease wages or other benefits. Arguably, in an ideal pension sys-
tem, risk sharing could be improved by shifting cohort life expectancy 
risk to workers in defined benefit plans. 
Adequacy 
The percentage of old-age individuals living in poverty is high in 
the United States compared to the levels in many other OECD countries. 
That result occurs in part because the U.S. Social Security program 
provides a relatively low replacement rate as compared to that in many 
other OECD countries. 
Replacement rates are a common measure of benefit adequacy, but 
policy analysts differ as to what level they should be. Many people 
view a replacement rate of between 70 and 80 percent of preretirement 
earnings as adequate, but some argue for replacement rates between 80 
and 90 percent (Mitchell and Turner 2010), and indeed some argue for 
even higher replacement rates because of the cost of medical care in old 
age (VanDerhei 2006). Others, however, argue for a lower replacement 
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rate, noting that workers raising children need a relatively low replace-
ment rate, perhaps 65 percent, to maintain their preretirement standard 
of living in retirement. 
Part of the debate over adequacy is whether the goal should be to 
maintain the individual’s preretirement standard of living or to match 
the standard of living for a particular cohort group such as current work-
ers in the individual’s job or industry. As the U.S. population ages, the 
question of adequacy becomes intertwined with the intergenerational 
support issue. If the system of pension support is not prefunded, current 
workers may demand a greater voice in what constitutes an adequate 
pension benefit. 
Adequacy refers not only to benefits received at the point of re-
tirement, but also to benefits received during the length of retirement. 
Most policy experts feel that more Americans should annuitize at least 
part of their 401(k) plan account balances (Iwry and Turner 2009). 
However, relatively few experts have opted in favor of mandating the 
annuitization of account balances, though some policy experts favor 
that approach. 
In sum, while the measures for improving coverage and the al-
location of risk are relatively straightforward, the issue of adequacy 
involves determining standards for which there is not agreement among 
policy experts. This lack of agreement may be partially the result of the 
need for more research to determine how standards of adequacy would 
differ among people in different situations, such as childless couples 
as compared to single parents or couples facing the expenses of raising 
children. Nonetheless, in the view of many policy experts, the ideal 
U.S. pension system would involve higher levels of pensions for older 
Americans, which implies the commitment of greater resources to the 
pension system, and a lower percentage of older Americans living in 
poverty. 
OTHER GOALS 
In addition to the three primary goals of coverage, risk sharing, and 
adequacy, a number of other goals play a role in the development of the 
U.S. pension system. 
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Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution Plans 
An issue in the policy debates is the role of defined benefit plans 
versus defined contribution plans and hybrids in the ideal pension sys-
tem. This issue actually may be more about how to reach goals than 
about the goals themselves, but because of its importance, it is high-
lighted here. Some analysts appear to consider the decline in defined 
benefit plans as an inevitable outcome because those plans are dino-
saurs that are unable to adapt to changing business and employment 
conditions. A number of policies could be considered, however, based 
on the alternative view that the endangered status of defined benefit 
plans is due in part to policy decisions that have caused changes in their 
regulatory environment. Further, some people argue that defined benefit 
plans should form the main part of the private pension system, and that 
401(k) plans and other defined contribution plans are not really pen-
sion plans but rather are savings plans. Although defined benefit plans 
currently have few champions, labor unions still tend to favor defined 
benefit plans. 
Others favor 401(k) plans because of the large element of individual
responsibility they entail, exactly the reason some people do not like 
them. Policy experts who favor 401(k) plans argue that managing those 
plans is not too complex for most people, and investment of financial 
assets is a skill that people should be expected to have. Others argue 
that people have busy lives, and they should not be expected to become 
financial experts. The empirical evidence indicates that many people do 
a poor job of managing their 401(k) plans in terms of the amount they 
contribute and the investments they choose (Turner 2003). 
A major debate is occurring over the appropriate role for 401(k) 
plans. There is widespread recognition of the shortcomings of these 
plans—poor investment choices made by participants, many of whom 
have the opportunity to participate but do not do so, failure to provide 
annuitized benefits, and high level of risk placed on participants. A
number of commentators have called for the retirement of 401(k) plans. 
Opinion differs, however, as to what changes are needed for 401(k) 
plans. Some favor a focus on fixing these plans, and making them more 
like defined benefit plans in some respects, for example, by requiring 
that they provide annuities, have automatic enrollment, and provide 
appropriate default investment vehicles. Others favor looking for new 
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types of plans, preferably hybrid plans that combine the best features of 
traditional defined benefit and defined contribution plans. 
Distributional Issues 
The system of providing tax subsidies for pensions has come under 
heavy criticism. Because the U.S. tax system is progressive, with higher 
income persons paying higher marginal tax rates, the tax subsidies for 
pensions, per dollar contributed, are higher for high-income than for 
low-income persons. This could be remedied by providing tax rebates 
that are equal across income classes per dollar contributed, a change 
many people view would move the U.S. pension system toward an ideal 
system. Others argue that the higher tax subsidies for individuals with 
higher marginal tax rates appropriately incentivize those individuals to 
participate in pension plans. In some plans, such as 401(k) plans, the 
nondiscrimination rules then require the plan to incentivize sufficient 
numbers of lower paid employees to participate in the plan to meet the 
minimum requirements of those rules. Thus the tax subsidies, though 
unequal, support increased plan participation and align the interests of 
higher and lower paid employees. 
Dealing with Increasing Longevity 
Life expectancy has increased in the United States, as in many other 
countries. However, there has been little discussion of pension policy 
adjustments that might be made in response to this increase. For ex-
ample, the idea of encouraging people to work longer and take their 
pension at a later age has received little attention, other than by a few 
academics. While Social Security in the United States has raised its 
Normal Retirement Age from 65 to 67, with the adjustment currently 
being phased in over a 22-year period, private pension plans are more 
limited in their ability to make similar adjustments (Muir and Turner 
2007). Other adjustments could include an increase in the earliest age 
at which benefits can be received and an increase in the age at which 
benefits must be taken. 
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Financial Literacy 
Given the role of individual decision-making in the 401(k) system, 
where workers generally must decide how to invest the account balance 
of their individual account from a menu of options, greater emphasis is 
being placed on financial literacy and on financial education for pension 
participants. 
Some, however, oppose this approach and argue instead that less 
responsibility be placed on workers when making financial decisions 
about their pension investments. With this approach, pensions would 
be collectively managed by professional managers, rather than being 
managed by individual participants. Economies of scale would result 
in reduced costs, and professional management would result in better 
investment choices. 
In addition, some argue that financial education is not effective. 
Although some workers may be helped, financial education often seems 
to have no effect on the workers’ decisions. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section discusses policy recommendations for 401(k) plans, 
which are by far the most prevalent type of defined contribution plan, 
followed by policy recommendations for defined benefit plans. 
Policy Recommendations for 401(k) Plans 
Since the 1980s, the role of 401(k) plans has changed from being 
mainly supplementary plans, offered by employers who also offered a 
defined benefit plan, to often being the only plan employers provide. 
However, the regulation of 401(k) plans has lagged in recognizing their 
increasingly important role. 
Regulating 401(k) plans as retirement plans 
One approach to regulating 401(k) plans has been called the “DB-
ification” of 401(k) plans. This approach calls for changes in 401(k) 
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plans that would make them more like defined benefit plans. These 
changes include automatic enrollment of employees as the default 
(with an opt-out option), default investment in life cycle or target date 
funds, and an automatically increasing contribution rate. Automatic en-
rollment, however, may result in some low-wage workers paying tax 
penalties because they accumulate account balances that they did not 
really want and that they liquidate at job change. 
Clear disclosure of costs 
Participants in 401(k) plans are frequently unaware of the in-
vestment and administrative costs they bear in their 401(k) plans. An 
underlying premise of the 401(k) system is that workers are capable 
of making good decisions concerning investments. However, good 
decisions are not possible if workers do not have easy access to infor-
mation concerning fees. This information is available for many workers 
through the prospectuses of the mutual funds they invest in, but research 
has shown that most people find prospectuses confusing and do not read 
them when making financial decisions (Turner and Witte 2008). 
Increased fee transparency also may encourage employers to offer 
lower cost investment options in 401(k) plans. If employers seriously 
consider the more transparent fees when choosing plan options, the 
resulting competition may drive down fees across the investment in-
dustry. Thus, even if participants do not scrutinize fees, increased fee 
transparency and increased scrutiny by employers in choosing options 
may lower investment costs. 
Some policy experts recommend that the fees participants pay in 
dollars, as well as the expense ratio for investment expenses, should be 
disclosed on the annual and quarterly account statements they receive. 
This type of disclosure is done in Australia for plan administrative 
fees and by the Janus mutual funds for investment costs. Advocates 
of increased disclosure believe that the information can be provided in 
a low-cost way simply by providing a standardized disclosure of the 
level of fees paid in dollars annually for an account of $10,000. Dis-
closures should be kept simple, so that they will be understandable to 
participants. 
Opponents argue that many participants will not benefit from such 
disclosure because they will not take it into account when making deci-
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sions. In addition, participants may not understand the implications of 
the disclosure. Opponents also believe that standardizing fee disclo-
sures for a given account balance may be misleading to individuals with 
substantially different account balances. This is especially true to the 
extent flat fees are charged rather than percentage fees based on asset 
balances. Disclosure advocates respond that, with increasing account 
balances, more experience with investing, and better financial educa-
tion, larger numbers of workers would benefit from more extensive 
disclosure. 
In October 2010, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) issued new 
disclosure requirements for 401(k) plans. Plans are required to disclose 
administrative fees charged to the accounts and charges for individual 
expenses, such as charges for taking a loan from a plan account. In ad-
dition to performance and benchmark information, for investments that 
do not have a fixed rate of return, plans must report the total annual op-
erating expenses of the investment both as a percentage of assets and as 
a dollar amount for each $1,000 invested. Thus the DOL appears to be-
lieve that, despite the added costs resulting from additional disclosure, 
the additional disclosure will be of sufficient value to plan participants. 
Clear disclosure of benefits 
Employees may not understand the relationship between 401(k) ac-
count balances and future retirement benefits. This situation could be 
addressed by requiring employers to report annually to employees how 
much their current 401(k) balance would provide in monthly payments 
at retirement age, based on reasonable assumptions. This could be done 
by providing an example, based on an account of $10,000, a stated life 
expectancy, and a stated retirement age. This low-cost approach would 
provide workers an idea of how their account balance would translate 
into a retirement benefit. Research in behavioral economics has dem-
onstrated the low level of financial knowledge of many Americans, and 
improved disclosure of this type would help some workers have a better 
idea of how much they need to save to meet their retirement goals. 
Opponents of this type of required reporting of 401(k) account 
balances are skeptical of the extent to which such increased reporting 
would affect participant behavior given the strength of the inertia ef-
fects that have been reported by behavioral economists. The disclosure 
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of projected monthly benefits also may be misleading and confusing 
because they will be heavily dependent on assumptions, including life 
expectancy and interest rates. Those assumptions may create expecta-
tions that the lump sum account balance can be annuitized at retirement 
to achieve the projected monthly benefits. In fact, the assumptions may 
change over an employee’s working career and annuity rates may de-
pend on a variety of factors that are not knowable until retirement. 
Leakage 
Preretirement disbursements of pension money are particularly 
a problem in 401(k) plans. Many policy analysts argue that the tax-
favored nature of the money means that it should not be available to 
participants until retirement. Opponents of locking up retirement ac-
count balances fear that lack of access to the money would decrease the 
willingness of employees to make voluntary plan contributions. If some 
access is permitted in limited circumstances to meet this concern, then 
at a minimum, account balances over a minimal threshold should not be 
distributed on job change. 
Dealing with market meltdowns 
Workers age 50 and older have higher allowed contributions to 
401(k) plans than younger workers. These contributions are called 
“catch up” contributions, based on the idea that older workers may not 
have saved adequately for retirement. Catch up contributions might 
be allowed for all workers during an economic downturn, so that they 
could compensate for the losses in their defined contribution plans. Op-
ponents of permitting such contributions for all workers argue that they 
could result in a windfall for young workers whose account balances 
have many years to recover. The increased cost of the tax incentives for 
all workers also may be politically unacceptable during an economic 
downturn. 
Policy Recommendations for Defined Benefit Plans 
Defined benefit plans have declined considerably in their role in the 
U.S. pension system. Nonetheless, relatively little importance has been 
placed in policy debates on policies that might reverse this trend. Most 
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people appear to have accepted the decline in defined benefit plans, 
without considering the role that public policy might have played in that 
decline. A number of policies could be considered to address this issue. 
Equal tax treatment 
Differing from most countries with private pension systems, private 
sector defined benefit plans in the United States are the only major type 
of pension plan that does not permit employee tax-deductible contribu-
tions. Employee tax-deductible contributions are permitted for 401(k) 
plans and for defined benefit plans for state and local government em-
ployees. Non-tax-deductible employee contributions are permitted for 
private sector defined benefit plans, but those contributions do not make 
economic sense, and are consequently rare, because of the alternative of 
relying on employer contributions, which are tax deductible. 
Extending tax deductibility of contributions to private sector 
defined benefit plan participants would help level the playing field be-
tween defined benefit plans and 401(k) plans. The tax deductibility of 
employee contributions appears to be a major reason for the popularity 
of such contributions in 401(k) plans. Permitting employees to make 
tax-deductible contributions to defined benefit plans would reduce the 
direct costs of those plans that are borne by employers and shift costs 
onto employees. Among countries where defined benefit plans play 
a major role in their pension system, the United States is practically 
unique in not permitting tax deductibility of employee contributions. In 
most countries with defined benefit plan systems, employee contribu-
tions play a major role in financing the plans. 
Dealing with rising life expectancy 
The increase in life expectancy appears to have contributed to the 
decline in defined benefit plans because defined benefit plans lack the 
flexibility to deal readily with this continued increase in cost to em-
ployers (Muir and Turner 2007). In the United States, some plans have 
reduced their benefits, but generally this change is only done for new 
hires and thus has limited effect on the plan sponsor’s costs. 
A policy innovation, following the example of the Notional Defined 
Contribution plan in Sweden, would be to permit life expectancy index-
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ing of benefits at retirement. This policy would reduce both costs and 
risks for employers. 
For each new retirement cohort, the generosity of the plan would be 
adjusted downward to reflect the trend toward greater life expectancy. 
Under U.S. law, this innovation currently would not be allowed because 
it would violate the anti-cutback rule, which is defined in terms of an-
nual benefits. If it were redefined to take an economist’s perspective and 
use lifetime benefits as the measure, life expectancy indexing would not 
constitute a cutback in lifetime benefits. This feature would shift cohort 
life expectancy risk to workers, who are better able to bear this risk than 
are employers. 
Linking interests of management to workers 
The tax system could be used to encourage broader coverage through 
defined benefit plans. For example, to tie the interests of management 
to those of workers, the allowable maximum income considered for 
determining defined benefit plan benefits could be raised in plans that 
provide coverage to all full-time workers. Another option, possibly in 
combination with the first, could require that employers provide similar 
plan features for rank-and-file workers as they provide for executives. 
One change to align the interests of management with the interests 
of the rank-and-file was made in recent years to the funding require-
ments of defined benefit plans. If a company’s defined benefit plan is 
insufficiently funded and certain other criteria are met, then the com-
pany is prohibited from making contributions to non-tax-qualified plans 
for specified executives. 
Funding rules 
Volatility in employer contributions to defined benefit plans has 
increased due to changes in funding rules that restrict the timing of 
employer contributions. Funding rules prohibit employers from contrib-
uting to defined benefit plans in years when plan overfunding exceeds a 
certain level. Even though employees continue to accrue benefits, plan 
sponsors cannot contribute toward the increased liabilities of their plans 
in those years.1 This prohibition on contributions generally occurs when 
the stock market and companies are performing well. Because pension 
plans are long-term commitments and because of the fluctuations in the 
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stock market, plan sponsors then are required to make contributions at 
a later date. This requirement generally occurs when the stock market 
and companies are performing poorly. The resulting temporal pattern of 
contributions not only increases the volatility of contributions, it forces 
plan sponsors to contribute on a schedule exactly opposite to what they 
would choose. 
To reduce the volatility and timing problem of employer contribu-
tions for defined benefit plan funding, both the maximum and minimum 
contribution requirements can be eased. For example, plans could be 
allowed to contribute 25 percent of normal cost any year, regardless of 
funding level, which would permit them to contribute in years when the 
plan was overfunded. They would still have minimum requirements in 
years the plan was underfunded, but those requirements should be less 
onerous and more within the employer’s control because of the added 
funding they could make in years the plan was overfunded. 
Volatility could also be reduced by higher target funding levels with 
longer time periods to reach them. With higher target funding levels, 
the likelihood that plans would become underfunded would be reduced. 
An alternative approach would be to use a three-year moving average 
of funding ratios to smooth changes in funding ratios and thus smooth 
contributions. This approach has been proposed in Canada. 
Lost pensions 
The lost pension problem is a problem for workers who are laid off 
or who change jobs (Blake and Turner 2002). It can be difficult for a 
worker to track down a pension from a former employer, particularly 
if that employer has gone out of business. Both the United Kingdom 
and Australia have made significant efforts to assist people facing this 
problem. 
In the United States, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC) maintains a missing participants list for defined benefit plans 
that the PBGC has acquired and for terminated defined benefit plans. 
Legislation enacted in 2006 requires the PBGC to extend that program 
to include former participants in defined contribution plans and in other 
less common types of plans. The PBGC has not yet issued regulations 
on the extension of the program. At this time, however, it appears that 
the program still will not cover some potentially lost participants such 
as those in non-terminated defined benefit plans. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Pension policy is an evolving product of social institutions and the 
economy. With the decline in defined benefit plans and the increasing 
role of 401(k) plans, improvement is needed in the way pensions are 
provided to U.S. workers. The regulation of 401(k) plans needs to be 
updated to recognize that they generally are no longer supplementary 
plans, perhaps retaining the current, less-stringent regulation, when 
they are supplementary plans. Policies need to be enacted to strengthen 
defined benefit plans by making them more flexible and improving the 
ways they are funded, for example, by allowing employers more flex-
ibility to make contributions to plans during times of high asset values 
and high interest rates. Such a change could help address the issue of 
the volatility of employer contributions to defined benefit plans. Im-
provements in risk sharing could be enabled by legislation, such as 
permitting plans to shift the risk of improvements in cohort life expec-
tancy to workers. 
Note 
1. Depending on interest rate movements, plan liabilities might not increase. 
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Imagining the Ideal 
UK Pension System 
Bryn Davies 
Union Pension Services Limited 
This chapter presents what I imagine to be the ideal pension 
system for the United Kingdom. It is in the nature of a thought experi-
ment,1 where the theory or hypothesis to be tested is that it is possible 
to imagine a pension system that meets a set of desirable objectives, 
while being constrained as little as possible by politics or the existing 
structures of pension provision. This contrasts with most discussions on 
pension provision that focus on these practical constraints. Although a 
concentration on what is practical is understandable, and perhaps even 
inevitable, the question is how far it is useful when considering the 
shape of an “ideal” pension system, given the triple goals of providing 
socially acceptable benefits, improving coverage, and reducing risks. 
Such an exercise faces real constraints. First, ideology still plays 
some part in whatever is proposed. We all belong to various “epistemic 
communities” and use our own “conceptual tools” (Ervik 2005). It also 
determines the language that we use to describe these ideas, and we 
need to recognize the impact that language has on the outcome of these 
debates (Davies 2009). None of us is free of ideology, but we can try 
to control for its impact by being as open as possible about where we 
stand. Readers can then make the necessary adjustment from their own 
perspective. The problem comes when ideas are presented as being
value-free when, in fact, they are highly subjective.2 
The second constraint is that the chapter considers only the situa-
tion in the United Kingdom, and it is presented entirely as an approach 
to providing pensions in the United Kingdom. Lessons can be learned 
from other countries, and it is even possible that other countries can 
learn from the experience of the United Kingdom. But as Barr and Dia-
mond (2010) point out, when implementing pension reform, “choice 
45 
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is constrained by [a country’s] fiscal, political and constitutional ca-
pacity.” So, as a result, the ideas presented are bound to be shackled, 
however reluctantly, by existing structures. 
The third constraint is that this chapter can only skim the surface 
of what is really a major exercise, leaving out much of the background 
and concentrating on the structure of what is ideal, rather than on gen-
eral principles. However, there are other sources for the background, 
including a series of reports from the UK’s Pensions Commission3 that 
were produced from 2004 to 2006. While I do not agree with all of 
the Commission’s analysis and conclusions, there is no point repeating 
the extensive and detailed work that it undertook in providing the data 
and setting out the issues that face anyone considering the UK pension 
system. The Pensions Policy Institute (PPI) has also provided a use-
ful series of reports on UK pensions4 although, again, I do not agree 
with all of its conclusions. For an understanding of the principles that 
should govern pension reform, reference should be made to those laid 
down in the recent work of Nicholas Barr and Peter Diamond (Barr and
Diamond 2009). 
Given these constraints, this chapter is structured as follows. First, 
it briefly explains what is still wrong with the UK pension system, 
despite some recent reforms. Second, it discusses the elements of pen-
sions that should be provided in a civilized and prosperous society. 
Third, it considers the role of the State in mandating and/or encour-
aging these different types of provision. Fourth, it discusses how the 
required level of retirement income should be provided in practice, 
setting out a comprehensive approach with appropriate roles for State, 
employment-based, and personal provision. Fifth, it discusses how the 
pensions could and should be financed. Conclusions are offered in the 
final section. Throughout the chapter, I concentrate on the structure of 
pension provision, rather than on the parameters that should be applied 
to that structure. 
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WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE CURRENT UK 
PENSION SYSTEM? 
A short outline of the current UK pension system is provided in 
Appendix 3A. 
The Pensions Commission (2005) concluded that, “The current 
pension system combined with the current state system will deliver in-
creasingly inadequate and unequal results.” The Commission pointed 
out that while the State had planned to play a reduced role in pension 
provision for the average pensioner on the assumption that voluntary 
market-based private provision would increase, such an increase was 
simply not happening. The reasons identified for this failure were that 
employers’ willingness to provide pensions voluntarily was actually 
falling and initiatives to stimulate personal pension saving on a volun-
tary basis had not worked. 
In the light of these problems, the Commission recommended two 
key changes: 
1) Reform of the State system (social security) to provide a more 
generous flat-rate pension that would be less means-tested and 
closer to a universal benefit with the intention of more effec-
tively preventing poverty while not deterring private pension 
plans. 
2) Automatic enrollment of all employees into a private pension 
plan, with the right for an individual to opt out, and a default 
pension savings plan based on compulsory contributions at a 
minimum 8 percent level from workers and their employers 
and a low annual management charge. 
The Commission’s general approach was adopted by the last 
government, which outlined its proposals in a White Paper in 2006 
(Department of Work and Pensions 2006), and the proposals were sub-
sequently incorporated into legislation. Following the General Election 
held in 2010, the new coalition government indicated that it intended to 
proceed with the reforms. 
Unfortunately, despite the reforms, the UK pension system still 
falls short of the standards required by an ideal pension system and will 
continue to do so, even in the longer term when the recent reforms are 
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fully in effect. These shortcomings are explored in more detail later but 
the main failures can be summarized as follows: 
• An overreliance on market-based pension provision, with its 
inherent inefficiencies, high costs, and excessive risks, which 
means that many pensioners will still end up with inadequate 
incomes. 
• The right for individuals to choose not to have any pension in 
addition to the State flat-rate pension (social security) will lead 
to greater inequalities in retirement between those who belong 
to an adequate private pension arrangement and those who do 
not. 
It has been frequently suggested that an additional problem is that 
the Commission’s approach means an even more complex pension sys-
tem than the current one, for example, having two flat-rate pensions 
with different qualification conditions. However, I am not convinced 
that having a complex structure is, in itself, a problem, provided that 
the system delivers adequate pensions without requiring people to make 
complex decisions. Some level of complexity is inevitable in any sys-
tem that seeks to protect citizens’ accrued rights, and these should not 
be wished away, however inconvenient they may be. 
HOW MUCH PENSION? 
The first question that needs to be answered in designing the ideal 
pension system is how much pension do people need? This amount is 
typically expressed in terms of the “replacement ratio,” that is, the ratio 
of an individual’s income in retirement to that they received at work. 
The most plausible assumption is that most people will typically expect 
to have broadly the same standard of living in retirement they enjoyed 
while working. This is not to say the people would not like a higher 
income after they retire, and people might need a greater income in 
retirement than they received while working because, with increased 
leisure time, they have more opportunities to spend. In any event, there 
is no doubt that when it comes to income, more is better. Nevertheless, 
the general objective of the ideal pension system is to allow people to 
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maintain their standard of living into retirement, apart from those with 
the lowest incomes who, as discussed below, might expect to improve 
their standard of living. 
In practice, research suggests that the standard of living can be 
maintained in retirement with a lower income than that received while 
at work and that this will be regarded as adequate by pensioners them-
selves. Aworking paper from the Center for Retirement Research (CRR) 
states that this is because of differences in taxation, a reduction in the 
need to save, and elimination of work-related expenditures (Munnell 
and Soto 2005). The working paper concluded that, based on a range of 
studies that had examined the issue, “middle class people need between 
70 and 75 percent of their pre-retirement earnings to maintain their life 
style once they stop working.” The Pensions Commission suggested a 
lower figure, referring to research that suggests people on average will 
aspire to a retirement income that is two-thirds of their earnings during 
their working life (Pensions Commission 2005). A 1994 World Bank 
report suggested tentatively an even lower figure of “say, 60 percent of 
the gross average lifetime wage for the average worker” (World Bank 
1994). 
Such targets are clearly meant to be an average and both individ-
ual circumstances and preferences mean that the ideal will vary from 
person to person. For example, some will need less pension income 
because they have also accumulated or inherited assets that they are 
prepared to use to maintain their lifestyle. There are also individual 
choices to be made about the distribution of consumption over a life-
time. There are also practical difficulties in defining the replacement 
ratio; for example, the CRR Report points out the difficulty of deciding 
what should be in the numerator and denominator of the ratio. Should 
the denominator (work income) be averaged over the working lifetime 
or only that received in the run up to retirement? Despite these practical 
and conceptual difficulties, the replacement ratio is too useful a tool to 
discard when looking at pension systems. It is assumed for the purposes 
of this chapter, therefore, that the denominator is based on the indi-
vidual’s revalued average lifetime earnings from employment and that 
the numerator includes state and private pensions but not income from 
investments and disinvestment of assets, including property. 
Given the objective of replacing earnings, the question of whether 
a pension system creates too great a disparity in retirement incomes is 
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really a question about whether there is too great a disparity in incomes 
among working people. This suggests that excessive income disparities 
would be better resolved in the context of the earnings that people re-
ceive, rather than their pensions. However, it is generally accepted that 
there is still a role for some income redistribution within the pension 
system. The point is particularly significant for the pensions accrued 
by women who, on average, still receive significantly lower earnings 
than men. 
In practice, this means that people who have lower average incomes 
while working require higher replacement ratios. The Pensions Com-
mission (2004), for example, states that, “lower income people may 
need a high consumption replacement rate to be assured of what society 
considers a minimum acceptable standard of living.” The World Bank 
(1994) similarly suggested that there should be a floor on the replace-
ment rate set at the poverty line for low-income workers. So, if it is 
assumed that the desirable replacement ratios quoted above of between 
60 percent and 75 percent are for people with middle incomes, those 
with lower incomes should be entitled to a higher ratio, possibly up to 
100 percent or more. For example, the Pensions Commission (2004) 
suggested a range of benchmark replacement ratios, from 80 percent of 
gross earnings for the lowest earners, to 67 percent for median earners 
and 50 percent for top earners. 
To summarize, while there is obviously scope for disagreement 
about the precise figures, there is general agreement that the target re-
placement rate should increase as preretirement earnings decline. Such 
a structure can be defined in a number of ways, but in the United King-
dom, the practice has been to use a combination of a flat-rate element 
that is paid regardless of lifetime earnings, plus an earnings-related 
element that is expressed as a proportion of the individual’s revalued 
lifetime earnings in excess of a minimum, which is referred to as a 
disregard. On this basis, the general formula that defines the level of 
pension provision, based on the individual’s revalued lifetime earnings, 
is as follows: 
P = (FRE + [ARE − D] × T ) ÷ ARE, 
where 
P = pension (expressed as the replacement ratio), 
FRE = flat-rate element (£), 
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ARE = average revalued earnings (£), 
D = disregard from earnings (£) when calculating the earnings-
related element, and 
T = target ratio for the earnings-related element. 
While the pattern is clear, there is still room for considerable discus-
sion about the value of the various parameters and, hence, the overall 
outcome. However, I suggest that the parameters should be set to meet 
two objectives: 
1) The flat-rate element, which is all those who earn less than the 
disregard will receive, has to be sufficient to provide an accept-
able standard of living in retirement for those with the lowest 
incomes. 
2) The flat-rate and the earnings-related elements taken together 
should produce a target replacement rate of between 65 and 75 
percent for those with median incomes. 
What should be regarded as a sufficient flat-rate element for this 
purpose is obviously open to debate, but it is generally agreed that it 
should be set at a level that keeps people out of poverty, that is, above 
the “poverty line.” I have assumed for the sake of illustration that it 
should be 60 percent of the median United Kingdom household income 
for a single person with no dependents.5 
The figure leaves out any allowance for housing costs because, as 
discussed below, it is assumed that these will be met in full for people 
with the lowest incomes through separate housing benefit arrangements. 
In current terms, this amounts to a flat-rate element of about £6,500 per 
year. Coincidentally, this figure is also close to about 60 percent of the 
annual equivalent of the UK national minimum hourly wage. 
The two objectives can be achieved in a number of ways, depend-
ing on the relationship between the disregard and the earnings-related 
target. In the United Kingdom the practice has been to set the disregard 
at 100 percent of the flat-rate element. This has appeared to work rea-
sonably well, provided the flat-rate element is at or above the poverty 
line. Given median annual earnings for people in full-time employment 
of £25,428 per year (Office for National Statistics 2009) and a flat-
rate pension of £6,500 per year, the flat-rate element will provide a 25 
percent replacement rate for someone with median earnings. So, if the 
target for the overall replacement rate is 70 percent, the earnings-related 
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element would have to be 45 percent of total earnings or 60 percent of 
earnings in excess of a disregard that is equal to the flat-rate element. 
The total income that is produced by the formula previously shown, 
expressed as the replacement rate, is shown by the line in Figure 3.1. 
One possible criticism of this set of outcomes is that individuals 
with revalued lifetime earnings greater than the median would fall short 
of the target range. However, the assumption is that people with higher 
lifetime incomes will typically be able to make up the shortfall from 
resources other than their pension. 
A number of important associated points deserve a fuller treatment 
but can only be highlighted in this chapter: 
• Pensioners should share in the rising living standards of the 
country as a whole, so the benefit specified above should be 
indexed to national average earnings. 
• It is assumed that the social and medical care required in retire-
ment will be funded separately by the employed population on 
an insurance basis, which means the National Health Service in 
the United Kingdom, so such costs do not need to be consid-
ered when determining pensioners’ regular incomes. 
• There are strong arguments for social care for the elderly to 
be provided on a similar basis, so such costs would also not 
need to be considered when determining pensioners’ regular 
incomes. 
• The target is on a per person basis, with no allowance for the 
potential savings of living as a couple; that is, all rights should 
be on an individual basis and there are no derived rights. 
• Any additional social payments in regards to children and other 
dependents for pensioners on low incomes should be covered 
by the same arrangements as those available to citizens of 
working age. 
• In the same way, support for housing costs for pensioners on 
low incomes should also be covered by the same arrangements 
as those available to citizens of working age. 
• No account is taken of any additional benefits or concessions, 
for example, concessionary travel arrangements that are pro-
vided for social reasons on the basis of age. 
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Figure 3.1 Target Replacement Ratio 
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NOTE: FRE is the flat-rate element, D is the disregard from earnings when calculating 
the earnings-related element, and T is the target for the earnings-related element. 
One key issue in designing the ideal pension system is the age at 
which the pension comes into payment. While not denying the sig-
nificance of this key parameter in establishing the overall value of a 
pension system, I do not address this issue in this chapter—the target 
pension level should apply whatever the pension age. However, it is 
clear that there is a choice to be made between keeping retirement age 
down and the level of pension that can be paid. This relationship is clear 
and direct for funded pension arrangements—the later a person retires 
the higher the income that can be taken from the accumulated fund— 
but it is also relevant for unfunded plans, given the resources that are 
available to pay pensions. The corollary, however, is that an increase 
in pension age is directly equivalent to a reduction in pension, with the 
greatest adverse effect on those groups in society with lower life expec-
tancy and poorer health. This raises the issue as to whether and, if so, 
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WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN PROMOTING THIS
LEVEL OF PENSION? 
Given the answer to the question of how much pension should be 
provided, the next question is how much of it should the State mandate 
and how much should it merely encourage? The argument in favor of 
compulsion is essentially that people can be myopic and lack informa-
tion, despite the evidence that those with higher incomes in retirement 
have much higher levels of satisfaction. In the long run, the argument 
goes, everyone will be pleased that they were compelled to have a de-
cent income in retirement. 
In large part I accept the argument for compulsion but recognize 
that there is still scope for individual choice within the overall sug-
gested target. For example, those who have or anticipate access to other 
non-pension assets may well prefer to consume current income now, 
rather than being compelled to put some of it into a pension that they 
will not enjoy until later in their lifetime. So although there is general 
agreement that some level of benefits should be compulsory, the issue 
is determining what that level should be and, in particular, whether it 
should extend beyond the flat-rate element. 
The Pensions Commission approached this topic by identifying 
four levels of activity for the State in promoting a pension system, as 
shown in Figure 3.2 (Pensions Commission 2005). In essence, the Pen-
sions Commission’s (2005) suggestion was that the State should: 
1) Ensure the provision of a minimum income, that is, the flat-rate 
poverty prevention element. 
2) Strongly encourage the provision of half the target earnings-
related element through auto-enrollment with opt-out rights. 
3) Enable the provision of the other half of the earnings-related 
element by offering a low-cost option. 
4) Facilitate purely voluntary additional provision through tax 
relief. 
This type of setup raises a number of questions, such as what is the 
difference between “enables” and “facilitates”? There are also ques-
tions about the degree of activity at each level, such as whether the 
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provision that the Commission wanted to strongly encourage should, 
in fact, be compulsory. But the general approach, based on a range of 
levels of pressure from the State, provides a system that makes the 
different elements of pension provision work together to produce the 
desired level of total retirement income, while also offering individuals 
a reasonable degree of flexibility to exercise their personal preferences 
about that income. 
The pattern of provision illustrated in Figure 3.2, within the overall 
target replacement ratio shown in Figure 3.1, is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
The separate issue of how these pension elements should be provided 
and by whom is addressed in the next section. 
Figure 3.2 Target Pension Income as a Percentage of Earnings for the 
Median Earner at the Point of Retirement 
second NPSS pension Impact of possible Total prFull basic State Further ovision 
state pension pension with with default voluntary by employer or 
44 years of contributions contributions employee on a 
contributions/credits and reasonable to NPSS voluntary basis 
return assumptions 
NOTE: NPSS is the National Pension Savings Scheme proposed by the Pensions Com-
mission. 
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This general approach provides the foundation for an ideal pension 
system, but one significant change is needed to the structure proposed 
by the Pensions Commission to achieve my ideal. The earnings-related 
element that the Commission says the State should strongly encour-
age should be ensured; that is, it should be mandatory. A World Bank 
(1994) report offers some support for this approach: “the government-
mandated replacement should probably be only about half of the gross 
average lifetime salary for the average worker.” 
The Pensions Commission (2005) had three arguments against 
making this element mandatory that can be summarized as follows: 
1) Mandatory provision of this element would be on either an 
unfunded basis that is untenable within the acceptable public 
expenditure limit and would tend to crowd out adequate flat-
rate provision, or on a funded basis that may be seen by many 
people as taxation by another name and therefore might have 
the same effect. 
2) Individual preferences differ, and there should be scope for dif-
ferent preferences between saving more and retiring later. 
3) Individual circumstances differ. An increasing number of 
people will be able to use housing assets (either accumulated 
themselves or inherited) to fund at least part of their consump-
tion in retirement, whereas others will not, which means that 
straightforward compulsion on a significant scale could be 
against some people’s interests. 
The arguments for permitting some flexibility are clear, but none 
of them leads directly or unequivocally to the conclusion that compul-
sion should be limited to the flat-rate element. The real issue is how 
much flexibility, and given the general wish for everyone to have an ad-
equate income in retirement (where adequacy is assessed in relation to 
the individual’s preretirement income), there is nothing inevitable about 
limiting the State’s role to poverty prevention. But this is not a techni-
cal argument about pensions; it is part of a much broader philosophical 
debate about the role of the State in a free society. Some more practical 
points, however, can be made in favor of State involvement with the 
provision of earnings-related pensions. 
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Figure 3.3 The Role of State Pension Commission Proposals 
100 























6,000 14,000 22,000 30,000 38,000 46,000 54,000 
Average revalued earnings (£) 
First, requiring a minimum level of earnings-related pension will 
reduce inequalities in society, for example, between those who work 
foremployers that provide complementary pensions, including those in 
the public sector, and those who work for employers that do not. The 
Labour Party identified the problem of having “two nations in old age” 
in the ground-breaking report “National Superannuation” (Labour Party 
1957). The report identified the “privileged minority,” who were en-
titled to an occupational pension and the “unprivileged majority,” who 
are outside any sort of superannuation plan. The report concluded that 
everyone should accrue an earnings-related pension, and the follow-
ing 50 years saw successive efforts to spread the advantages of having 
such superannuation more widely. But now, as reported by the Pensions 
Commission, the spread has gone into reverse, both in terms of cover-
age and benefits provided (Pensions Commission 2004). Put simply, 
earnings-related pensions for all employees are a reasonable social ob-
jective that has not been delivered by a reliance on voluntarism. 
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Second, at least part of the earnings-related element of the pension 
needs to be provided on a risk-free basis which, as is explained in the 
next section, requires the State to be involved. Avoidance of risk is not 
just an individual preference but a simple necessity when applied to 
income needed to stay above the poverty line. What this means is that 
people with low to median incomes cannot afford to take risks with a 
significant part of the earnings-related income that they need in addi-
tion to the flat-rate element. This type of system, however, would only 
be equitable if the costs and benefits of providing risk-free earnings-
related pensions are spread across the working population as a whole. 
Currently, public service workers in the United Kingdom are often said 
to be unduly privileged because they have risk-free supplementary pen-
sions, whereas most workers in the private sector do not. Clearly this 
difference exists, but given the importance of good pension provision, 
the right answer must be to improve risk-free provision where it is in-
adequate, not to cut it back where it is adequate. 
Third, the only real success in the United Kingdom in terms of wid-
ening the coverage and level of earnings-related pension provision has 
been the little-recognized mandatory State Earnings Related Pension 
Scheme (SERPS). There were three main problems with SERPS: the 
perception was that it would become too expensive; it was subjected to 
a series of cutbacks, which led to the belief that it would offer a poor 
deal to pensioners; and it was poorly understood, with almost no one 
willing to promote its advantages. It also suffered because the basic 
State pension was tied to prices, rather than earnings, so that SERPS 
(later named the State Second Pension or S2P) was expected more and 
more to play a poverty prevention role, for which it was ill-suited. De-
spite all these difficulties, it has resulted in the great majority of new 
retirees over the last decade receiving worthwhile earnings-related pen-
sions in addition to the flat-rate basic State pension. Unfortunately, this 
record of success in delivering pensions has largely been ignored. 
Even when these arguments are accepted, the question of how 
much of the total earnings-related target should be provided through a 
mandatory element and how much should be provided by an element 
that is encouraged strongly is ultimately a matter of judgment. The ideal 
might be to have a gradual transition across the whole band of earnings-
related provision, passing gradually from “ensures” to “enables,” but 
this is hardly practical. The Pensions Commission for its purposes 
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simply split the target into two equal parts and this does not seem an 
unreasonable basis to use for the purposes of this discussion. 
A summary of what I consider to be the key elements of an ideal 
pension system and the benefits they should provide is presented in 
Table 3.1. 
HOW SHOULD THESE BENEFITS BE PROVIDED? 
Given these key elements of an ideal pension system, this section 
discusses how they should each be provided. 
Flat-Rate Element 
There is now general agreement in the United Kingdom that the basic 
flat-rate pension should be provided by the State on an unfunded basis, 
without a means-test and financed by the hypothecated (earmarked) 
payroll tax, known in the United Kingdom as National Insurance. The 
United Kingdom already has such a benefit in the State basic pension 
(social security), but at present it falls short of the income replacement 
target set in the previous section, being only 47 percent rather than the 
target of 60 percent of median household income after housing costs for 
a single person. It is envisaged that this shortfall will be made good over 
the next 20 years by increasing the State basic pension in line with aver-
age earnings and transforming the existing earnings-related S2P into a 
second flat-rate pension, as explained in Appendix 3A. 
There is less agreement about what should be the basis of entitle-
ment; that is, should it be based on an individual’s contribution record 
or on the basis of citizenship and/or residence? The Pensions Com-
mission (2005) fudged the issue by suggesting that future accruals of 
the State basic pension should be on a long-term residence basis (e.g., 
pro rata to a working life of 45 years), while existing accrued rights to 
the State basic pension based on an individual’s contribution record 
should be unchanged, except that the benefit could be made universal 
immediately above a certain age (e.g., 75 or 80). The Commission also 
proposed that entitlement to the S2P, even after it becomes a flat-rate 
benefit, should continue to be based on an individual’s earnings record. 
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60 Table 3.1  Key Elements of an Ideal Pension System 
Element Role of the state Features Amount 
Flat-rate Mandates Poverty prevention and redistribution 
of income between pensioners 
60 percent of median household income 
for a single person, which is equal to 
25 percent of average revalued lifetime 




Mandates Provision of a risk-free element toward 
an adequate earnings-related income in 
retirement 
30 percent of average revalued lifetime 
earnings in excess of a disregard equal 
to the flat-rate element 
Earnings-related 
additional 
Encourages Provision of an element of individual 
choice in securing an adequate income 
in retirement 
30 percent of average revalued lifetime 
earnings in excess of a disregard equal 
to the flat-rate element 
Additional Facilitates Additional income for individuals who Individual choice 
personal desire a retirement income higher than 
the proposed target 
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The Government decided that the State basic pension should con-
tinue to be on a contributory basis, although the contribution conditions 
have been eased significantly, with women being the main beneficiaries 
of the change. For the small minority who fail to meet the conditions for 
entitlement, a means-tested benefit should continue at a level that would 
prevent poverty in old age. 
While the basis of entitlement is clearly an important issue and my 
inclination is to support a contributory approach, it would be difficult to 
do the issue justice in the current chapter and the matter is left for future 
discussion. In any event, current projections suggest that even on a con-
tributory basis, the great majority of retirees will receive a State pension 
above the poverty line (Government Actuary’s Department 2010). It 
can be argued, therefore, that this element of the ideal system will come 
into place over the next 20 years. However, this is achieved at the cost 
of losing the existing earnings-related pension provided by the State. 
Earnings-Related Mandated Element 
The United Kingdom has had an earnings-related mandated pen-
sion system in place since 1978, initially in the form of the SERPS and 
in the form of the S2P since 2002. Both of these systems are unfunded, 
with current benefits paid from current National Insurance contribu-
tions. However, as explained above, it is now envisaged that by 2030 
the S2P will have been transformed into a second flat-rate pension that 
is paid in addition to the basic State pension, with the intention that the 
two flat-rate pensions taken together will exceed the poverty line. 
Under the current system, it is proposed that the recognized need 
for people to have an earnings-related pension in addition to the flat-rate 
minimum should be met by an approach that “strongly encourages” 
private pensions by means of the auto-enrollment requirement and the 
creation of a default low-cost option on a funded basis. The drawbacks 
of this approach are that the opt-out right will lead to an unknown num-
ber of workers that end up with inadequate benefits compared to the 
target income identified above. They will also be subjected to an un-
acceptable level of risk and costs for this element of their retirement 
income, as this is inherent in private market-based provision. The only 
way these problems can be avoided is for this element of their pension 
to be compulsory and provided directly by the State. 
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The UK experience with SERPS/S2P demonstrates that this alter-
native approach possesses a range of features that are highly desirable, 
if not essential, for this element of the pension system, including: 
• complete protection against any investment risk and the con-
sequent arbitrary fluctuations in the benefits paid on retirement 
from year to year, 
• a lack of complex choices to be made by the individual, 
• equity between members, with benefits and contributions based 
on each member’s full earnings record, 
• full transferability of rights, with no penalty on switching 
employment, 
• full protection of rights, increasing in line with average earn-
ings up to retirement and inflation thereafter, 
• low administration costs, and 
• scope for the maturity of the system to be accelerated, com-
pared to the need to wait for a full working lifetime with a fully 
funded arrangement. 
An additional point that, while important, is not considered in this 
chapter is whether there should be any contracting-out or “carve-out” 
permitted in place of this element of provision. In other words, should 
it be possible for private plans that meet defined standards to substitute 
for the State plan? This type of arrangement is now long established in 
the United Kingdom, going back to 1961, and was originally proposed 
because of concern that the expansion of State provision would have 
an adverse impact on the well-developed system of occupational pen-
sion plans that already existed. Such arguments still apply, although the 
significant reductions that have taken place in recent years in the stan-
dard and coverage of such plans suggest that it might not have as much 
force as in the past. In any event, it is taken as axiomatic that were such 
contracting-out to be permitted, it would have to be on the basis that the 
private plan would guarantee to provide at least as much pension as that 
promised by the State plan. 
The conclusion is that this element of provision should be offered 
entirely or primarily by the State and that it should provide a pension 
of 30 percent of the individual’s revalued lifetime earnings in excess 
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of a disregard equal to the flat-rate pension. There would have to be 
a joint contribution rate from the employer and employee that would 
meet the cost of providing such a pension over a normal working life-
time. In other words, I envisage this element of pension being provided 
on a basis that is cost neutral for society as a whole, with the need for 
redistribution within the pension system being met principally by the 
flat-rate element. Redistribution within this element would be limited 
to arrangements that would provide credits for people who are outside 
paid employment but have an important social role, for example, those 
who have full-time caring responsibilities for children or other depen-
dents, most of whom will be women. The cost of such redistribution 
should be met from general taxation. 
The contribution rate that is calculated on this basis would obvi-
ously depend on the age at which the pension is payable and underlying 
actuarial assumptions. Some dispute the appropriate basis upon which 
such calculations should be made, and such intergenerational judg-
ments are difficult. Nevertheless such decisions have to be made, and 
to this end, the UK Treasury has set out the policy it wishes to see 
adopted consistently when making such judgments in the Green Book 
(HM Treasury 2006). 
In essence, for policy decisions that involve a comparison between 
current and future figures for income or expenditure, the Green Book 
distinguishes the appropriate discount rate for individuals to use from 
the one that should be used for society as a whole. One of the key dif-
ferences is that the former is subject to the exigencies of investment 
markets, while society as a whole, in the form of the government, is 
not. As a result, the latter should be judged by using what is termed the 
social time preference rate, which does not go up and down with move-
ments in markets, but is set for the long term. At present the Treasury 
considers this to be 3.5 percent per year. 
In addition to the assumed discount rate, an assumption has to be 
made about how long pensions are expected to be in payment, that is, 
about pensioner mortality. It is now clear that longevity is continuing 
to improve at a relatively fast rate, and it seems reasonable to assume 
that this trend will continue for the foreseeable future. Using the dis-
count rate identified above and projected mortality rates for the United 
Kingdom, Table 3.2 presents the contribution rates, expressed as a per-
centage of earnings in excess of the earnings disregard, that would be 
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Table 3.2  Total Contribution Rate for an Earnings-Related 30% Target 
Pension (% of earnings in excess of disregard) 







SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
equivalent in value to the target pension, depending upon the age of re-
tirement. The rates assume a working life equal to the number of years 
between age 25 and the assumed retirement age. 
These contribution rates are broadly consistent with the eight per-
cent proposed by the Pensions Commission (2005) and legislated for by 
the last government. The important difference is that the pension will 
be obligatory and provided by the State in this proposal, and hence, it 
is guaranteed. 
Given this general approach to the provision of the earnings-related 
mandated element, a number of important practical issues still need to 
be resolved: 
• Should the plan be on a notionally funded basis, with the re-
sult that the amount of pension accrued each year will decrease 
with age, or should there be a level rate of accrual? My prefer-
ence is for a level accrual rate, as this accelerates the payment 
of benefits, but it also brings the cost forward. 
• How should the contributions be divided between employer 
and employee? 
• Because contributions are compulsory, is it necessary for them 
to give rise to tax relief ? If not, what would be the appropriate 
tax regime? 
• Should there be built-in arrangements to deal with changes 
in circumstances, for example, in expected mortality after 
retirement? 
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The last issue is particularly important, but I do not consider it in 
detail in this chapter. However, it is worth pointing out that, to the ex-
tent that such adjustments are necessary, it would be possible to make 
them by changing the pension system’s parameters, for example, by 
increasing the age at which the pension is received, rather than by mak-
ing changes to the system itself. Nevertheless, it is important that such 
adjustments be made automatically on a basis of explicit rules that are 
determined in advance, rather than being made on an ad hoc basis (Barr 
and Diamond 2009). 
Earnings-Related Encouraged Element 
A number of forms of pension provision would be appropriate for 
the earnings-related encouraged element, but these should preferably 
be on a collective basis to minimize both costs and risks, while sim-
plifying the choices that might need to be made. The details of these 
arrangements would be a matter for collective bargaining or individual 
negotiation and would encompass both defined benefit and defined con-
tribution arrangements. 
The role of the State might be limited therefore to offering appro-
priate incentives and setting minimum prudential standards through a 
pensions’ regulator. Alternatively, the State might have a greater role by 
allowing individuals and their employers to contribute to the arrange-
ment outlined above for the mandatory element, but on a voluntary basis. 
The existing method of encouraging membership in these arrange-
ments is through offering tax incentives on what is described as the 
“EET” approach—contributions from the employee and the employer 
are exempt (E) from tax, the fund roll-up is also exempt (E) from tax, 
but payment of benefits is subject to tax (T). In practice the system is 
not so simple, with limits on tax-free contributions that are likely to be 
tightened in the near future, some taxation of equity dividends in the 
roll-up phase, and the ability to take about 25 percent of the accumu-
lated fund as tax-free cash on retirement. It is not clear whether this is 
actually the most equitable way of using State resources to encourage 
this element of pension provision, as greater benefit goes to those with 
higher levels of income. Consideration should be given, therefore, to 
the possibility of offering some alternative form of pension support that 
is not tied so directly to each individual’s income. 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about fnding the option.






    
 
66 Davies 
There are, of course, already well-established plans in the United 
Kingdom which could meet this particular need. However, the arrange-
ments that are available offer a relatively limited choice between 
employer-sponsored occupational pension plans on a defined benefit 
basis on the one hand and funded individual accounts on a defined 
contribution basis on the other. In other words, the choice is between 
arrangements that place almost all the risk on the employer and em-
ployee, respectively. The former are in significant decline, and it has 
been suggested that this could be arrested if there were a shift to greater 
risk-sharing in employer-sponsored plans because employers may be 
more prepared to offer such plans if they did not face all of the risk. 
While possible approaches to risk-sharing have been much discussed, 
including changes in pension legislation, there are relatively few ex-
amples of plans where it has been adopted in practice. 
Additional Personal Element 
As with the earnings-related encouraged element, there are already 
well-developed arrangements in the United Kingdom whereby indi-
viduals who want a pension in addition to that provided by the other 
elements can provide it for themselves. The only issues for the State in 
the context of this element are as follows: 
• It needs to ensure that these arrangements are properly regu- 
lated along broadly the same lines as those that apply to per-
sonal investments more generally. 
• It needs to determine whether there is the need for and, if so, 
the extent of any tax advantages that apply to this form of sav-
ing that are more advantageous than those available on saving 
more generally. 
HOW CAN IT BE AFFORDED? 
The question addressed in this section is whether society can af-
ford the pensions arrangements set out above. This clearly is a political 
rather than a technical issue, which relates entirely to the earnings-
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related mandated element. As far as the other elements are concerned, 
political consensus in the United Kingdom holds that a flat-rate pen-
sion that provides an income that keeps pensioners out of poverty can 
and should be afforded through a hypothecated social security tax. The 
earnings-related encouraged element and the additional element would 
ultimately be a matter of individual or collective choice, and the issue 
of affordability does not arise. 
The Pensions Commission’s view was that it was untenable for the 
State to provide an earnings-related element within acceptable public 
expenditure limits (Pensions Commission 2005). The Commission 
also suggested that it would crowd out the flat-rate element. However, 
the pensions that it proposed were broadly the same as those proposed 
above for the earnings-related mandated element. In other words, the 
Commission concluded that it was not tenable for pensions at this 
level to come from an unfunded State plan like that suggested above,
whereas it was tenable for pensions of a broadly similar amount to 
come from funded private plans. So, it is not the size of the pension 
commitments that the Commission saw as the problem with having a 
State plan; it is simply the way in which those pension commitments 
are labeled. That is, the difficulty is political, not financial or technical. 
There are, of course, those who argue that funding the pension has 
a variety of intrinsic advantages, with the 1994 World Bank report be-
ing the classic example. Similarly, Hemming (1999) concluded that 
“theoretical arguments tend to be consistent with the view that funding 
will be associated with higher saving than pay-as-you-go,” although he 
went on to say that “convincing empirical support is missing.” How-
ever, Minns (2001) pointed out that, although the proponents of funding 
suggest that there are a range of advantages, their case depends ulti-
mately on the single argument that funding leads to greater saving and 
investment, which leads in turn to more economic growth and an en-
hanced ability to pay higher pensions in future. 
The problem for proponents of funding is that there is no sound 
basis for the argument that the funding of pensions promotes additional
growth. For example, Hughes (2000, p. 56) concluded that, “The bal-
ance of the evidence . . . does not show that pay-as-you-go state pensions 
significantly reduce saving or that funded occupational or personal pen-
sions significantly increase it.” Similarly, Orszag and Stiglitz (2001) 
included the idea that (funded) individual accounts raise national saving 
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as one of their 10 myths about (pay-as-you-go) social security systems. 
Barr (2001) concluded that, “The magnitude of the impact of funding 
on growth is controversial. Though there is some empirical evidence 
that funding contributes to higher savings in the USA, there is no robust 
evidence of a similar effect elsewhere.” Barr (2006) also reminds us of 
the point made by Atkinson (1999), that any analysis that ignores the 
benefits of the welfare state, while considering its cost, is deficient. In 
other words, there is no robust evidence in support of the link between 
greater pension saving and growth and that, even if there is such a link, 
there is no guarantee about the timing or the extent of any effect. 
What all this means is that, if we can afford the pensions proposed 
by the Pensions Commission on a funded basis, there is no logical rea-
son why they cannot be afforded through the State plan proposed in 
the previous section. The net effect will be the same, with pensioners 
receiving higher incomes; the only difference is in the way the cash 
flows are labeled. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents a short outline of what I imagine to be the 
ideal pension system for the United Kingdom. The focus is on the 
underlying structure, rather than the parameters for such a system, al-
though figures are suggested for the purposes of discussion. In outline, 
the suggested structure is as follows. 
A flat-rate mandatory element aimed at poverty prevention and re-
distribution of income should be provided by the State on an unfunded 
basis. This could provide a benefit of 60 percent of the median house-
hold income for a single person, which is equal to 25 percent of average 
revalued lifetime earnings for someone with median earnings. 
An earnings-related mandatory element that pays a risk-free mini-
mum level of pension should also be provided by the State on a basis 
that is unfunded but, in broad terms, cost-neutral to society. The sug-
gested target is to provide an income of 30 percent of the individual’s 
average revalued lifetime earnings in excess of a disregard that is equal 
to the flat-rate element. 
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An earnings-related additional element aimed at providing some 
individual flexibility about the level of pension that is secured could 
be provided though an occupational pension plan or some form of col-
lective provision. This form of provision should be encouraged by the 
State, either through tax relief or an alternative more equitable form of 
support. The suggested target is to provide up to a further 30 percent of 
an individual’s average revalued lifetime earnings in excess of a disre-
gard that is equal to the flat-rate element. 
Finally, an additional personal element is proposed to provide 
further flexibility for those who seek additional pensions. It would be 
based on personal accounts and is facilitated but not necessarily encour-
aged by the State. 
Such an approach would achieve the triple goal of providing socially
acceptable levels of benefit, ensuring the widest practical coverage of 
such benefits, and reducing the risks and costs to levels that are accept-
able across the income range. 
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Outline of the UK Pension System 
The UK’s pension system has one of the most developed systems of pri-
vate pension provision in the developed world, but this is coupled with one of 
the least generous State pension systems. This Appendix provides a short sum-
mary of how this works. Table 3A.1 gives a brief summary of the two current 
State pension systems. 
In 2004, the State system was estimated to deliver a gross replacement rate 
of 37 percent of earnings for current retirees who had enjoyed average earnings 
throughout their working lives and a replacement rate of 24 percent to those 
who had twice the average earnings. Since then, there has been some reform of 
the State system, with a relaxation of qualifying conditions and a move toward 
indexation of the basic State pension in line with earnings, rather than prices. 
However, this has been coupled with a move toward the transformation of the 
S2P into a second flat-rate pension by the year 2030 and an increase in the State 
pension age to 68, which will be achieved for both men and women by 2046. 
The key difference between the two elements of the State pension is that the 
S2P has more restrictive qualifying conditions than the basic pension. 
An important feature of the State pension system is that employees who 
have alternative private pension arrangements that are of an appropriate stan-
dard can contract out of the S2P. In doing so, they lose their entitlement to 
accrue the State earnings-related pension, and in return, they and their em-
ployer receive a rebate on their National Insurance contributions. The rebate 
is designed to be financially neutral to the State system. The conditions for 
contracting out are currently expressed in terms of either the ultimate benefits 
or the contributions to be paid, although the latter option is to be abolished by 
2012. In the longer term, when S2P becomes a flat-rate pension, it is envisaged 
that the system of contracting out will be abolished entirely. 
Only about two-fifths of those of working age accrue benefits in a private 
pension system. The rest depend on the inadequate level of State provision for 
their retirement incomes. This will begin to change from 2012 onward, when 
the government will start a phased introduction of a new system of personal 
accounts for employees who are not already in private pensions. Many of the 
details of this new system have yet to be decided, but it will be on a defined 
contribution basis, with total contributions of at least 8 percent of pensionable 
pay. It will also be based on mandatory enrollment, but members will have the 
right to opt out. Given that it will be on a funded basis and set at a compara-
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tively low level, it will take many years before it will have a significant impact 
on retirement provision. 
Out of the 14 million or so who do have some form of private pension 
provision, about 4 million workers accrue benefits through an individual ar-
rangement. In some cases, these individual arrangements are sponsored by the 
employer through what are known as stakeholder plans or group personal pen-
sions. However, these arrangements are almost invariably contract based, are 
taken out on a voluntary basis through insurance companies, and have little 
or no employer contributions. The other 10 million or so employees with pri-
vate pension provision are members of what are termed occupational pension 
schemes, which are typically plans sponsored by individual employers for their 
own employees. There are some multi-employer plans (e.g., within a particular 
industry), but these have limited coverage. Occupational plans are established, 
invariably by the employer, as part of the employment contract that they offer 
to employees. Although there is no requirement on employers to offer pension 
provision, most large employers do so and a significant proportion of medium-
sized employers do as well. Few small employers offer this sort of pension 
arrangement. 
Subject to various minimum standards for benefits laid down in legisla-
tion, it is up to the employer to decide what the plan provides, although in some 
cases it is the result of collective bargaining with appropriate trade unions. 
However, once established, there is a whole range of regulatory provisions that 
govern how these plans operate. There are also upper limits on benefits and 
contributions set by the tax authorities, in return for which plans enjoy various 
tax advantages. 
In the private sector, such plans are invariably funded and established on 
a trust basis, where the assets are held in a trust fund, which is legally sepa-
rate from the finances of the employer and the members. The great majority 
of assets are invested by the funds themselves, with the trustees appointing 
investment managers who make day-to-day investment decisions, within in-
vestment policies laid down by the trustees. A minority of assets, mainly in 
respect of the large number of relatively small plans, is held by insurance 
companies, although in effect, they are acting in a very similar role as the 
investment managers. 
Some public sector plans, mainly in local government, are also established 
on a funded basis. However, most public sector plans, including those for civil 
servants, health workers, the armed forces, and schoolteachers, are run on a 
pay-as-you-go basis, with benefits being paid out of general taxation. 
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Table 3A.1  Summary of UK State Pensions 
The basic state 
pension (BSP) 
The state second 
pension (S2P) 
A flat-rate benefit paid from age 65 for men and 60 for women 
born before April 6, 1950, increasing over a period of years to 
age 65 for women born after April 5, 1960 and to 68 for men and 
women born after April 5, 1978. 
Entitlement is based on payment of National Insurance 
contributions (effectively a payroll tax on employees and 
employers), with credits for periods of unemployment, sickness, 
and family responsibility. 
The benefit for someone with a full record of working years is 
currently £5,078 per year for a single person and £8,120 per year 
for a married couple (where the partner is not entitled to a full 
pension in their own right). 
Payments increase at least in line with average earnings. 
An earnings-related benefit paid at the same age as the BSP. 
Provides a pension of at least 20 percent of revalued average 
earnings between upper and lower limits, currently £40,040 and 
£5,044 per year, respectively. 
A higher proportion of earnings is provided for employees with 
lower levels of earnings, up to 40 percent for those with earnings 
that are currently less than £14,100. 
Payments are indexed to prices. 
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Notes 
1. A thought experiment is a proposal for an experiment that would test or illuminate 
a hypothesis, theory, or principle. 
2. As Keynes (1936, p. 383) said famously, “Practical men, who believe themselves 
to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some 
defunct economist.” 
3. See http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20070801230000/http://www 
.pensionscommission.org.uk/index.html. 
4. See http://www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/. 
5. This rate is sometimes referred to in the United Kingdom as the “official poverty 
line.” The issue is discussed in more detail at http://www.poverty.org.uk/summary/ 
income%20intro.shtml. 
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Public and Private Provision 
of Pensions and the Ideal 
Pension System for Ireland 
Gerard Hughes 
Jim Stewart 
School of Business, Trinity College Dublin 
Pension systems in many countries are far from ideal in terms of 
equity, efficiency, and viability. Pension reform has moved to center 
stage in most developed economies, but it is important to recognize that 
pension reform may not always result in improvement in pension pay-
ments or security.1 Many would dispute the statement in the EU Green 
Paper on pensions that, “Reforms have underpinned recent increases 
in effective retirement ages and opened new avenues to delivering ad-
equate incomes in a sustainable manner” (European Commission 2010, 
p. 5). As shown later, retired persons in Ireland are very dependent on 
state social security payments. Yet the EU Green Paper assumes “pub-
lic replacement rates will decline” and that “it is important to provide 
sufficient opportunities for complementary entitlements” (European 
Commission 2010, p. 8). 
Pension systems need reform, but change is costly for all stakehold-
ers, and hence pension systems have considerable path dependency. 
Reform that leads to the introduction of new sources of pension in-
come leads to the issue of how the new pension arrangements will be 
integrated with existing pension arrangements. If there is replacement, 
there may be considerable administrative costs. A new type of pension 
arrangement, such as an individual pension, is often introduced in addi-
tion to existing arrangements. This has happened in many EU countries 
(see Stewart and Hughes 2009) and leads to considerable inefficien-
cies resulting from multiple sources of income, often of relatively small 
amounts. 
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78 Hughes and Stewart 
Pension systems and government proposals for pension reform are 
driven by tax relief that disproportionately benefits those with higher 
incomes. But the main failure is the low level of income given to those 
in retirement. Although the Irish pension system needs reform, after 
several reviews and a government Green Paper, proposals for reform 
remain inadequate in a number of respects. 
IDENTIFYING PENSION REFORM ISSUES 
Reform must be evidence based, yet there are large data gaps in re-
lation to pension systems and the income and assets of retired persons. 
This is especially true of the Irish pension system. Three particular data 
gaps stand out: 
1) Despite the enormous cost of tax relief, it is not known whether 
the relief increases net resources for retirement. 
2) Few data are available on the incomes and assets of retired 
persons. We may surmise that the collapse of bank shares (the 
“blue chips”) has disproportionately affected a certain section 
of retired persons, but the extent to which this has happened is 
not known. 
3) Despite the encouragement and tax incentives to join funded 
pension systems, there are no data on the costs in terms of ad-
ministrative and other charges of running such plans. Instead 
a government Green Paper on pension reform (Department of 
Social and Family Affairs 2007a) relied on data from the UK 
pension system—a very different pension system because of 
its considerable economies of scale resulting from its larger 
size. One may surmise that administrative costs are higher in 
Ireland. The Green Paper refers to a “typical charge” of 1.5 
percent per year, but no evidence is offered to support this rate. 
Indeed, administrative and other charges are a key aspect of 
pension systems, but they are often ignored. Returns are nearly 
always given gross of costs, so that a gross return of 4.5 percent 
becomes a net 3.0 percent after costs. Over time this can have a 
dramatic effect on accumulating lump sums. 
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Perhaps the most important data issue is that projections, often for 
a 40-year period, are treated as facts. One prominent example is that the 
proportion of those aged 65 and over has been projected to increase, but 
the age structure of the population and crucially the size of the labor 
force is uncertain. The only certainty is that past demographic projec-
tions for Ireland have been wrong. A second example is that financial 
market returns are assumed to be constant. The dot com bubble and the 
recent crash were not forecast—they were assumed to be impossible. 
This issue is compounded by the false belief that equities will always 
outperform any other form of investment—that is, there is a positive 
equity risk premium (Stewart 2011, Table 3). The projected illustrated 
returns on the proposed auto-enrollment arrangement in the National 
Pensions Framework document are 7 percent per year real return over 
a 40-year period (Department of Social and Family Affairs 2010, Table 
4.1). This is an important assumption and is crucial to the proposed new 
pension plan. In contrast, the average return on group-managed pension 
funds for the 10-year period to April 2010 was 0.5 percent. The lat-
est group-managed pension fund returns are an improvement compared 
with previous years. 
Proposals for an ideal pension system should show how it will solve 
the problems of the existing system in relation to simplicity, adequacy, 
cost, equity, coverage, and effectiveness in delivering pensions. We will 
show how Ireland’s current pension system fails to meet many of these 
criteria and how an ideal system would enable all of them to be met. 
THE CONTEXT FOR REFORM 
Ireland has a population of about 4 million (see Table 4.1). Home 
ownership rates are high, with 80 percent of all households and 90 per-
cent of pensioner households owning their own homes. Life expectancy 
for men and women at age 65 is 15.4 years and 18.7 years, respectively. 
Although Ireland is committed to maintaining living standards in 
old age, the balance, in terms of policy, between public and private pro-
vision is struck in favor of private provision. Successive governments 
have taken the view that the role of the public social security pension 
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Table 4.1  Key Economic and Demographic Data for Ireland, 2006
Category 
Population (million) 4.2 
GDP current prices and current PPPsa, (US$, billion) 175.1 
GDP per capita, current prices and PPPs (US$) 41,300 
Home ownership rates: all households (%) 80 
Home ownership rates: households aged 65+ (%) 90 
Life expectancy in 2001 at age 65: male (years) 15.4
 female (years) 18.7 
a Purchasing power parity. 
SOURCE: GDP and GDP per capita: OECD in Figures; home ownership: Department 
of Social and Family Affairs (2007b, p. 26); life expectancy: Irish Life Table No. 14, 
2001–2003. 
system is to provide a minimum basic income that will prevent poverty 
in retirement. As the state social security pension is not sufficient for 
most people to maintain their living standard in retirement, the private 
sector pensions market is given generous tax relief on contributions 
and investment income to encourage individuals to make their own ar-
rangements to top up the flat-rate state pension with an earnings-related 
supplement from a private pension provider. 
The Pension System in Ireland 
The structure of the pension system in Ireland reflects successive 
governments’ conceptions about the role of the state. Table 4.2 shows 
that the structure of the Irish pension system is relatively simple. It is 
based on a partnership approach between government, employers, and 
employees. It consists of a compulsory state social insurance system 
(social security), which levies contributions at a range of proportional 
rates for different classes of contributors and pays flat-rate benefits, and 
a voluntary private system, which is subsidized through the tax system. 
The social insurance system provides a state pension (transition) at age 
65 that requires withdrawal from the labor force for one year and a 
state pension (contributory) at age 66 that does not require withdrawal 
from the labor force. In addition, a means-tested state pension (non-
contributory) is provided for those not covered by the social security 
system. The amounts paid by the transition and contributory pensions 
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Table 4.2  Structure of Ireland’s Pension System 
First tier: Mandatory public pension
system—flat-rate social welfare pensions 
Social insurance (employees) Social assistance (not in workforce or 
not qualifying for social insurance) 
Age 65: state pension (transition) 
Age 66: state pension (contributory) Age 66: state pension (non-
contributory) 
Second tier: Voluntary private pension
system—occupational and personal pensions 
Occupational (employees) Personal (self-employed and 
employees) 
Defined benefit Retirement Annuity Contract (RAC) 
Defined contribution Personal Retirement Savings Account 
(PRSA) 
SOURCE: Department of Social and Family Affairs, http://www.dsfa.ie. 
are the same, while the non-contributory pension has usually been about 
10 percent less than the social security pension, although the difference 
is currently just 5 percent. For convenience, these three pensions will 
be referred to as the social welfare pension where it is not necessary to 
distinguish among them. 
An important feature of the Irish pension system is that the state so-
cial security pension is integrated with occupational pension payments 
for most defined benefit plans, so that both payments combined can-
not exceed an agreed replacement rate. This means that an increase in 
state social security pensions may reduce payments from occupational 
pension plans. For this reason, employers with defined benefit plans 
welcome increases in social welfare payments. 
The private pension system has two components: occupational pen-
sion plans and personal pension plans. Occupational plans are provided 
on a voluntary basis by employers for groups of employees. Personal 
pension plans are for employees who are not covered by an occupa-
tional plan or individuals who are not employed. Personal plans take 
the form of Retirement Annuity Contracts (RAC) for the self-employed 
and Personal Retirement Savings Accounts (PRSA) for everyone else. 
In the past, most of the workplace plans were defined benefit pen-
sions. Consequently, they were supposed to provide a guaranteed 
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benefit that would replace up to two-thirds of preretirement earnings 
for employees who spent their full career with one employer. In the last 
10 years or so, many defined benefit pension plans have been closed to 
new entrants. They have been replaced by defined contribution plans 
because most employers are no longer willing to guarantee new en-
trants to the labor force a pension related to length of service and level 
of final earnings. The benefits that a member of an occupational or in-
dividual defined contribution plan can expect will depend on how much 
is contributed to the plan, how well the plan is managed, and the perfor-
mance of stocks, shares, and other assets. All of the investment risk in 
defined contribution plans is borne by employees or the self-employed 
rather than by employers. 
Although the structure of the pension system is relatively simple, 
operating it has become complex because of the variety of categories 
of workers contributing to the public social security system and the 
large buildup of pension and tax law required to regulate private pen-
sion funds and the drawdown of pension benefits. 
Pensioner Poverty Rates and the Level of State Social
Security Pensions 
Considerable progress has been made in recent years in reducing 
poverty among pensioners by increasing the social welfare pension, 
where poverty is defined as a retirement income of below 60 percent of 
average earnings. Figure 4.1 shows that the percentage of pensioners at 
risk of poverty increased from 20 percent in 1997 to over 36 percent in 
2003, primarily due to the failure of the social welfare pension to keep 
pace with increases in average industrial earnings during a period of 
rapid earnings growth. Since then, however, the social welfare pension 
has increased faster than workers’ earnings and the rate fell to just over 
11 percent in 2008.2 
The increases in the social welfare pension in 2004 and subsequent 
years have significantly improved Ireland’s ranking in international 
comparisons of pensioner poverty. Using a comparable measure of 
relative income poverty for all EU27 countries, Figure 4.2 shows that 
Ireland’s pensioner poverty rate of 21 percent in 2008 was a little over 
the average EU27 rate of 19 percent.3 Nevertheless, the fact that one-
fifth of pensioners were at risk of poverty in 2008 indicates that there 
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Figure 4.1 Percentage of People Age 65 and Over in Ireland at Risk of 










SOURCE: Whelan et al. (2003) and Central Statistics Office (2009). 
is some way to go to eliminate pensioner poverty in Ireland. The very 
low pensioner poverty rate for New Zealand, which has a flat-rate state 
social security pension similar to the social welfare pension in Ireland, 
indicates what could be achieved if Ireland were prepared to increase 
the level of the social welfare pension above the poverty level. 
Some progress has been made toward this objective. Figure 4.3 
shows that the level of the social security and social assistance pensions 
for couples relative to average industrial earnings changed little be-
tween 1994 and 2000. In 2001, the government began to respond to the 
large increase in pensioner poverty that had occurred when the economy
was booming during the 1997–2000 period by starting to increase pen-
sions faster than earnings. This policy resulted in the gap between social 
security and social assistance pensions and the 60 percent poverty line 
for a couple narrowing from about 6 and 10 percentage points, respec-
tively, in 2003 to 4 and 7 percentage points in 2008. 
These improvements have, therefore, brought the social security 
and social assistance pensions to within striking distance of the poverty 
line of 60 percent of average earnings. It would be perfectly feasible for 
the Irish government to increase the social welfare pension to a level 
%
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Figure 4.2 Percentage of People Age 65 and Over at Risk of Poverty 
Relative to the 60 Percent Poverty Line for People Age 65 and 















SOURCE: Zaidi (2010) and Ministry of Social Development (2005). 
that would virtually eliminate pensioner poverty, as has been done in 
New Zealand with a similar flat-rate state pension. Callan, Nolan, and 
Walsh (2007) have shown that an increase in the social welfare pension 
to bring it above the poverty level would require only 837 ($1,071) 
million euros (€) of the €1,462 ($1,871) million increase in revenue the 
Exchequer (government treasury department) could raise by giving tax 
relief on private pension contributions at the standard rate of tax rather 
than at the marginal rate of tax.4 
On its own, increasing the social welfare pension would not resolve 
the complications resulting from incomplete contribution records for 
the social security pension, the means test for the social assistance pen-
sion, rules about dependency, the retirement condition required for the 
social security state pension (transition), and the interaction of the social 
welfare pension with private pensions, which creates uncertainty about 
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Figure 4.3 Social Insurance, Social Assistance Pension, and the 60 
Percent Poverty Line for a Couple Relative to Average 
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how much to save and results in the loss of private pension benefits for 
low-paid members of some occupational defined benefit pension plans. 
Women in Ireland are particularly disadvantaged by the social se-
curity and private pension systems because women provide most of the 
care required by children and elderly relatives. Consequently, their work 
histories are more irregular than those of men, and it is more difficult 
for women to qualify for either a social welfare or a private pension. 
As the purpose of Ireland’s flat-rate social welfare pension is to prevent 
poverty in old age, these problems could ideally be addressed by intro-
ducing a universal state social security pension to eliminate the means 
test and differential payments to pensioners whose needs are the same. 
The introduction of a universal pension would require an increase 
in public expenditure. This is the primary reason why a universal state 
social security pension was ruled out in the Green Paper on Pensions 
(Department of Social and Family Affairs 2007a). However, as already 
noted, there is some scope for increasing current expenditure on pen-
sions because Ireland has operated a very favorable tax regime for 
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Figure 4.4 Actual Expenditures on Social Welfare Pensions and Tax 
Expenditures on Pensions, 1980–2007 
4,000 































NOTE: There is a break in the tax expenditure series in 2004 and 2005, and the figures 
for 2006 and 2007 are not comparable with those for previous years because of a 
change in the method of estimation. 
SOURCE: Social welfare pensions: Hughes (1985, Table A4) and Statistical Reports 
of the Department of Social and Family Affairs. Pensions tax expenditure: Statistical 
Reports of the Revenue Commissioners. 
pensions to encourage the development of the private pension system. 
Figure 4.4 indicates that the cost of tax relief was initially fairly mod-
est, but it has grown rapidly over the last three decades. As argued later, 
reducing tax relief would enable the payment of higher social welfare 
pensions. 
In 1980, the earliest year for which the Revenue Commissioners esti-
mated the cost of the tax relief for occupational pensions, it amounted 
to about €51 ($64) million. By 1990, its cost had increased more than 
five times to €283 ($362) million. In the year 2000, just before the dot 
com bubble burst, the Exchequer was forgoing about the same amount 
in tax revenue, €1.5 ($1.92) billion, as it was spending on state social
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Figure 4.5 Exchequer Expenditures on Social Welfare Pensions, Pension 
Tax Relief, and the Aggregate for Both, 1980–2007 (as a 
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NOTE: There is a break in the tax expenditure series in 2004 and 2005, and the figures 
for 2006 and 2007 are not comparable with those for previous years because of a 
change in the method of estimation. 
SOURCE: Annual Statistical Reports of the Department of Social and Family Affairs 
and the Revenue Commissioners. 
security pensions, €1.6 ($2.05) billion, for those aged 65 and over. In 
the Finance Act of 2004, steps were taken to improve the quality of data 
on pension contributions by requiring employers to provide details in 
their annual P35 tax return form of aggregate employer and employee 
contributions to pension plans. When the results of the new method of 
estimation were published in the Green Paper on Pensions (Department 
of Social and Family Affairs 2007a), they showed that the cost of tax 
relief for private pensions was significantly higher than had been shown 
by previous estimates. In 2006, the cost of the tax relief amounted to 
€2.9 ($3.7) billion—almost the same as the amount the Exchequer 
spent, €3.2 ($4.1) billion, on state pensions for older people. In 2007, 
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the cost of the tax relief fell to €2.6 ($3.3) billion as a consequence of 
the financial crisis, while the cost of state social security pensions in-
creased to €3.9 ($5.0) billion. 
If the cost of tax forgone on private pensions is taken into account, 
we get a different perspective on pension costs. Figure 4.5 shows the 
cost of public expenditure and tax expenditure on pensions in Ireland 
relative to GNP over the period 1980–2007. At the beginning of the pe-
riod in 1980, the cost of the state social security pension was 3.3 percent 
of GNP, while the cost of the pension tax expenditure was 0.4 percent 
of GNP. The cost of the social security pension increased to 4 percent of 
GNP up to 1985, while the cost of the pension tax expenditure remained 
around one-tenth of that at 0.4 percent of GNP. From 1985 to 2003, the 
cost of the social security pension fell continuously to about 2 percent 
of GNP while the cost of the pension tax expenditure more than tripled 
to 1.4 percent of GNP as the government pursued its policy of develop-
ing the private pension system. Between 2000 and 2001, the cost of the 
pension tax expenditure fell as a result of the collapse of the dot com 
bubble. However, it recovered quickly and it rose to 1.9 percent of GNP
in 2006 before falling back to 1.6 percent in 2007 as a consequence of 
the financial crisis. 
Adding the cost of the tax relief for private pensions in Ireland to 
the cost of public social security expenditure on pensions provides a 
different perspective on the issue of the affordability of a universal state 
pension in Ireland. The addition of the tax expenditure on the private 
pension system in Ireland indicates that the resource cost of supporting 
the public social security and private pension systems has fluctuated 
around 4 percent between 1980 and 2007. There is scope, therefore, for 
reallocating resources between the public and private components of 
the pension system. 
PROBLEMS WITH THE PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM 
The way in which pension tax relief is allocated to members of oc-
cupational and individual pension plans is inequitable. Figure 4.6 shows 
the distribution by income quintile of the tax relief on self-employed in 
1999–2000 and employee contributions to occupational pension funds 
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Figure 4.6 Distribution by Income Quintile of Tax Relief on Pension 
Contributions by Employees in 2000 and Self-Employed 
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SOURCE: Hughes (2007, Figure 3.12). 
in the year 2000. The distribution for both employment groups is much 
the same—the bulk of the tax relief accrues to the top 20 percent of 
earners (quintile 5 in Figure 4.6), while the bottom 20 percent receive 
virtually nothing. Two-thirds of the tax relief for employees and three-
quarters of the relief for the self-employed accrued to people in the 
highest income quintile. The bottom 20 percent of employees and the 
self-employed received only 1.1 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively, 
of the tax relief. The distribution of the tax relief for the self-employed 
is more concentrated than it is for employees because the pension cov-
erage rate for the self-employed is significantly lower than it is for 
employees. 
The distribution of tax relief is concentrated at the top end of the 
earnings distribution because the effective limits on employee contri-
butions in Ireland were largely determined by the maximum pension 
permitted under Revenue Commissioners rules that would attract tax 
relief, rather than by a maximum contribution. In Ireland, the pension 
benefit could not exceed two-thirds of pensionable salary, so this put an 
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upper bound on how much could be contributed, although it varied with 
age and level of earnings. 
Pension tax relief in Ireland is intended to increase the coverage 
of the private pension system and to provide an earnings-related sup-
plement to the social welfare pension. Hence, one would expect the 
coverage of occupational pension plans to have risen over the last 20 
years and the social welfare pension to be less important than private 
pensions in delivering an income in retirement. Let us consider, there-
fore, what has happened to private pension coverage and how effective 
public and private provision are in delivering retirement income to the 
older population. 
Trends in the Coverage of Occupational Pensions 
Figure 4.7 shows that the occupational pension coverage rate de-
clined by 8 percentage points from 1985 to 1999. From 2000 to 2009, 
however, much of the ground lost was recovered so that the coverage 
rate was just under 45 percent at the start and end of the period shown in 












SOURCE: Hughes (2007, Figure 3.13) and authors’ estimates. 
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Figure 4.7. A factor that may have contributed to this recovery was the 
very strong employment growth experienced between 1995 and 2006 
when Ireland’s economy grew at rates that were unprecedented since 
Independence in 1921. 
It is evident, therefore, that the policy of providing generous tax re-
lief to encourage the growth of occupational pension plans has not been 
effective in increasing pension coverage over the last 25 years. This 
failure has been compounded by a switch in coverage from occupa-
tional defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans, as Figure 4.8 
shows. The switch to defined contribution plans places a big obstacle 
in the path to the achievement of the Pensions Board target of replacing 
50 percent of preretirement income because the difference between the 
target for the social insurance pension (34 percent of average earnings) 
and the overall target has to be made up by a private pension.5 The deci-
sion by employers to replace defined benefit with defined contribution 
Figure 4.8 Percentage of Workers Covered by Defined Benefit (DB) and 














SOURCE: Pensions Board Annual Reports. 
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plans for most new entrants to the labor force means that there can be 
no certainty about what average level of pension the private sector can 
deliver. 
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the average level of pension 
that can now be delivered by the private pension system, Ireland has 
put a lot of effort during the last 10 years into the development of 
a personal pension option in the hope that it would help to increase 
the pension coverage rate. The government’s advisory body on pen-
sions, the Pensions Board, identified a number of barriers to improving 
pension coverage (see Pensions Board 1998). It recommended that a 
standardized, low-cost personal retirement savings option should be 
made widely available irrespective of employment status. 
The government accepted the Board’s recommendation, and it in-
troduced the PRSA in 2003 for employees and others not covered by 
an occupational plan or an RAC. The government made it mandatory 
for employers to designate a PRSA provider, but it did not require the 
employer to make a contribution on behalf of employees. Age-related 
tax incentives were provided to encourage people to start saving for 
retirement. Anyone under the age of 30 taking out a PRSA is allowed 
to claim tax relief on contributions of up to 15 percent of earnings. The 
percentage of earnings on which tax relief can be claimed increases 
with age until it reaches 40 percent for those aged 60 and over. 
PRSAs operate like defined contribution pension plans, but their 
charges are considerably higher than those for occupational plans as 
they do not benefit from the economies of scale accruing to group plans. 
It was hoped that tax relief, and the mandatory requirement for employ-
ers to provide access to a PRSA, would result in a significant increase 
in pension coverage within five years of the introduction of the PRSA. 
This expectation has not been met. Seven years after the introduction of 
PRSAs, coverage had increased by only 2 percentage points, from 52 
percent in the first quarter of 2002 to 54 percent in first quarter of 2008. 
The failure of a voluntary approach to increasing pension cover-
age has resulted in the publication of a National Pensions Framework 
(Department of Social and Family Affairs 2010) in which the govern-
ment proposes to increase coverage by introducing an auto-enrollment 
plan for employees who are not covered by their employer’s plan. Very 
few details are provided about how this plan will work. It is worth not-
ing that the option of a quasi-mandatory addition to the Irish pension 
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system was considered in the Green Paper on Pensions and a decision 
was deferred because “It would be useful, perhaps, to allow time for 
more evidence on performance of soft mandatory schemes elsewhere 
to emerge, particularly from New Zealand” (Department of Social and 
Family Affairs 2007a, par. 8.54). To date, the government has not pro-
duced any evaluation of how the auto-enrollment plan has worked in 
New Zealand, but St John, Littlewood, and Dale (2010) have shown 
that the New Zealand plan has required significant subsidies from the 
government to achieve the large number of enrollments that have oc-
curred to date. 
EFFECTIVENESS OF PENSION DELIVERY 
A key issue in designing an ideal pension system is determining 
how effective the public and private components are in delivering pen-
sions. One way to look at this issue is in terms of what proportion of the 
target population actually receives income from each component. 
Despite all the tax relief, the long-term existence of occupational 
pensions, and various government initiatives, state welfare pensions and 
other transfer payments provide the bulk of income to retired persons. 
These and other points can be deduced from Household Budget survey 
data for the 2004–2005 period. The data consist of a randomly cho-
sen cross-section survey of 6,884 households. Because the raw data are 
based on households,6 they were converted into a per capita equivalent 
basis using standard adjustment techniques. Table 4.3 shows the num-
bers of those aged 65 and over reporting income from various sources. 
Not all of those aged 65 and over report pension income, but the num-
ber of people reporting occupational pension income is less than half 
of those included in the survey. Over 70 percent of respondents report 
income from the state social security pension; slightly over 50 percent 
report financial income and just under 30 percent report earned income. 
Table 4.4 shows income per capita broken down by various sources. 
The main features of Table 4.4 are as follows: 
• Mean and median gross income decline with age, except for 
income from state welfare pensions. 
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• Income from various state welfare pensions accounts for 38 
percent of total income for those aged 65–74 and 53 percent of 
income for those aged over 75. 
• Mean income from occupational pension coverage is low, and 
median values are zero, indicating that most of those included 
in the survey do not receive an occupational pension. 
• Financial sources of income are low and highly skewed; the 
median values are zero. 
• Non-pension income accounts for 28 percent of mean income 
for those aged 65–74 and 13 percent of those aged 75+. This 
represents a significant reliance of retired persons on sources 
of retirement income other than pension income, mostly repre-
senting paid work. 
The small number of those with occupational pensions is surprising, 
but it is of interest to examine incomes for those reporting occupational 
pension income. Table 4.5 shows income data for those with pensions 
from state employment. Even for those with occupational pensions 
from state employment, state social welfare payments are important, 
accounting for 30 percent of mean pension income for those aged 75+, 
or 38 percent of median pension income. Mean income from financial 
assets is higher than for the entire survey group but still low. Non-
pension income is lower than for retired persons as a group in the sur-
vey, at 18 percent of mean income. 
Table 4.5 also shows the same data for those who report pension 
income from non-state employment. The gross income and pension 
income are lower for all age groups compared with those who report 
pension income from state employment. For example, for those 75 and 
older, median pension income is almost 30 percent lower than those re-
porting pension income from state employment. The gap is even larger 
for those aged 65–74 (35 percent). However, gross incomes are closer, 
at about 81 percent of the level of those with a pension from state em-
ployment because financial income and income from paid work are 
higher. 
Table 4.5 also shows an inequality in pension income (and gross 
income) between those groups reporting pension income from state 
employment as compared with those reporting pension income from 
non-state employment. The median pension income as a percentage of 
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Table 4.3  Numbers of Those Aged 65 and Over Reporting Income from Various Sources 
Income from Income from Income from all 
Gross Total pension state other state social 
household income from employment employment security Financial Earned and other 
Age income (€) all sources (€) pension pension pensionsa income income 
65–74  871  831  138  257  630
 475 314 
75+  573  557
 81  136
 440  251 
107 
Total 1,444  1,388
 219  393
 1,070  726 421 
NOTE: The cells do not sum to the number of respondents in the survey because some people reported income from multiple sources. 
a State old-age pension, state retirement pension, widows’ pensions, and blind person’s pension. 
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Table 4.4  Sources of Pension Income (€ per week) 
96 
Income Income Income 
Total gross Total pension from state from other from all state Total other 
household income from employment employment social security financial Earned and 
incomea all sources pension pensions pensionsa income other income 
Age N Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. 
65–74  871 339 242 221 185 43.2 0 48.4 0 129 166 10.5 0.4 83.7 0 
75+  573 276 203 219 187 35.1 0 37.8 0 146 176  9.6 0.0 27.3 0 
Total 1,444 314 216 220 187 40.0 0 44.2 0 136 173 11.0 0.1 61.3 0 
NOTE: Not all income is shown by source. Hence the individual rows do not sum to total gross mean income. 
a State old-age pension, state retirement pension, widows’ pensions, and blind person’s pension. 
In order to view























   
 
                                      
                                     
                                      
                                      
                                      
                                      
                                        
                                        
                                       
 
97 
Table 4.5  Income for Those Reporting Pension Income from State Employment Pensions, Non-State Employment 
Pensions, and No Occupational Pensions (€ per week) 
Income Income Income 
Total gross Total pension from state from other from all state Total other 
household income from employment employment social security financial Total earned 
incomea all sources pension pensions pensionsa income income 
Age N Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. 
State employment pension 
65–74 138 465 413 377 370 273 238 12 0 92 101 14 6 61 0 
75+ 81 444 387 378 356 248 214 15 0 115 135 19 2 28 0 
Total 219 457 403 377 359 264 230 13 0 100 105 16 4 49 0 
Non-state employment pension 
65–74 257 424 334 295 242 16 0 164 0 115 132 19 2 91 0 
75+ 136 355 293 289 252 15 0 159 0 114 138 14 0 25 0 
Total 393 400 326 293 244 16 0 162 0 115 132 17 1 68 0 
No occupational pension 
65–74 498 267 193 145 174 0 0 0 0 145 174 4 0 88 0 
75+ 367 218 193 163 180 0 0 0 0 163 180 5 0 29 0 
Total 865 246 193 153 175 0 0 0 0 153 175 4 0 63 0 
NOTE: Not all income is shown by source. Hence the individual rows do not sum to total gross mean income. 
a State old-age pension, state retirement pension, widows’ pensions, and blind person’s pension. 
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pension Male Female 
occupational 
pension Male Female 
65–75 235  87  148  125  54  71 
75+ 222  69  153  98  38  60 
Total 457 156  301  223  92 131 
average income varies between 73 and 87 percent for those reporting 
pension income from non-state employment, compared with 94 to 98 
percent for those reporting income from state employment. 
Gross income and pension incomes of those with pension income 
from non-state employment, while lower than those with pension in-
come from state employment, is still higher than the average pension 
income of all retired persons in the survey. The reason for this is the 
much lower pension income of those with no occupational pension in-
come, as shown in Table 4.5. The gap between median pension income 
and median gross income is not large, but the gap between mean gross 
income and mean pension income is the largest in percentage terms of 
the separate groups examined. This reflects the relatively higher contri-
bution to income from paid work for this group 
Apart from considerable differences in pension income between 
those who report occupational pension income as compared with those 
who do not, there are also large differences in pension income by gender. 
Table 4.6 shows the gender of those reporting no occupational incomes 
for single-person households only. People without an occupational pen-
sion are predominantly female. There are nearly twice as many single 
females as males living alone without any occupational pension. 
Although not shown in the table, their incomes are one-third to one-half 
of those with occupational pensions. Females also make up the majority 
(60 percent) of those living alone with an occupational pension. 
Table 4.7 shows occupational pension income broken down by 
state employment pension, non-state employment pension, and gender 
for single-person households (hence the numbers of respondents are 
smaller). Median pension income is highest for females with a state oc-
cupational pension, and there is also less dispersion in female pension 
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Table 4.7  Occupational Pension Income (€ per week) by Gender 
State pension income Non-state pension income 
Male Female Male Female 
Age N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
65–74 19 272 217 31 304 333 35 219 140 40 168 154 
75+ 11 375 214 22 230 239 29 182 144 39 151 120 
Total 30 310 215 53 274 268 64 202 142 79 159 125 
NOTE: Not all income is shown by source. Hence the individual rows do not sum to total gross mean income. 
a State old-age pension, state retirement pension, widows’ pensions, and blind person’s pension. 
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SOURCE: Department of Social and Family Affairs (2007a, Table 4.4). 
income—the mean and median values are much closer in all cases. For 
those reporting non-state occupational pension income, the median in-
come is higher for males aged 75+ but not for those aged 65–74. 
Finally, the minor role that the private pension system and other 
sources of income play in providing retirement incomes in Ireland be-
comes even more evident when the data are disaggregated by income 
quintile to show how much income pensioners in different quintiles re-
ceive from each income source (Figure 4.9). State pensions account for 
almost all of the income received by pensioners in the first four quin- 
tiles. Private pensions and other income provide a significant part of 
total income only to the group at the top of the income distribution. 
Private pensions, investments, and earnings provide around three-
quarters of the total income of pensioners with the highest incomes. 
This is hardly surprising given the skewed distribution of pension tax 
relief in favor of the highest earners. 
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THE FAILURES AND SUCCESSES OF IRELAND’S
PENSION SYSTEM 
Our evaluation of the pension system in Ireland in terms of sim-
plicity, adequacy, cost, equity, coverage, and effectiveness in delivering 
pensions leads to a number of conclusions. The main defect of the Irish 
public pension system is that it has failed to eliminate pensioner poverty. 
Successive governments’ preferences for a public system that provides 
only a subsistence income in retirement and for a private system that is 
supposed to provide an earnings-related top-up has focused attention on 
the cost of the public social security system while the cost of Exchequer 
support for private pensions has been largely ignored. The cost of the 
tax expenditure for private pensions in Ireland is now nearly as great 
as the cost of direct expenditure on the public social security system. 
Consequently, when the cost of the tax expenditure is factored in, the 
aggregate cost of pension provision has fluctuated around 4 percent of 
GNP for the last 30 years. 
Contrary to expectations, the provision of generous tax relief for 
private pensions has not increased the coverage of occupational pen-
sions. Most of the benefits of the tax relief for private pensions have 
been appropriated by the very highest earners. This occurs at the ex-
pense of taxpayers, most of whom generally receive little benefit from 
the favorable tax treatment of private pensions. 
PROPOSED REFORMS: NATIONAL
PENSIONS FRAMEWORK 
The recently published National Pensions Framework (Department 
of Social and Family Affairs 2010) sets out the government strategy on 
pensions. It states that the government “will seek to sustain” the state 
social security pension at 35 percent of average weekly earnings. It is 
currently at 32 percent. It will also become easier for some groups to 
qualify. There will be tax reform, but rather than granting all relief at the 
standard 20 percent rate, relief will be granted at a 33 percent rate, and 
rather than eliminating the tax exemption from lump sum payments, the 
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maximum tax-free lump sum will be reduced to €200,000 ($256,000), 
which exempts from tax the lump sum payable to the most senior civil 
servants. 
The National Pensions Framework proposes an individual pension 
plan in addition to those already in existence (Additional Voluntary 
Contribution, PRSA, Approved Retirement Fund, and others) but only 
for those without pension coverage (Department of Social and Family 
Affairs 2010, pp. 29–31). This proposed plan has all the signs of an ini-
tiative led by the pension industry. There will be auto-enrollment (with 
an opt-out option), funds will be invested, and as noted above there is 
the typical industry analysis of returns assuming a constant 7 percent 
per year, in real terms, for 40 years (Department of Social and Family 
Affairs 2010, Table 4.1, p. 32). 
It is most unlikely that this plan will succeed in providing adequate 
retirement income. The contribution periods of workers will be less than 
forecast, given periods of unemployment, working abroad, or caring for 
children and other family members. Financial market returns will cer-
tainly not be as forecast. In addition, the proposed contribution level as 
a proportion of salary is too low (8 percent) to provide retirement in-
come as forecast in government proposals. In addition, the proposals do 
not attempt to quantify the extra risk borne by members of the new plan. 
There is a danger that employers will see this new plan as a cheaper
alternative to existing plans because they may contribute 2 percent 
of salary to the new plan, whereas contributions to existing defined 
contribution plans have been reported to be 11 percent of salary and 
contributions to defined benefit plans are 16 percent of salary. More 
recently a figure of 6 percent has been cited as the average contribution 
rate to defined contribution plans. Thus employers may seek to switch 
employees from an existing defined benefit, or more likely defined con-
tribution plan, to the new cheaper plan. A similar trend has occurred in 
the United States with 401(k) plans. 
The cost of the new plan (managing funds, a tracking mechanism 
to keep track of mobile workers, and managing dormant accounts) will 
be expensive, as has been shown to be true in Australia. For small ac-
counts, fees over time could reduce sums considerably. 
Government proposals also involve reform of pensions in relation 
to state employment. The main proposed reforms for new entrants in-
volve increasing the retirement age to 66 and basing pensions on career 
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average earnings. The main proposal in relation to existing and future 
public service employees is that the consumer price index rather than fi-
nal salary will be used as the basis for post-retirement pension increases. 
The new government proposals have nothing to say about the Na-
tional Pension Reserve Fund. Perhaps this is because the reserve fund is 
now essentially a vehicle to provide finance to the Irish banking system. 
Originally it was intended to partially prefund future state employee 
and social welfare pensions and was hailed by some commentators as 
the most important initiative in a decade. 
The government-proposed reforms have little to offer to members 
of defined benefit plans in actuarial deficit. A particular concern for 
many employees is that their employer may be unprofitable or insolvent 
as a result of property speculation, over-borrowing, and extraordinarily 
poor management. 
The government proposals, however, devote some space to ad-
vocating programs of financial education for individuals relating to 
retirement planning and summarizing the considerable state effort at 
financial education for individuals. However, financial education is not 
the key to successful retirement planning or financial decision making, 
as Ghillarducci (2008, p. 137) notes. 
Finally, there is a proposal that the earliest age at which the state 
social security pension can be received will increase to 68 starting in 
2014. There is no discussion of enhanced benefits as a result. Increas-
ing the retirement age may be welcome by some groups with particular 
skills, for example, professional groups such as lawyers. But for those 
working in hazardous or physically demanding employment, increasing 
the retirement age could substantially reduce the period of retirement. It 
is therefore regressive, representing a transfer from those who are less 
well off and with lower life expectancies to those who are better off and 
with higher life expectancies. 
These proposed reforms do not address the issues of equity and ef-
ficiency. The ultimate viability of any pension system depends on the 
future productivity of an economy. Unless issues of equity and effi-
ciency are addressed, future productivity will be adversely affected. 
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THE KEY TO DEVELOPING AN IDEAL PENSION SYSTEM 
FOR IRELAND 
Despite the poor performance of private pensions, the National 
Pensions Framework proposals for the future development of the pen-
sion system aim to maintain the social welfare pension at a subsistence 
level of about one-third of average earnings and to try to increase the 
coverage of the private pension system. It is hoped this can be done 
by automatically enrolling employees who are not covered by an oc-
cupational plan in individual pension accounts that would be managed 
by the private sector. This proposal flies in the face of the evidence that 
the social security public pension system is far more effective than the 
private system in delivering pensions and in providing the bulk of re-
tirement income. Only a small minority of pensioners at the top of the 
income distribution receive significant benefits from the private pen-
sion system. 
The evidence on the performance of the two components of Ire-
land’s pension system strongly suggests that the opposite should be 
done in an ideal system. There should be a larger role for the public 
component rather than for the private component of the pension system. 
The current system could be developed in ways that draw on the 
strengths of the public component and begin to correct the inequita-
ble treatment of taxpayers who gain little from tax relief for private 
pensions. Ireland is not, of course, starting with a clean slate. Pension 
systems are to some extent path dependent, so it is not being suggested 
that Ireland should ignore what has been done in the past. What would 
be possible is to change the balance of pension provision in favor of the 
social security public system. 
Elements of an Ideal Pension System for Ireland 
The evidence presented above shows that the public component of 
the pension system is doing a far better job of delivering an income 
in retirement than the private component, that it is currently providing 
retirement income for over 90 percent of pensioners, and that its ben-
efits are not high enough to prevent poverty in old age. To build on the 
strengths of the social security public pension system and to address 
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its weaknesses, the TCD Pension Policy Research Group (see Hughes 
2007; McCashin 2005; Stewart 2005) proposed that the tax incentives 
for private pensions should be at the standard rate of tax rather than the 
marginal rate; the flat-rate social welfare pension should be increased 
to 40 percent of earnings to bring it above the poverty level; it should 
become a universal benefit, similar to New Zealand’s superannuation, 
which would be payable to every pensioner on the basis of residence 
in the country for a specific period of years; and a second-tier social 
security pension should be introduced to top up the universal pension to 
50 percent of earnings. 
A universal social security pension funded out of general taxation 
would be distinctively redistributive, it would ensure pensions as of right 
for men and women, and it would abolish the means test for pensions. 
The transformation of the current social security system into a second-
tier earnings-related pension recognizes the strong social and political 
attachment to work-based pensions in Ireland. The social security 
pension would not require dependents’ additions because dependents 
would be entitled to a pension in their own right under the proposal for 
a universal state social security pension. This would strengthen the role 
of social security as a benefit derived from participation in the labor 
force. The pension could be flat rate, as it is now, or it could be related 
to earnings. This design “recognises the fact that a pensions system, of 
necessity, must incorporate a number of competing values, that reform 
must build to some extent on existing provisions and expectations, and 
command broad public support” (McCashin 2005, p. 117). 
At present, Ireland is using social security pensions to try to achieve 
a number of different objectives: the prevention of poverty in old age; 
the provision of support for pensioners’ dependents; the maintenance of 
contribution records during periods of unemployment, illness, or tem-
porary withdrawal from the labor force; and the provision of adequate 
income during retirement. It is difficult to achieve this multiplicity of 
objectives with just one instrument. The introduction of a universal 
state social security pension and a state earnings-related pension would 
separate the goal of poverty prevention from that of income mainte-
nance and permit the development of policies that would have a better 
chance of achieving each objective. 
The increase in the state basic social security pension would be 
paid for by giving tax relief for private pensions at the standard rate of 
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Table 4.8  Distribution of Gains and Losses from Using the Standard Tax 
Rate for Pension Tax Relief and Increasing the Social Welfare 
Pension Above the Poverty Level and Percentage Change in 
Income by Income Decile, 2005 
Income decile Gain or loss (€ million) Percentage change in income 
1 10.80 0.6 
2 160.10 6.4 
3 264.80 10.0 
4 122.80 3.3 
5 26.40 0.5 
6 −18.70 −0.3 
7 −58.10 −0.8 
8 −137.60 −1.7 
9 −299.90 −3.1 
10 −435.60 −3.1 
All −365.00 −0.6 
NOTE: The Social Welfare Pension is assumed to increase by €38 per week. 
SOURCE: Callan, Keane, and Walsh (2009, Tables 5.1 and 5.4). 
tax. The earnings-related component would be paid for by increasing 
employer and employee Pay Related Social Insurance Contributions 
(PRSI) and using some of the revenue released by standard rating the 
tax relief of private pensions. This approach would enable Ireland to 
eliminate pensioner poverty at a cost it could afford and at the same 
time contribute to the long-term sustainability of the public social se-
curity pension system. This approach also has the very considerable 
advantage that it is the only one that would improve the position of 
existing pensioners. Policies that rely on the private pension system 
to improve pensions will do nothing for existing pensioners because a 
long period of time is required for assets to build up to a level that could 
provide even a modest improvement in living standards. 
Is the Ideal Pension System for Ireland Affordable? 
The proposals for the ideal pension system for Ireland pose a key 
question: are they affordable? Researchers at the Economic and So-
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cial Research Institute (ESRI) in Dublin have used a micro-simulation 
model to estimate the cost of implementing this policy (see Callan, 
Keane, and Walsh 2009). They simulated what would have been the 
cost in 2005 of increasing the social welfare pension by €38 ($48) per 
week, which would have brought it just above the poverty level, and 
financing the increase in the pension by giving tax relief on private pen-
sion contributions at the standard rate of tax rather than the marginal 
rate. The outcome of this exercise is shown in Table 4.8. The effect of 
using the standard rate of tax relief on pension contributions would be 
to release almost €950 ($1,216) million in tax revenue forgone from 
taxpayers in the sixth to the tenth deciles. Just over three-fifths of this 
sum, or €585 ($749) million, would be required to bring nearly all pen-
sioners above the poverty level (i.e., by increasing all social security 
and social assistance pensions by €38 [$48] per week). The losses for 
taxpayers in the top five income deciles would range from −0.3 per-
cent to −3.1 percent of income, while the gains for those in the bottom 
half of the income distribution would range from 0.5 percent to 10 per-
cent of income. The biggest losses would be borne by taxpayers in the 
top two income deciles who would contribute to the Exchequer almost 
80 percent of the additional revenue that would be raised by using the 
standard tax rate for tax relief on pension contributions, a result that is 
hardly surprising in view of the evidence presented previously showing 
that the bulk of pension tax relief accrues to taxpayers at the top of the 
income distribution. 
Callan, Keane, and Walsh (2009) also calculated the effect of using 
the standard rate for tax relief and raising the social welfare pension 
on the “at risk of poverty” measure for pensioners. They found that the 
pensioner poverty rate would fall by almost 90 percent, from 25.9 per-
cent of households headed by a pensioner to 2.8 percent. 
If the state social security pension were brought up to 40 percent of 
earnings, a 10 percent gap would remain between the first-tier pension 
and the replacement rate target of 50 percent of preretirement income 
set by the Pensions Board for the average worker. The objective of the 
proposal for a second-tier social security pension is to close this gap. 
Estimating how much it would cost to do so would necessitate complex 
simulations requiring access to a long-term projection model that is not 
available to us. However, in its National Pensions Review, the Pensions 
Board (2005) considered a mandatory state social security earnings-
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related system (Alternative 4) that would provide a flat-rate pension of 
34 percent of average industrial earnings and a supplementary social 
security earnings-related payment that would provide a benefit close 
to the 50 percent target for a substantial additional number of workers. 
The earnings-related component would provide a benefit of 1 percent 
of annual pensionable earnings between the minimum income for PRSI 
payment and twice average industrial earnings. Annual earnings would 
be revalued at retirement to take account of inflation and the benefit 
would be based on career average earnings. Projected retirement in-
come replacement rates under Alternative 4 range from 68 percent for 
those with half average earnings, to 55 percent for those with average 
earnings, and 47 percent for those with twice average earnings. 
The additional contributions required to pay for an earnings-related 
social insurance pension would be equivalent to about 5 percent of la-
bor force earnings. To meet the full cost of the existing flat-rate social 
welfare pension and the Alternative 4 earnings-related component, the 
contribution rate required for a new entrant to the labor force would be 
26.5 percent of pensionable earnings within the limits described above. 
Although we differ with some of the assumptions underlying this al-
ternative, it is the closest in spirit to our proposal and it gives a broad 
indication of the long-term costs and benefits of the proposal. 
If Alternative 4 were operated on a pay-as-you-go basis, rather than 
funded as the Pensions Board prefers, it would result in a substantial 
improvement to the Exchequer finances in the first decade of its opera-
tion and no increase in cost through 2056 over the current system of 
flat-rate state social security pensions and tax relief for private pen-
sions. The Pensions Board (2005, p. 253) describes this outcome as 
“illusory” because it assumes costs would increase after 2056. How-
ever, it is worth noting that even if Alternative 4 were funded, it would 
cost just 1.6 percent of GNP more now than the current system and 0.3 
percent more in 2056. On average in the period up to 2026, it would 
cost 1.3 percent of GNP, or 0.3 percent more than the annual contribu-
tion to the National Pension Reserve Fund. 
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CONCLUSION 
The proposal to introduce a universal social security pension and 
to reduce the tax relief for retirement saving is not as dramatic as it 
might seem at first sight (see McCashin 2005). The state social security 
pension system is already providing the bulk of retirement income for 
the great majority of pensioners in Ireland. The tax relief for retirement 
saving has not succeeded in increasing coverage of occupational pen-
sion plans, and the tax incentives for personal pensions (PRSAs) have 
had little effect on coverage, especially at the lower end of the income 
distribution. The cost of expenditure on the public social security pen-
sion system and the tax expenditure on the private pension system in 
Ireland are now almost the same. Consequently, there is scope for a 
reallocation of resources between the public and private components of 
Ireland’s pension system. 
An important advantage of the proposed strategy is that it would 
provide a secure framework for people who wish to save to maintain 
a reasonable relationship between their income from work and their 
income in retirement. It would improve the living standards of current 
pensioners, contribute to the elimination of pensioner poverty, im-
prove the equity of the tax system, provide equal treatment for men 
and women, and contribute to the long-term sustainability of Ireland’s 
public pension system. Finally, it would strengthen the public social 
security component of the pension system which is already nationally 
established, politically accountable, and enjoys public credibility and 
legitimacy. 
Notes 
1. For example, the introduction of 401(k) plans in the United States has been as-
sociated with a collapse in retirement income. See Ghilarducci (2008, pp. 56–57). 
2. Although governments in Ireland have never committed themselves to formally 
indexing pensions, they have maintained a close relationship with average indus-
trial earnings since the contributory old-age pension was introduced in 1961. Over 
the period 1961–1998, the average personal rate of the contributory pension was 
about 25 percent of average industrial earnings. Following a recommendation 
in 1998 by the Pensions Board (1998) that the personal contributory pension be 
increased to 34 percent of average industrial earnings, it increased to about 30 per-
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110  Hughes and Stewart 
cent of average industrial earnings in the period 1998–2007. In 2007 it reached the 
34 percent target set in the Pensions Board report (see Hughes and Watson 2005). 
3. The at risk of poverty rates for Ireland in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 differ because the rate 
in Figure 4.1 is primarily based on a national definition that includes income from 
private pensions whereas Figure 4.2 is based on an EU definition that excludes 
such income. For further information, see Central Statistics Office (2009). 
4. The exchange rate on June 30, 2006, was €1 = $1.28, and this rate is used through-
out the paper to convert euros into U.S. dollars. 
5. The Pensions Board replacement rate targets of 34 percent and 50 percent are 
modest. Munnell and Quinby (2009, p. 3) point out that “as a general benchmark, 
retirement income equal to 65 to 80 percent of pre-retirement earnings should be 
more or less adequate.” 
6. The accuracy of the data depends on the accuracy of information given by inde-
pendent households. For example, the Household Budget Survey notes (Central 
Statistics Office 1997, p. 6) that, “no adjustment is made for the understatement of 
expenditure, for example [on] alcoholic drink which is a traditional national and 
international phenomenon in household expenditure surveys of this type.” In addi-
tion, the Central Statistics Office (2001, p. 5) comments that, “some categories of 
income tend to be underestimated in surveys of this nature.” 
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The Optimal Pension System 
Is Denmark Best? 
Finn Østrup 
Center for Financial Law, Copenhagen Business School 
In its report Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the 
Old and Promote Growth, the World Bank (1994) recommended that 
countries set up a multifaceted pension system based on three pillars: 
1) a public old-age pension that covers the basic needs of older 
people, 
2) mandatory pension plans that are fully funded, and 
3) personal pension plans. 
The Danish pension system closely resembles this type of system. 
A basic flat-rate pension benefit (social security benefit) is provided to 
all residents in Denmark through the government budget. On top of 
this, persons are covered by labor market systems, which are negotiated 
between employees and employers at the level of the individual firm or 
profession. Third, persons may derive an income from tax-subsidized 
personal pension arrangements that can be established with banks and 
life insurance companies. 
This chapter first discusses the main characteristics in the design 
of a pension system. It then discusses how the pension system affects 
a number of different policy objectives. The chapter finally turns to the 
Danish experience and describes some of the problems that have been 
encountered in this multifaceted pension system. A major finding from 
the chapter is that no universal formula can be found for an optimal 
pension system. The optimality of a national pension system depends 
on the goals that the pension system is supposed to achieve, which may 
vary between countries. Based on the Danish experience, it is shown 
that a multifaceted pension system such as that recommended by the 
World Bank may give rise to a range of problems. 
113 
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POSSIBILITIES OF DESIGNING A PENSION SYSTEM 
The main goal of pension systems is to provide a certain standard 
of living for people who no longer receive a labor income after a certain 
age. If people without a labor income are to maintain a certain standard 
of living, consumption possibilities must be transferred from people 
who are active in the labor market. This can take place in two ways. 
One possibility is to directly transfer money from employed people 
to pensioners. These types of payments take place in pay-as-you-go sys-
tems, which have various forms. A levy may, for example, be charged 
on individuals who are actively working, the proceeds of which are then 
used to finance benefits for pensioners. Payments can also be made by 
an enterprise to its former employees. A third possibility is that the retir-
ees receive benefits through the government budget. In pay-as-you-go 
systems, the criteria for the size of pensions may change. A person may, 
for example, receive a pension income that is determined as a certain 
percentage of the person’s final salary in the firm in which he or she 
worked. People may also receive a flat-rate pension, for example, one 
financed through the government budget. 
Pay-as-you-go plans are usually defined benefit plans, implying 
that the amounts used to finance the pensions are determined by the 
size of benefits. Pay-as-you-go systems may, however, also be defined 
contribution plans. A government or an enterprise may, for example, set 
aside a certain sum that is then shared among the retirees. In practice, 
such a system has, however, not been implemented, possibly due to the 
large amount of uncertainty that would result with respect to the pen-
sion to be received by individual retirees. 
Another possibility for organizing a pension system is that persons 
save for their old age while they are employed. The type of pension 
system is said to be prefunded. The saving can be managed either by the 
individual or it may be placed in an institution, for example, a pension 
fund or life insurance company. Pensions are later paid from the institu-
tion in which the saving was placed. 
A second way to classify pension systems is to consider the institu-
tional level at which the plans are organized. A broad distinction can be 
made between three institutional levels: 
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1) pensions are organized at the individual level, implying that it 
is the decision of each individual how to provide for his or her 
living in old age; 
2) pensions are organized at the level of an enterprise or collec-
tive group (e.g., employees in a certain sector or persons with 
a similar educational background), implying that it is left for 
enterprises or collective groups to organize pension plans; or 
3) pensions are organized at the societal level, implying that pen-
sions are organized by, for example, the government, which 
establishes a universal pension system for all residents or for 
all persons who fulfill certain socioeconomic criteria. 
Classifying pension systems on the basis of these two criteria—on 
the basis of financing (pay-as-you-go vs. prefunded) and institutional 
level at which pensions are organized (individual, enterprise/sector, and 
society)—we can derive six different ways to organize pension systems 
(Table 5.1). 
Examples of systems organized at the level of society based on 
pay-as-you-go finance include the public old-age pensions that are 
widespread in the United Kingdom and in the Scandinavian countries 
(Denmark, Norway, and Sweden). One example is the Danish basic old-
age pension, which is financed through the government budget. The 
Danish government pays a basic pension benefit to every person aged 
65 or older who has been a resident in Denmark for a certain minimum 
period. The benefit is calculated based on criteria stipulated in legisla-
tion adopted by the Danish Parliament. All persons above the age of 65 
receive a uniform basic benefit, but supplementary benefits are paid to 
people with low incomes. The general labor market system in Sweden 
is an example of society-wide systems that are based on prefunding. 
This system has been legislatively established and covers all employ-
ees. Employees are required to pay a certain percentage of their wage 
income to a pension fund that determines benefits based on the savings 
and accrued earnings. Examples of pension plans organized at the sec-
tor level with pay-as-you-go financing are the various sector plans that 
constitute the basis of pension systems in Continental Europe (e.g., Bel-
gium, France, and Germany). Employees belonging to specific sectors 
pay contributions to a sector-wide plan that finances pensions out of its 
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Table 5.1  Categories of Pension Systems 
System organization Pay-as-you-go finance Prefunded finance 
The society level Public old-age pensions General systems financed 
through taxes 
The enterprise or Pensions based on pension Sector systems with 
sector level promises from firms prefunded saving 
Pension systems for public (pension funds, etc.) 
servants financed through 
the public budget 
The individual level Old-age provision through Individual pension 
family members savings (e.g., in life 
insurance companies) 
revenue. Benefits are determined on the basis of the retiree’s previous 
labor income. 
As an example of prefunded pension systems organized at the level 
of the firm are those negotiated between firms and either single em-
ployees or labor unions. Such pension plans are common in Denmark. 
In many Danish enterprises, part of the company policy is that a certain 
percentage of the employee’s wage income is paid to an individual pen-
sion account in a pension fund or in a life insurance company, which 
manages the funds. The employee’s pension benefit is subsequently 
calculated on the basis of past contributions and investment earnings. 
In most plans, the pension participant is guaranteed a minimum rate of 
return. For certain groups of employees, mostly in the public sector, 
pensions are part of a general wage agreement that is negotiated by 
a trade union on behalf of its members. Persons covered by the wage 
agreement make contributions to the pension fund, and pensions are 
determined on the basis of past contributions with accrued returns. The 
pension funds guarantee a certain minimum rate of return. 
An example of pensions organized at the individual level with 
prefunding is personal pension plans established by individuals in life 
insurance companies or other pension institutions. The agreement en-
tered into between the individual and the pension institution stipulates 
that the policy holder is entitled to certain benefits after a specified 
age either in the form of a lump sum or an annuity. In Denmark, tax-
subsidized personal pension plans are widespread. Pension savings can 
be undertaken not only in life insurance companies but also in banks. 
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Finally, pension plans organized at the individual level based on 
pay-as-you-go financing include plans under which a group of people 
contribute to a retired person out of their income. Such pension pro-
vision is known in non-industrial societies. Family-based pensions, in 
which members of a family contribute to older family members, belong 
in this category. 
POLICY OBJECTIVES IN DESIGNING A PENSION SYSTEM 
The pension system serves or affects a range of goals, which are 
seen as valuable from the point of view of society in a variety of ways. 
Below we discuss how the pension system affects 
• the desire to bring about a desired standard of living for persons 
who have retired from the labor market, 
• the reduction of uncertainty concerning the postretirement 
standard of living, 
• the level of national saving, 
• the size of the labor force and the efficiency of labor markets, 
and 
• the efficiency of financial markets. 
The Desired Standard of Living after Retirement 
Individuals have preferences with respect to the standard of living 
that they desire after retirement from the labor market. A main goal of 
pension arrangements is to bring about this desired standard of living. 
Complications arise in the design of a pension system because 
different conceptions exist, both among individuals and in society, con-
cerning the standard of living that pension systems should provide. Here 
we distinguish three possibilities. One possibility is that individuals 
may wish to achieve a certain level of consumption. After retirement, 
a person may, for example, desire to realize certain goals with respect 
to travel, the purchase of a holiday cottage, or providing other family 
members with gifts. In the case of such preferences, the goal of pension 
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systems should be to ensure that persons have acquired the financial 
resources that make it possible to realize the desired level of consump-
tion during retirement. 
Another possibility is that people wish to maintain a certain stan-
dard of living relative to a reference group, for example, people with the 
same educational background or who have worked in the same sector or 
enterprise. They may also want to maintain a certain standard of living 
relative to the general standard of living in the population. 
Finally, a third possibility is that individuals may wish to maintain 
a certain standard of living relative to the standard of living that they 
enjoyed when they were active in the labor market, for example, with 
respect to housing or leisure activities. Some people may want to main-
tain the same standard of living, whereas others may accept limited 
downsizing. 
Individuals may have views regarding their postretirement standard 
of living that differ from the level that is regarded as reasonable from 
the perspective of society. From the point of view of society, it may, 
for example, be seen as unacceptable if older people have a standard 
of living that is markedly different from that which is enjoyed by the 
rest of the population. If the standard of living among older people falls 
markedly below that of the rest of the population, political pressures 
may build up to improve the living standard among the pensioners. It 
may also be seen as unacceptable from a societal point of view if pen-
sioners enjoy a living standard that is markedly above that of the rest 
of the population. In this case, political pressures may arise for making 
pensioners shoulder a larger part of the “societal” burden. 
If the goal of the pension system is to maintain a certain standard of 
living relative to other societal groups, it is preferable that the pension 
system be organized on a defined benefit basis. Thus, in defined benefit 
plans, pensions can be adjusted in such a way that individuals realize 
a certain standard of living relative to other groups. If defined benefit 
plans are organized at the level of society, older people will normally 
receive a pension that makes it possible to maintain a certain standard 
of living relative to the rest of the population. The level of public old-
age benefits is often adjusted on the basis of the general wage level. In 
the case of defined benefit plans organized at the level of an enterprise 
or a sector, the pension is often tied to the wages of people who cur-
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rently work in the enterprise or sector. In enterprise plans, pensioners 
may, for example, receive extra benefits if wages rise in the enterprise. 
In defined contribution plans, pensions depend on past savings and 
on the return that can be achieved on this saving. The return on invest-
ments may follow a development that is different from the development 
in wages. In defined contribution plans, it may therefore be difficult to 
realize a certain standard of living relative to the groups who are ac-
tive in the labor market. If, however, it is the goal to achieve a certain 
level of consumption in old age, defined contribution plans organized 
at the individual level may be seen as most desirable because this gives 
individuals the opportunity to adjust contributions in such a way that 
a certain sum will be available at a certain age. If the goal is to bring 
about a desired standard of living relative to other pensioners, it may 
be desirable to have defined contribution plans organized at the level 
of the group with which the individuals want to make comparisons. If, 
for example, the goal of economists is to maintain a certain living stan-
dard relative to other retired economists, it can be seen as appropriate if 
economists join together and organize their own pension plan. 
Reduction of Uncertainty in the Level of Pensions 
A desirable goal of pension systems is to reduce the risks that are 
related to reaching a desired standard of living. Below we discuss the 
different risks that arise in different types of pension systems. Pension 
systems should be assessed in terms of the likelihood that these different 
risks will arise and of the weight that is attached to risk minimization. 
Pay-as-you-go pension systems 
In pay-as-you-go pension plans organized at the enterprise level, 
pledges regarding the future level of pensions usually result from em-
ployment contracts. Enterprises are legally bound to keep these pledges. 
The fulfillment of the pension pledge is conditioned on the survival of 
the enterprise. In the case of bankruptcy, the pension pledge will no 
longer be met. Pensions in pay-as-you-go plans organized at the enter-
prise level are therefore subjected to the risk that the company may go 
bankrupt. 
In the case of pay-as-you-go plans organized at the societal or sec-
tor level, the level of pensions will depend on decisions made by those 
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who make the pension possible by agreeing to transfer consumption 
possibilities to the pensioners. At any time, contributors can change the 
rules of the game, thereby changing the size of the benefits. In a pub-
lic old-age system, for example, legislators may decide to change the 
level of pensions. In plans organized at the sector level, the employed 
members of the plan may find that the economic burden related to con-
tributions is too big and decide on reductions in pensions. Legislative 
rules may make such changes at the sector level difficult or impossible, 
but legislators may also take the view that the burden related to pension 
contributions is too heavy and decide on changes in legislation that will 
make it possible to cut back on pensions. 
Various shifts in the economic or political environment may bring 
about situations that may either cause enterprises to go bankrupt, thus 
being unable to meet pension pledges in enterprise-based pension plans, 
or may lead to decisions about a reduction in the level of pensions in 
plans organized at the sector level or the level of society. An overview 
of different types of risk is found in Table 5.2. 
One risk arising for pay-as-you-go pension systems is related 
to negative macroeconomic shocks that cause a lowering of wage 
incomes. It may be seen as “fair” if retirees share in these types of 
economic downturns. Thus, in the case that there is a reduction in after-
tax wage incomes caused by an economic downturn, it is likely that a 
decision will be made also to reduce pensions. Thus, the consumption 
possibilities for pensioners will be cut back in line with a reduction in 
the purchasing power that has taken place for wage earners. In the most 
extreme example, in pay-as-you-go systems organized at the enterprise 
level, negative macroeconomic shocks may lead to the bankruptcy of an 
enterprise, which will then be unable to meet pension pledges. 
In addition to macroeconomic shocks, pay-as-you-go systems orga-
nized at the enterprise level or at the sector level are exposed to shifts 
in the demand for the product that is produced by the sector. A decline 
in demand may, for example, reduce the number of workers in a par-
ticular sector and thus make it more burdensome to finance pensions. 
One example is the financial difficulties experienced by pension sys-
tems that are organized for workers in coal or steel industries. A shift 
in the composition of demand may also bring about the bankruptcy of 
single enterprises. 
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Table 5.2  Overview of Risks Related to Pension Plans Based on Pay-As-You-Go Finance 
Level of organization Possibility of changing
for the pension plan the pension level Types of risk 
Enterprise Bankruptcy risk Macroeconomic at the national level affecting the survival 
of the company 
Sector-specific economic risks 
Enterprise-specific economic risks 
Demographic shifts
 Sector Change in underlying pension Macroeconomic risks related to changes in real wages 
agreement (national level) 
Sector-specific economic risks 
Demographic shifts 
Change in preferences regarding level of pension
 Society Change in legislation Macroeconomic risks related to changes in real wages 
(national level) 
Demographic shifts 
Change in preferences regarding level of pension 
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Other factors also affect pay-as-you-go plans organized at the enter-
prise level. A firm may go bankrupt because of factors that are specific 
to the enterprise in question. There may, for example, be a reduction in 
the demand for the products produced by the particular firm. Inefficient 
management may also bring the enterprise down. 
For pay-as-you-go plans organized at the sector or society level, a 
further risk arises in connection with changes in the attitude toward the 
level of pension considered to be “fair.” Younger generations may not 
support the “generation pact” that implies they should support a certain 
living standard for older generations. 
Pay-as-you-go plans are also exposed to demographic shifts. If, for 
example, as a result of a reduction in the birth rate, there is a reduction 
in the number of younger people relative to older people, it will be more 
burdensome for the young to support a certain living standard for the 
old. In plans organized at the sector level or at the level of society, this 
may cause a decision to change the level of pensions. The same risk 
exists in plans organized at the enterprise level. A larger share of older 
people relative to workers means that the burden for the enterprise as-
sociated with the financing of pensions will increase, increasing the risk 
that the enterprise may go bankrupt and thus be unable to meet pension 
pledges. 
Prefunded pension systems 
Four types of risk arise with respect to the level of the pensions in 
prefunded pension systems: risks related to 
1) fluctuations in the return on the pension savings, 
2) the sale of assets in the pension system, 
3) political intervention that may change the standard of living of 
future pensioners, and 
4) mismanagement of the pension arrangement. An overview is 
given in Table 5.3. 
Pension plans will be exposed to changes in the various economic
factors that may cause a reduction in the earnings of companies in 
which the pension plan has placed its investments, either in the form of 
equities or debt instruments (e.g., corporate bonds). In the case of equi-
ties, the pension arrangement will be exposed to the losses that occur in 
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Table 5.3  Overview of Risks in Prefunded Pension Plans 
Level of organization Possibility of changing





Changes in return on pension savings 
Policy changes that reduce after-tax 
real income 
Changes in return on pension savings 
Policy changes that reduce after-tax 
real income 
Changes in return on pension savings 
Policy changes that reduce after-tax 
real income 
Changes in return on pension savings 
Policy changes that reduce after-tax 
real income 
Macroeconomic risks which affect capital income 
(global level) 
Change in preferences regarding level of pensions 
Demographic shifts 
Inefficient management of pension plan 
Macroeconomic risks which affect capital income 
(global level) 
Change in preferences regarding level of pensions 
Demographic shifts 
Inefficient management of pension plan 
Macroeconomic risks which affect capital income 
(global level) 
Change in preferences regarding level of pensions 
Demographic shifts 
Inefficient management of pension plan 
Macroeconomic risks which affect capital income 
(global level) 
Change in preferences regarding level of pensions 
Demographic shifts 
Inefficient management of pension plan 
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connection with a fall in earnings and thus also in the stock price. In the 
case that the pension plan invests in debt securities issued by compa-
nies, it will be exposed to the risk of bankruptcy in the enterprise. One 
may assume that pension plans will try to diversify their investments, 
including globally. This will cause the plans only to be exposed to the 
nondiversifiable (systemic) macroeconomic risks that occur in connec-
tion with changes in capital income at the global level. 
Pension plans will further be affected by the risk related to the 
sale of assets in the pension plan, which will depend on demographic 
shifts. At the time when pensioners need to use their pension savings 
for consumption, pensioners will have to sell assets (e.g., equities) in 
the pension plans. The purchasers of these assets will primarily be em-
ployed people. If there is a large number of retired older people relative 
to employed younger people, the outcome will be a fall in the price of 
the assets the pension plans want to sell. In this case, we may see a fall 
in share prices or in the price of fixed property. This fall in asset prices 
will reduce the purchasing power of the older generation. 
A third type of risk is that the performance of pension plans will 
be affected by political intervention. Several possible policy changes 
would benefit the working generation. One is the pursuit of inflationary 
macroeconomic policies, which will erode the real value of fixed-
income assets in the pension plans. Another possibility is the taxation 
of the pension savings, either in the form of higher taxes on capital 
income in general or in the form of taxes levied specifically on pension 
savings. An exchange-rate policy directed toward a real depreciation 
of the domestic currency works to reduce the purchasing power of the 
older generation insofar as pension plans have invested in financial as-
sets denominated in foreign currencies. A further policy intervention to 
reduce the purchasing power of the older generation is to raise prices on 
government services used by that generation, for example, fees related 
to health care or higher prices on medicine. 
Finally, policymakers can reduce the purchasing power of pensions 
through a low interest rate policy. The big losers from the pursuit of 
low interest rate policies pursued after 2001 and again since 2008 have 
been the pension savers who have experienced a large reduction in the 
return on their savings. It may be asked whether this policy would have 
been politically feasible if the saving had been undertaken by private 
individuals and not by pension institutions, which are distanced from 
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The Optimal Pension System 125 
the savers and which the savers, due to a lack of transparency, find it 
difficult to assess. 
Policy changes that reduce the after-tax real income of pensioners 
may be caused by shifts in preferences concerning the standard of liv-
ing for the older generation. Concepts with respect to what is regarded 
as a “fair” living standard may change. Policy changes aimed at lower-
ing real incomes for pensioners may also be caused by macroeconomic 
shifts that reduce real wages for the younger generation. One may fur-
ther expect the working generation to be less inclined to maintain the 
living standard of the old generation and thus more likely to undertake 
legislative changes that reduce the purchasing power of pensioners, if 
demographic shifts reduce the number of young people. 
An additional risk for prefunded pension plans arises in connection 
with inefficient management of the plan. In attempts to attract custom-
ers, managers of life insurance companies may, for example, promise 
pensions that are too high. A recent example of this is the British life 
insurer Equitable Life. Plans may also be managed by incompetent man-
agers who derive a low return on assets. The risk of mismanagement is 
exacerbated by corporate governance problems that arise particularly in 
relation to pension institutions. 
IS THE DANISH SYSTEM BEST? 
As mentioned previously, the World Bank (1994) advocated a 
pension system based on three pillars. The basic idea is that the first 
pillar—the mandatory public plan (social security)—will provide in-
dividuals with a guarantee of a minimum standard of living in old age. 
The goal of this first pillar is to redistribute income toward those who 
have a need for additional income in old age. The goal of the second 
pillar—mandatory privately managed plans—is to shift income from 
the active working years to retirement years. According to the World 
Bank (1994, p. 9), this shall be done “avoiding perverse intragenera-
tional redistributions and unintended intergenerational redistributions.” 
The second pillar is further seen as promoting saving and as facilitat-
ing the development of financial markets. Finally, the goal of the third 
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pillar—the voluntary personal or occupational plans—is to facilitate in-
dividuals’ efforts to achieve a higher income in old age. 
Denmark has a pension system that closely resembles the system 
recommended by the World Bank. As its first pillar, Denmark has a 
basic flat-rate public pension (social security) that is tax financed. This 
pension provides all residents with a basic income when they reach 
age 65, presently (2010) about €9,000, with a possibility of as much as 
about €18,000 if the individual has no additional income. In addition to 
this basic public old-age pension, nearly all Danish workers are covered 
by fully funded occupational systems in which benefits are determined 
on the basis of contributions and investment returns on pension sav-
ings. Finally, many Danish citizens have personal saving plans that are 
subsidized through the tax system and withdrawals can be made only 
after a certain age. 
The question is, however, whether this organization of pensions is 
in fact the best system. In the discussion above, questions have been 
raised concerning some of the basic assumptions that underlie the rec-
ommendations in the World Bank report. 
The main portion of pensions will, according to the World Bank 
recommendations, come from the mandatory fully funded private 
pension plans (the second pillar). A main argument against such fully
funded pension plans is that they provide less certainty concerning 
the living standard in old age than defined benefit plans. Thus, in fully 
funded pension plans based on defined contributions, the size of pen-
sions depends on the share of production that goes to capital income. In 
contrast, under defined benefit systems, it comes from development in 
wage incomes. Because the profit share of capital income in production 
varies more than the wage share, fully funded pension plans based on 
past contributions will cause more uncertainty in terms of the standard 
of living in old age than will defined benefit plans. This is a serious 
objection against such a pension system. After all, a major goal of a 
pension system is to provide individuals with a certain real income in 
old age. 
It may be argued that the benefit rate in defined benefit plans is 
exposed to the uncertainty that results from the benefit rate being deter-
mined in a political process in which decisions are made about a proper 
standard of living for the retirees. This is, however, also the case in 
defined contribution plans. Thus, the consumption possibilities for old 
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The Optimal Pension System 127 
people under defined contribution plans are determined by decisions 
made concerning the taxation of pensions and capital income. Policy-
makers may also decide that pensioners will have to pay more for the 
services that they use. Working-age people may also reduce the living 
standard of the retirees through macroeconomic policies that may erode 
the purchasing power of saving (e.g., inflation). Thus, defined contri-
bution plans are exposed to basically the same political uncertainty as 
defined benefit plans. 
The case of Denmark demonstrates that fully funded plans, in addi-
tion to being subjected to economic uncertainty, are exposed to political 
uncertainty. Following lengthy political discussions, Denmark intro-
duced in 1982 a tax on the investment returns in pension plans. The 
goal was to reduce the real return in pension plans to reduce the real in-
come of future pensioners. It was widely argued that the high real return 
earned on funded pensions would lead to an unbalanced social situation 
in which an excessive share of national income would accrue to pen-
sioners. In recent years, there has been much discussion in Denmark on 
cutting back on the free services offered to wealthy pensioners through 
the government budget. In 1980, the Social-Democratic government 
had plans to force Danish pension funds and life insurance companies 
to earmark part of their investments to finance enterprises with a growth 
potential. Similar plans have recently (August 2010) been proposed by 
the current Liberal-Conservative government. The plan is to establish 
a fund financed by pension institutions with the aim of providing fi-
nance for small- and medium-sized enterprises with a growth potential. 
In September 2010, at the height of the financial crisis, the government 
initiated discussions with the pension institutions to encourage them to 
invest in and thus rescue problem banks. The plan was abandoned after 
resistance from the pension industry. 
These different examples show that the existence of a large pool of 
savings in pension institutions represents a temptation for policymak-
ers. They may want to use the funds for purposes that, for political or 
financial reasons, are difficult to pursue through the government budget. 
These episodes raise doubt whether it is possible to efficiently manage 
the savings in prefunded pension plans. 
Another basic objection to fully funded pension plans with defined 
contribution benefits is that such plans are unable to provide pension-
ers with a desired standard of living relative to the working population. 
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Thus, if the goal of a pension system is to provide pensioners with a cer-
tain living standard relative to the rest of the population, funded defined 
contribution pension plans can be seen as inferior relative to defined 
benefit plans in which explicit political decisions are made regarding 
the proper living standard for pensioners. 
During the recent decade, interest rates have fallen to very low 
levels. The prefunded Danish plans are guaranteed so that the rate of re-
turn cannot fall below a set minimum rate. For plans established before 
1994, the promised minimum rate of return was 4.5 percent. It was then 
lowered to 2.5 percent, and for plans established since 1999, the rate 
has been 1.5 percent. Due to the low interest rates that have prevailed 
during the past decade, the Danish pension industry wants to abolish 
the minimum rate guarantees. This has met with fierce resistance from 
many of the members. One argument is that the pension institutions 
will evolve into mutual funds with some cover against life risk if the 
minimum return guarantees are abolished. 
A basic challenge for pension systems is to handle a future larger 
share of older people in the population. This implies that funded pension 
plans will have to sell their assets to a shrinking share of working-age 
people, which would result in downward pressure on asset prices, for 
example, a fall in prices of shares and of long-term fixed-rate bonds. 
The implication is that the losers in the intergenerational conflict over 
resources will be the future pensioners who will experience a fall in 
the value of their investments. Seen from the perspective of securing 
pensioners a certain living standard, fully funded pension plans can be 
viewed as especially deficient in situations in which there is a rising 
share of older people in the population. 
To some extent, pension plans can dispose of assets that can be 
used immediately for consumption without the need to effectuate sales 
in markets. Pension plans may, for example, hold bank deposits or debt 
securities that mature at the time when proceeds are needed for pen-
sion payments. In this case, the outcome could be inflation because the 
pensioners are competing with workers to lay hold of production for 
consumption. An upward price pressure may be expected in particular 
on goods and services that are used by older people, for example, health 
services and medicine. If the monetary authorities in this type of situa-
tion try to maintain price stability through a strict monetary policy, the 
outcome will be a rise in unemployment. In this case, the losers in the 
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intergenerational conflict will be workers who face a higher unemploy-
ment risk. If the monetary authorities allow inflation to take place, the 
losers will be pensioners who see the real value of their assets dimin-
ished. In either case, social tensions are to be expected. 
Similarly, a reduction in a country’s production resulting from 
a smaller labor force will imply an upward pressure on prices of the 
national production, implying that the country will experience a real ap-
preciation and thus a reduction in the purchasing power of pensioners, 
as discussed above. 
The World Bank report stresses the positive effects on saving as a 
point in favor of mandatory defined contribution–funded pension plans. 
It is, however, uncertain to what extent funded pension plans increase 
saving. In spite of the expansion of prefunded pension plans, Denmark 
has one of the lowest household saving rates among the industrialized 
countries. The same is true in the United States and the United King-
dom. As argued above, prefunded plans organized at the society level or 
at the sector level may harm saving because they lack transparency and 
thus make it difficult for households to make correct decisions concern-
ing saving. Surveys regarding the saving behavior of Danish households 
show that there are considerable differences between households with 
the same age and income regarding saving behavior (see Hansen,
Meding, and Østrup 2009). A large number of people in their fifties 
have no savings except for that in their pension plans. This seems to 
confirm that it may be particularly difficult to make informed savings 
decisions with prefunded plans. 
The World Bank report finally views funded pension plans as a posi-
tive contribution to the development of financial markets. It is, however, 
uncertain to what extent this is the case. If pension plans diversify in-
ternationally, they will not help to develop domestic financial markets, 
and the experience from Denmark shows that pension institutions are 
increasingly diversifying internationally. Furthermore, it seems reason-
able to ask whether the goal of high saving could not be reached more 
suitably through a strict fiscal policy that creates a budgetary surplus or 
through credit restrictions that make it more difficult to take out positive 
equity in houses. 
A wider choice of financial instruments may, on one hand, be seen 
as positive as it may help the diversification of risk and alleviate the 
financing of investments. The recent financial crisis has, however, dem-
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onstrated that a wider choice of financial instruments also works to 
reduce transparency and encourage excessive risk taking. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Contrary to the recommendations of the World Bank, we conclude 
that no universal formula can be found for an optimal pension system. 
The optimality of a pension system should be seen in the light of the 
goals that the pension system is supposed to pursue. While the main 
goal of a pension system is to provide persons with a desired stan-
dard of living after retirement, the pension system affects, however, 
a number of other policy goals, for example, the labor supply and the 
efficiency of financial markets. The optimality of a pension system 
depends on the extent to which the pension system meets this range 
of policy goals. Because policy goals may differ among countries and 
change over time, no universal answer can be derived as to what is the 
optimal pension system. The Danish experience with a pension system 
that closely resembles the recommendations in the World Bank report is 
not unambiguously positive. Among industrial countries, Denmark has, 
for example, experienced one of the lowest saving rates for households. 
The accumulation of savings in pension institutions has acted as an in-
vitation to political intervention through which changing governments 
have sought to use the pension saving for purposes that are unrelated to 
securing the living standard of older people. Moreover, a main topic of 
discussion in Denmark has been the complexity of the pension system, 
which has caused a lack of transparency. 
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German Private Pension Law 
Current State and Future Directions 
Markus Roth 
University of Marburg 
PRIVATE PENSIONS AT THE CROSSROADS OF SECURITY
AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Shifting demographics and increased globalization are challeng-
ing the pension systems of industrialized nations worldwide. Given the 
structural problems of Germany’s social insurance and state-funded 
social security programs, the privately funded pension sector needs to 
be strengthened (Börsch-Supan 2004).1 A comprehensive analysis and 
doctrinal foundation for private pensions must be developed with due 
regard of the opportunities and risks associated with private pensions, 
both of which result from the asset funding of private pensions. Despite 
the general economic downturn during the recent financial crisis, the 
expected rate of return of private pensions constitutes a major opportu-
nity. Key risks lie in the failure to achieve expected rates of return and 
in the possibility of capital loss. In developing a legal framework of a 
system of private pensions and its individual products, appropriate con-
sideration needs to be given to such opportunities and risks. 
Whereas the German social security plan, the cornerstone of the 
German public pension system, generates an expected nominal return 
on employee and employer contributions of 0 to 2 percent,2 a return of 
4 to 8 percent is possible for private pensions. In the past, these lev-
els of real returns have been achieved on capital markets, at least over 
significant time periods. This is particularly true of long-term invest-
ment in equity securities.3 The risks associated with private pensions 
must be understood against the background of a long contractual pe-
riod.4 The financial security of citizens does not depend on a low rate 
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132 Roth 
of return volatility alone; other factors may well have to be considered 
in assessing the suitability of an investment vehicle for retirement. The 
guarantees granted by private pension providers ought to be reviewed 
according to their long-term feasibility and economic profitability. 
The opportunities and risks associated with the investment in capital 
raise the question of the underlying model of modern private pensions. 
While traditional legal thinking in Germany focuses on nominal secu-
rity, the modern view, as well as international thinking, attaches greater 
importance to personal responsibility. Looking at the concepts of secu-
rity and personal responsibility, it is necessary to balance the tension 
between them in private pensions. First steps were undertaken by the 
65th German Jurists Forum of 2004, which addressed issues of financial 
security and personal responsibility in both occupational and individual 
pensions (Steinmeyer 2004). The international prevailing model of the 
responsible and informed citizen focuses on the possibilities rather than 
the risks of private pensions. The model further underpins the freedom 
of choice through disclosure duties. 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE PENSION LAW 
Links between Branches of Private Pension Law 
Analyzing the system of private pensions in an integrated fashion 
departs from the traditional approach, which separates the treatment of 
investment products of individual pensions, such as life insurance and 
investment funds. The systems of occupational and individual pensions 
have also been analyzed separately. However, the products of indi-
vidual and occupational retirement provision are frequently interlinked 
and functionally interchangeable. For individual citizens, it makes no 
difference whether they receive an occupational pension or payments 
from an individual pension in addition to their social security pension. 
Furthermore, the law of occupational pensions utilizes investment ve-
hicles of individual pensions. According to the German Occupational 
Pensions Act, this is the case for occupational pension plans managed 
through external institutions, provided the external institution is a life 
insurance company; retirement funds and pension funds are also used, 
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German Private Pension Law 133 
albeit to a lesser extent. If the use of defined contribution plans (in 
which employers make no pension payment guarantees) were accepted 
by the German Occupational Pensions Act, then all investment vehicles 
of individual pensions would also be possible in occupational pensions. 
A comprehensive analysis of German laws on occupational and 
individual pensions facilitates the identification of similarities in le-
gal instruments of private pensions and sets a basis for developing 
principles protecting participants spanning all legal forms of private 
pensions. At the same time, these protective principles could serve to 
further develop the existing law on private pensions. This is of par-
ticular relevance for disclosure requirements and, more generally, for 
occupational pension law. Only when provided with adequate informa-
tion is the beneficiary able to make an informed decision on a preferred 
pension product. Because private pension products are interchangeable, 
the required information needs to be delivered in a consistent format. 
To develop occupational pension law in Germany, key issues are 
the creation of a separate pool of assets for funding occupational re-
tirement plans and the introduction of defined contribution plans.5 The 
Occupational Pensions Act does not require external funding of defined 
benefit plans. Many German employers fund pension obligations inter-
nally, by means of a book reserve recorded on the company’s balance 
sheet (book reserve funding). Corresponding with the international 
standard of external funding and encouraged by international account-
ing standards (IAS 19), large listed stock corporations in Germany 
already deviate from this practice and cover (direct) pension obligations 
with internal or external trusts. The Accounting Law Modernization Act 
(Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz)6 recently reformed German ac-
counting law, and companies subject to the accounting standards of the 
Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch) are expected to follow interna-
tional practice in the future. 
Again departing from international standards, German occupational 
pension law does not provide for true defined contribution plans; instead, 
it requires the employer to serve as a guarantor of payments during the 
disbursement period. According to the Federal Labor Court (Bundes-
arbeitsgericht), general labor law applies in this regard. In concrete 
terms, this means that the system of protective principles applicable to 
occupational pension law, rather than the Occupational Pensions Act, 
serves as the legal basis for defined contribution pensions. True defined 
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contribution pensions could be transferred into the scope of the Oc-
cupational Pensions Act by making the protective principles prescribed 
by the Act applicable to them. A further point of concern is that the Oc-
cupational Pensions Act does not give employees the choice between 
various pension products. In the interest of affording employees more 
personal responsibility, this should be rectified in the future. 
Interdisciplinary Approach 
The importance of private pensions in general, and the position of 
the capitalization (advance funding) principle as an autonomous field 
of law in particular call for an interdisciplinary and comparative analy-
sis. The fact that asset funding of private pensions necessarily involves 
capital markets7 highlights the need for an interdisciplinary treatment 
of the topic. To understand capital markets properly, and to evaluate 
the investment decisions, requires consideration of both legal and eco-
nomic academic literature. 
An analysis of private pensions is not possible without using 
economic concepts and theories, including questions relating to the 
economic advantages of funding private pensions,8 as well as debating 
whether to favor the efficient financial market hypothesis or behavioral 
finance theory. Taking account also of the financial crisis and its effects, 
economic theories might serve as a guiding principle for appropriately 
developing private pension law, provided the theories are substantiated 
by empirical data. The contribution of private pensions to intergenera-
tional justice is of general significance. Every generation is responsible 
to provide for its retirement (Leinert and Esche 2000). This highlights 
the need for a funded pension plan for the baby boom generation’s old 
age. Failing to develop funded pensions would unfairly burden the next 
generation in providing for a much larger older generation through tra-
ditional pension systems (Börsch-Supan 2004). 
The societal importance of private pensions also requires con-
sideration of social sciences. Of significance are demographics (thus 
far showing a constant trend toward rising life expectancy), actuarial 
sciences, and behavioral sciences. Retirement provision is a topic fre-
quently ignored by society in general. Private retirement provision has 
thus far been practiced mainly by those who have higher incomes and 
are better educated, but those who have lower incomes or education 
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levels are particularly in need of private pensions. Because it can be 
difficult to interest the latter social classes in private pension plans, set-
ting incentives for intermediaries and especially employers ought to be 
considered.9 
CONTRACTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 
Defined Benefit, Defined Contribution, and Hybrid Pensions 
German law on private pensions is in need of systematization. This 
can be done typologically according to the service content of a particu-
lar individual pension contract. Based on internationally acknowledged 
labor law terminology, private pension contracts can be divided into 
three categories: defined benefit pensions, defined contribution pen-
sions, and hybrid pensions. 
For individual pensions, fully guaranteed (defined benefit) retire-
ment income in the form of an annuity is rarely provided; whereas for 
occupational pensions, defined benefit pensions in the form of so-called 
direct obligations funded internally by a book reserve on an employer’s 
balance sheet are still common German practice. Trust administration, 
management by power of attorney, investment funds, and defined con-
tribution pensions depend entirely on the asset management’s outcome. 
Hybrid pensions are of particular importance. Insurance-based pension 
contracts, which have traditionally dominated individual pensions in 
Germany, belong to this group. Retirement funds (Pensionskassen), 
life insurance contracts in occupational pensions, pension funds, and 
investment funds with warranty certificates typically are also hybrid 
pensions. 
As previously stated, defined contribution pensions do not fall under 
the Occupational Pensions Act; rather, their regulation is derived from 
general principles of German labor law, subject to further development 
by the courts and academia.10 The development of employee protection 
for defined contribution pensions should, however, be modeled after the 
Occupational Pensions Act. Such an approach would imply a restriction 
on forfeiture, increased portability, and the allocation of the profits from 
asset management. Because they bear the risk of investment, employees 
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are no less in need of the legal protection granted to people with classi-
cal benefits under the Occupational Pensions Act. As in other countries, 
defined contribution pensions in Germany ought to be conceptually un-
derstood as occupational pensions. 
Institutions in Private Pensions 
The term “private pension” is a generalized term encompassing the 
provision of individual and occupational retirement provision. Individ-
ual pensions are frequently managed through insurance companies and 
sometimes through investment funds and annuities. The term “occupa-
tional retirement provision” covers defined contribution pensions and 
conceptually also occupational pensions falling under the Occupational 
Pensions Act. The Occupational Pensions Act focuses on guarantees of 
the employer and therefore on the disbursement period. Until 2001, it 
was called the Act for Improved Retirement Provision. Internationally, 
the focus is more on the period of accumulation, in which the invest-
ment decisions are made. In this period, an institution is chosen through 
which the private pension plan is to be managed. 
The choice of a pension product is determined by German tax law, 
which is relatively restrictive in international comparison. Particularly 
for individual retirement plans, the scope of fiscal promotion is limited 
when compared to the state-funded social security pension. In addition, 
the guarantee offered for the deposited contributions restricts the bene-
ficiary’s freedom of choice. The tax law’s reference to the Occupational 
Pensions Act effectively makes the occupational retirement provision 
less flexible because only occupational pension plans as defined by 
the Occupational Pensions Act are promoted. The Act also does not 
grant the employee freedom of choice and requires a guarantee by the 
employer. 
Employees’ restricted freedom of choice follows from the syn-
chronization of control and liability in the Occupational Pensions Act. 
Mandatory defined benefit pensions lead employers to select a risk 
structure. Employers’ choice for the risk structure neglects the individ-
ual interests of employees especially in defined contribution plans in 
which the employees bear the investment risks. Following the practice 
in the United States, greater freedom of choice should be granted to 
employees. An insurance-based pension could also be offered. 
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German Private Pension Law 137 
When comparing the risk structures of various types of private pen-
sions, the specific risks of defined benefit pensions need to be taken 
into account. This is especially true of the risk of insolvency, which is 
partially borne by the employee, and the lack of inflation adjustment 
of pension promises for workers leaving employment prior to being 
eligible to receive a pension. Overall, the generalized statement that 
defined benefit pensions are more beneficial for employees than defined 
contribution pensions must be rejected. Each plan carries risks and ben-
efits that must be examined in light of potentially unstable and changing 
political and economic environments, subject to shifting demographics 
and climate change. 
PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PENSIONS 
Principles of protection for private pensions include the pension 
protection triangle and the loyally administered separate fund. To focus 
on one to the exclusion of the other neglects the particular nature of 
private pensions and the tension between security and responsibility. 
Termination (exit), consultation (voice), and guarantees taken 
together form the pension protection triangle. The triangle relaxes 
the traditional German focus on guarantees in private pensions. The 
inclusion of exit (i.e., the termination of contract) and voice (i.e., con-
sultation) applies the general concepts of protection in private law to 
pension contracts. Extending protection from nominal guarantees takes 
into account the tension between security and responsibility; while 
guarantees are associated with security, exit and voice are legal rules 
providing for self-responsibility. Not all components of the protection 
triangle need to be contained in each pension contract. Guarantees for 
defined benefit pensions in particular and the possibility of termina-
tion for asset management are sufficient. Alteration of the contract is 
a less severe measure than termination of insurance contracts and oc-
cupational pensions. 
To the extent that occupational pensions are subject to supervi-
sion by a general financial market authority, this supervision could be 
transferred to a specific regulatory authority, as is done in the United 
Kingdom. This would take account not only of the distinctive features 
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of occupational pensions but also of the fact that insurance-based invest-
ments are not the only means of obtaining financial security. Pursuant 
to the Pension Funds Directive, contractual trust agreements (CTAs) 
could also be placed under supervision, but this has not yet been done in 
Germany. Establishing a specific regulatory authority to oversee CTAs 
would be an appropriate measure. Germany’s insurance supervision is 
particularly rigid and should be developed on the basis of the British 
model. Such a development is expected in the coming years due to Eu-
ropean solvency requirements. 
The model of the loyally administered separate fund is applicable 
to private pension plans managed through life insurance companies 
and investment funds. However, the model has thus far not featured 
prominently in Germany’s occupational pension laws, which have tra-
ditionally been premised on an occupational pension promise covered 
solely by a book reserve recorded on the sponsoring company’s bal-
ance sheet. Yet, according to the German Federal Court, book reserves 
covering direct obligations constitute a quasi-separate fund. In practice, 
the model of the loyally administered separate fund already applies to 
companies bound by internationally accepted accounting principles. 
The pension promises of about two-thirds of the 30 largest German 
companies listed on the Frankfurt stock exchange (the DAX 30) are al-
ready covered by separate assets, particularly through CTAs. CTAs and 
separate funds in general are important for insolvency protection. Due 
to the possibility of netting pension obligations and internal or external 
trusts pursuant to the Accounting Law Modernization Act, CTAs can 
newly be used by companies subject to the accounting standards of the 
Commercial Code. 
In regard to occupational pensions, both the Pension Funds Direc-
tive in Europe and the ERISA pension law in the United States stipulate 
that separate funds be managed solely in the interests of the benefi-
ciaries. Private pension institutions are subject to fiduciary duties, and 
investments should also be managed in the sole interest of beneficiaries. 
The principle of precautionary investments, which is the prudent person 
rule based on portfolio theory, should apply. The focus should be on 
the investment risk of the entire portfolio, not on particular classes of 
investment. The principles of diversification and long-term investment 
should also be adhered to. 
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The legal concept demanding a prompt allocation of surplus funds 
in life insurance policies, which the Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority inherited from the previous federal Supervisory Office for 
the Insurance Industry, is not compatible with long-term investment 
practice. By contrast, accumulation of unallocated reserves enables 
investments in both high-risk and long-term investment forms, promis-
ing higher returns. Investment in shares is particularly effective in this 
regard. 
PENSION CONTRACTS 
Establishment of Pension Contracts 
Occupational pension contracts can be established individually or 
collectively and should contain the essential contractual elements. All 
pension contracts should also specify whether they provide for defined 
benefit, defined contribution, or hybrid pensions. 
In terms of the revised law on standard business terms, pension con-
tracts are now subject to the tests on standard form clauses prescribed by 
the German Civil Code. This is also true of insurance contracts, invest-
ment contracts, and since the reform of the law of obligation, pension 
promises under the Occupational Pensions Act. Even clauses reciting 
legislation trigger the tests of standard business terms, and transpar-
ency requirements are also applicable. Further attention should be paid 
to equal treatment requirements, upon which the validity of pension 
contracts in occupational pension plans can depend. 
Pension contracts are often integrated into a web of various per-
sons’ contractual obligations. Contractual arrangements, particularly 
for occupational pension plans managed through an external institu-
tion, can be described as a nexus of contracts. This legal concept can be 
used especially for the allocation of contractual obligations. Thereby an 
overlap in duties of both an employer and an external private pension 
institution can be avoided. This enables disclosure duties to be assigned 
to the external occupational pension institution. 
To date, private pension institutions’ duties to provide information 
at the stage of contract conclusion are still arranged heterogeneously. 
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Disclosure duties for private pension institutions even before contract 
establishment are based on fiduciary duties. At the same time, disclo-
sure duties should be understood as correlating to the participation of 
private pension products in the marketplace. This enables the disclosure 
duties to be harmonized. It is highly recommended to require insurance 
companies, in addition to investment funds and pension funds, to dis-
close the principles of their investment policy to beneficiaries. Such a 
requirement exists in the United Kingdom. To make an informed deci-
sion on entering into an insurance contract, the insured party has to be 
made aware not only of the role of the investment income but also of the 
manner in which it was earned. 
The Period of Pension Accrual 
In the period of pension accrual, the beneficiary is obliged to provide 
capital and remunerate the private pension institution pursuant to con-
tractual specifications. The remuneration must be explicitly disclosed in 
the pension contract, failing which, the usual remuneration is payable. 
If the pension contract lacks such disclosure, the remuneration is to be 
set by the courts at the lowest margin of the remuneration range used 
in the market. Forfeiture of pension plans is a special feature, and the 
respective provisions in the Occupational Pensions Act apply to defined 
contribution pensions. In Germany, employers have no obligation to 
fund occupational pension promises. Yet such an obligation can be im-
posed if distributions to shareholders would disproportionately increase 
the risk of insolvency, thereby protecting employees from bearing the 
associated risk that the adjustment of pensions would be cancelled in 
the disbursement period. This is especially the case in debt-financed 
company takeovers. 
Private pension institutions are frequently subject to investment re-
quirements. One such requirement is imposed by the Pension Funds 
Directive to develop and implement investment guidelines. Insurance 
companies are also subject to this requirement. Deriving from the 
principle of precautionary investment, the requirement of diversifying 
investments of the separate fund can only be dispensed with for direct 
pension obligations covered by a book reserve in the balance sheet. 
In fulfilling the standards of investments of assets, the possibility 
of the employer’s contingent liability should be considered. Imposition 
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of contingent liability on the employer allows a riskier investment of 
assets bundled together in a separate fund. Contingent liability is also 
relevant for a temporary deficit, and this is specifically regulated in pen-
sion funds. The mandatory contingent liability of employers in CTAs 
releases the trustee both of his duties to diversify and of the limits on the 
amount he is permitted to invest in the employer’s company. 
There is a further correlation between guarantees and investment 
behavior regarding life insurance policies. Allocation of surplus funds 
increases the guarantees. The currently prescribed solvency require-
ment, ensuring the ability to fulfill pension guarantees and the instant 
allocation of profits generated particularly from asset management, 
ought to be viewed with circumspection. In the international context, 
the common practice in the United Kingdom demonstrates that merely 
allocating profits from the surplus on maturity of the policy makes long-
term investment in shares possible. The British model is largely based 
on the famous British economist John Maynard Keynes, who encour-
aged long-term investment in shares as a safeguard against inflation 
risks in his capacity as advisor of life insurance companies in the 1920s 
(Keynes 1927). 
For life insurance policies, having a greater share of the final al-
location of surplus funds in relation to the overall entitlement tends to 
increase profits. An appropriate innovation is that insurance contract 
law now facilitates the possibility of agreements in each individual con-
tract on how to deal with surplus funds on maturity. The disclosure 
requirements of furnishing appropriate information on the product’s 
performance and the guaranteed value of an individual pension contract 
are sufficient in this regard. German insurance contract law now stipu-
lates the above disclosure duties. Furthermore, Germany should follow 
the British practice of obliging life insurance companies to point out the 
secondary market in cases where the beneficiary considers terminating 
his or her life insurance contract. 
The model of the loyally administered separate fund and the pen-
sion protection triangle are characterized by security and the possibility 
of contract modification. Both in the insurance industry and in occu-
pational pensions, beneficiaries are secured by setting up a separate 
fund and special security plans. Yet the Pensions Securities Association 
for occupational pensions ultimately guarantees only nominal interest, 
with the employee thus effectively bearing the inflation risk. Where oc-
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cupational pension promises are covered externally, a guarantee, even 
of minimal interest, would be possible. For the purposes of funding 
the Pensions Securities Association, external coverage through CTAs 
should be considered. 
A key protective mechanism for individual pensions is the benefi-
ciary’s right to terminate the contract. This is the only possible way for 
the beneficiary to react to long-term poor results in asset management. 
In the event of the contractual terms being modified, particularly where 
contractual parties are replaced, consideration must be given to the 
transfer of the pension contract’s entire value. The German Insurance 
Contract Act was recently changed to improve consumer protection in 
this respect. The portability principle in the law of occupational pen-
sions also applies to defined contribution pensions. 
Employees are in special need of protection of annuity benefits in 
cases where the employer reorganizes. Following the employer’s reor-
ganization, the new legal entity must have sufficient funds irrespective 
of other security mechanisms, so that pensions in the disbursement pe-
riod can be adequately adjusted. However, insurance-based funding or 
absolute security should not be required. 
The Disbursement Period 
The beneficiary should be able to choose between annuity pay-
ments and lump-sum payments in the disbursement period. Except for 
tax-favored individual pension plans, annuities are not mandatory, with 
lump sum payments and withdrawal rights as possible alternatives. 
Such alternatives are desirable considering the high costs associated 
with annuities and the possible need of funds for nursing home care. 
These principles apply in German occupational pensions. 
When a beneficiary chooses annuity payments, consideration must 
be given to adjusting the payment in the disbursement period, failing 
which, the beneficiary will bear all of the inflation risk. In the disburse-
ment period, for many pension products German pension law requires, 
at least in principle, a guaranteed interest rate. Where the beneficiary 
has an additional retirement plan, the allocation of the proceeds result-
ing from asset management meets the parties’ interests in principle. 
Thus the freedom of the beneficiary to select an appropriate pension 
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product corresponding with his individual risk preferences would be 
advisable in this respect. 
DEVELOPING GERMAN PRIVATE PENSION LAW 
Implementing Defined Contribution Pensions in the German 
Occupational Pensions Act 
The doctrinal foundation for defined contribution plans ought to be 
laid in the German law of occupational pensions. Defined contribution 
pensions can be developed from common legal principles applicable 
to private defined benefit pensions. Except for the employer’s obliga-
tion to meet claims (guarantee) and protection against insolvency, the 
essential protective elements of the Occupational Pensions Act can be 
applied to defined contribution pensions. Restrictions on forfeiture, 
portability, and retention of profits in the disbursement period also ap-
ply to defined contribution pensions. The previous employer duties of 
guaranteeing claims and providing for nominal insolvency protection 
(without adjusting inflation) could to a great extent functionally be re-
placed by a requirement to establish a separate fund, the principles of 
precautionary investment, encapsulation of the requirement of diver-
sification, and stringent requirements regarding encroachments on the 
employee’s contractual position. 
Against conventional German wisdom, a proposition that defined 
contribution plans are more risky than defined benefit pensions or hybrid 
pensions does not hold true. When properly managed, defined contri-
bution pensions provide better protection against inflation risk than 
defined benefit pensions. Employees and employers both can benefit 
from the use of tax-advantaged defined contribution pensions, which 
will shorten the period for vesting in occupational pensions, decrease 
the uncertainties surrounding the EU provisions stipulating equal treat-
ment and anti-discrimination, and improve both personal choice and 
mobility. 
Against the background of an aging society and particularly in light 
of low-income workers’ reservations toward entering into private pen-
sion contracts, automatic enrollment in occupational pensions should 
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be provided, giving employees the possibility to opt out. The 65th Ger-
man Jurists Forum proposed automatic enrollment as early as 2004, 
and international studies on behavioral science have substantiated the 
positive effects of automatic enrollment in occupational pension plans 
(Steinmeyer 2004).11 For automatic enrollment provisions, defined con-
tribution schemes are best suited. Since employees lack a guaranteed 
income in defined contribution plans, employers should offer sufficient 
investment choices, accommodating the fact that the employees bear 
the investment risk. The United States Pension Protection Act of 2006 
requires a choice between at least three investment products for defined 
contribution pensions. Other countries, such as Switzerland, require 
mandatory guarantees by external private pension institutions. Follow-
ing these examples, German law should also allow workers a choice of 
investments in defined contribution pension plans. 
Information Provided to Beneficiaries 
The information required to be provided to beneficiaries and retir-
ees should and can be based on general principles. The duties of private 
pension institutions to provide information are linked to participation 
in the private pension market. These duties follow from the fiduciary 
duties of the private pension institutions. Disclosure duties for life insur-
ance companies still also need to be developed in spite of the reform of 
insurance contract law. Disclosure of investment principles, allocation 
policies, and security of relevant guarantees are necessary in general, 
whether in a defined contribution pension or in life insurance contracts. 
In Germany, disclosure of investment principles is provided by explicit 
regulations for pension funds and investment companies. Such disclo-
sure duties for life insurance companies should be introduced, building 
on the British supervisory practice of the Financial Services Authority. 
Disclosure of investment principles enables the participant in 
individual accounts and defined contribution pensions to assess the in-
vestment risks of different options. It allows the participant to make 
a decision corresponding with his or her individual risk preferences. 
Special importance should be attached to the full transparency of costs. 
Disclosure of costs and performance of fund products should be super-
vised by an independent office and perhaps even by the government, 
similar to the British and Swedish models. For life insurance policies, 
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the British model of requiring companies to inform their clients about 
the secondary market should be followed. 
Special disclosure duties exist at the conclusion of pension con-
tracts and before the disbursement period. Product information in 
individual pensions should always be given prior to the establishment 
of the pension contract. In occupational pensions, the fact that the pen-
sion is frequently attached to the initiation of the employment contract 
needs to be taken into account. Thus, providing information of the ex-
istence of a pension before contract finalization is sufficient. Detailed 
information only needs to be given after the finalization of the employ-
ment contract. Where information is provided externally, for example, 
by pension funds, retirement funds, and direct life insurance compa-
nies, essential disclosure duties can be assigned solely to the external 
occupational pension institution. 
Before the disbursement period commences, the beneficiary should 
be informed about payment options, including plans of disbursement or 
annuity payments. Special emphasis should be placed on information 
regarding indexation of pension benefits. Choosing an indexed pension 
plan is advisable; failing this, the beneficiary will bear the entire risk of 
inflation. Participation in the outcome of asset management principally 
meets the interests of the parties, e.g., the employer, the beneficiary, and 
the external pension provider. This is particularly the case if a minimum 
payment is guaranteed. 
CONCLUSION 
Germany’s occupational pension system should provide employees 
with investment choices and encourage higher participation rates. The 
latter goal should be realized through automatic enrollment in occu-
pational pension schemes, giving employees the possibility to opt out. 
Incentives for automatic enrollment should be set by the Occupation 
Pensions Act or by tax law, at least with regard to large employers. 
Cost-effective individual choices for employees should be promoted 
through including defined contribution pensions in the German Occu-
pational Pensions Act. Offering investment alternatives with different 
risk profiles would allow employees to find solutions corresponding 
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with their individual risk preferences. In light of typical German saving 
behavior and the corresponding expectations of beneficiaries, a tradi-
tional insurance product should be chosen as the default investment 
product. 
Notes 
Text is derived from my German habilitation thesis Private Altersvorsorge: Betriebs-
rentenrecht und individuelle Vorsorge (Private pensions: occupational and individual 
pensions), Max-Planck-Instituts für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht
(Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law), Beiträge zum 
ausländischen und internationale Privatrecht (Contributions to Comparative and In-
ternational Private Law), Mohr Siebeck, 2009. I thank Martin Wilhelm, LL.M., for 
preparing the English translation. 
1. See Steinmeyer (2004) for an account of the reduced performance of state-funded 
pension plans. 
2. These are the figures currently reported in the yearly pension information provided 
by the German state pension system. 
3. Poterba, Shoven, and Sialm (2004) report a nominal return for 12 investment 
funds for the period 1962–1998 of 12.7 percent at an inflation rate of 4.7 percent.
Munnell and Sundén (2004), referring to Ibbotson, put the real return for United 
States shares at 7.1 percent for the period 1926–2008; Hopp (2008) puts the equiv-
alent figure for German shares at 4.9 percent for the period 1960–2007. 
4. According to Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2008), among the largest industrial-
ized nations for the period 1990–2007, German shares have been the most volatile, 
and German bonds have had the lowest real returns (−1.8 percent). In addition, 
losses on the German share market were the highest worldwide in the periods im-
mediately following World War I and the bursting of the Internet bubble. 
5. For an earlier account of true defined contributions, see Arbeitsgemeinschaft für 
betriebliche Altersversorgung e.V. (1997). 
Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Bilanzrechts (Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz 
– BilMoG) (Accounting Law Modernization Act), 25.5.2009, BGBl (Federal Ga-
zette) I 1102. 
7. For an instructive review on the impact of private pensions on capital markets, see 
Kübler (1991); see Buxbaum (1991) for the basic conditions set by occupational 
pension law and tax law. 
8. For the United Kingdom, see Myners (2001, p. 1), which states that “strong funded 
pension system[s] [are] . . . key national asset[s].” 
9. For a discussion of the employer’s position as an intermediary, see Köndgen 
(2004). 
10. Federal Labor Court, BAGE 112, 1, 7. The Federal Labor Court builds on the Ger-
man legal position up to the end of the Weimar Republic in 1933. 
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11. For the United States, see Akerlof (2002), Lucas (2005), Madrian and Shea (2001), 
Orszag and Orszag (2005), Poterba (2005), Thaler and Bernartzi (2004), and
Turner (2006). See also Munnell and Sundén (2005). For the United Kingdom, see 
Department for Work and Pensions (2008). 
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The Ideal Pension 
System for Belgium 
Kim De Witte 
University of Leuven 
This chapter discusses the ideal pension system for Belgium. Cur-
rently, the Belgian pension system is a subject of debate. Political and 
social actors have proposed substantial reforms. To get a good picture 
of the necessary reforms, value judgments and technical analyses have 
to be taken into account. Sometimes deep changes in the pension sys-
tem are advocated as if they were technically unavoidable, but this is 
obviously wrong. Not only are there different reform options available, 
the choice between them is based on ideological background and value 
judgments. In this chapter, I develop a clear set of evaluation criteria for 
pension reforms. The main reform proposals are then evaluated in the 
light of these criteria. 
First, I give an overview of the Belgian pension system. The struc-
ture, adequacy, and financing of the different types of pension plans 
are explained. Then I present the pension reform proposals of the main 
social and political actors in Belgium, where there is a consensus with 
respect to the necessity of a pension reform but no consensus with re-
spect to concrete reform proposals. After evaluating the various pension 
reform proposals, I present my personal vision on the ideal pension 
system for Belgium. 
OVERVIEW OF THE BELGIAN PENSION SYSTEM 
In this first section, the structure, adequacy, and financing of the 
Belgian pension system are presented. The Belgian pension system 
consists mainly of statutory pension plans, supplemented by occupa-
149 
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150 De Witte 
tional and individual pension plans. This is a variant of the well-known 
three-pillar model. The statutory pension plans are pay-as-you-go de-
fined benefit arrangements, the occupational pension plans are funded 
defined benefit or defined contribution arrangements, and the individual 
pension plans are funded defined contribution arrangements. 
Structure of the Belgian Pension System 
Statutory pension plans 
In Belgium, employees (both public and private), self-employed 
workers, and civil servants (a special class of public employee in Bel-
gium) are compulsorily insured under three different statutory pension 
plans. 
Pension plan for employees. The statutory old-age pension for 
employees depends on annual earnings, length of career, and marital 
status. The formula for the pension accrual of employees in a given 
year is as follows: the pension accrual for year X is the wage of year X
(capped) divided by 45 (the length of a full career) and multiplied by 
either 60 percent or 75 percent. The wage of year X is the gross sal-
ary during that year up to a certain ceiling (€47,282 in 2009, adjusted 
annually to current prices). The pension is computed as 60 percent of 
the capped wage for a single person or 75 percent for the head of a 
household (persons with a dependent spouse). At retirement, a statu-
tory pension is paid as an annuity equal to the result of this formula.1 
Pension coverage is continued during unemployment or other forms of 
involuntary inactivity (illness, pregnancy, disability, etc.). These peri-
ods of inactivity are valued at the last corresponding salary. To claim 
an old-age pension, an employee must have reached the age of 65 and 
stopped working.2 Pensions are paid monthly by direct deposit into the 
pensioner’s bank account. Pension benefits are automatically adjusted 
to a price index and partially adjusted to average wage increases. 
Pension plan for the self-employed. The statutory pension plan 
for the self-employed is similar to the employee plan, except for a re-
duction coefficient. The reduction coefficient reflects the discrepancy 
between the contributions paid by employees and by self-employed 
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workers. Because there were no social security contributions by the 
self-employed prior to 1984, statutory pension rights were calculated 
based on a fixed income. The formula for the old-age pension accrual 
for self-employed individuals is basically the same as the employee 
plan except the amount is also multiplied by the reduction coefficient. 
There are also some other minor differences with respect to the em-
ployee plan.3 
Pension plan for civil servants. The formula for determining the 
old-age and disability pensions for civil servants is different. The pen-
sion is equal to the average wage of the last 5 years multiplied by the 
length of the career (maximum of 45 years) divided by 60 (the retire-
ment factor). To receive a pension benefit, a civil service career of at 
least 5 years is required.4 At the maximum career length of 45 years, a 
replacement rate of 75 percent of the average wage of the last 5 years 
is obtained. Some occupations have a preferential retirement factor (55 
for teachers and less for other specific categories such as magistrates 
and academic services). People in these areas therefore reach the maxi-
mum replacement rate of 75 percent in less than 45 years. 
With some exceptions, the legal retirement age is 65 for men and 
women, and retirement with pension benefits is possible from the age 
of 60. The pension benefit is biannually adjusted to the consumer price 
index (CPI) and to the real wage increase of working civil servants. To 
benefit from a minimum pension, a career of 20 years is required. In ad-
dition, the survivor’s pension is calculated as 60 percent of the average 
wage of the last 5 years of the deceased person. 
Early retirement pension. An early retirement plan (the so-called 
prepension) is embedded in the unemployment plan, but only for em-
ployees. The full prepension consists of an unemployment benefit, paid 
by the public authorities (the National Employment Office), which 
amounts to 60 percent of the last gross wage earned, limited by a ceiling, 
which is different from that used in the pension plan. The beneficiaries 
also receive an allowance, paid by the employer. Since 2008, the legal 
age to receive the prepension is 60, provided the career length as an 
employee was at least 30 years for men (35 years as of 2012) and 26 
years for women (after 2008, this age increases by 2 years every 4 years 
until it reaches 35 years). Exemptions (for those who have reached at 
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least age 58) are still possible for those who have worked in physically 
demanding jobs. The prepension benefit is automatically adjusted to the 
CPI and partially adjusted to average wage increases. 
Disability. If a person’s disability prevents him or her from working 
for more than one year, a disability benefit is paid. In the employee plan, 
disability benefits are calculated at 65 percent of the limited lost remu-
neration for beneficiaries who are a head of a household, 53 percent for 
single persons, and 40 percent for cohabitants. In the self-employed 
workers’ plan, the disability benefits are fixed but differ according to 
whether the beneficiary is a head of household. The disability benefit 
is automatically adjusted to the CPI and partially adjusted to average 
wage increases. 
Guaranteed income for elders. Every person 65 or older whose 
pension plus other income is below a certain threshold is entitled to a 
means-tested guaranteed income for the elderly (GIE). In 2009, the GIE 
was €892.92 per month for a single person and €595.33 per month for 
cohabitants (for each person). The GIE benefit is automatically adjusted 
to the CPI and partially adjusted to average wage increases. 
Occupational pension plans 
In general, occupational pensions in Belgium are not mandatory, 
and only a few branches of industry have a mandatory occupational 
pension plan. The occupational pension must be externally funded by 
either group insurance companies or pension funds.5 About 70 percent 
of pension plan members are covered under an insurance contract. 
Hence, the Belgian occupational pension landscape is dominated by 
insurance companies. 
Legal framework. The legal framework for occupational pension 
plans was implemented at the beginning of 2004. The “Vandenbroucke 
Law” was enacted in 2003 to strengthen occupational pensions and 
regulate industry-wide pension plans. It covers occupational pensions, 
a tax plan for those pensions, and some related social security benefits. 
Industry-wide pensions. Industry-wide pension plans are the re-
sult of collective bargaining agreements between social partners, for 
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example, employer associations and trade unions.6 Employers of a 
given branch of industry are obliged to join the industry-wide plan, un-
less the collective bargaining agreement allows them to opt out of the 
plan. Opting out is only possible if the employer offers an occupational 
pension plan at the company level providing benefits equivalent to the 
industry-wide plan. 
Tax treatment. Belgium has enacted tax legislation improving 
the tax-exempt status of occupational pension contributions. The tax 
treatment of occupational pensions is based on the so-called exempt-
exempt-taxed system, meaning that contributions and investment 
earnings are almost exempt from taxes, but benefit payments are taxed. 
However, instead of the normal social security tax of approximately 35 
percent of gross salary, a special social security tax of 8.86 percent and 
an insurance tax of 4.4 percent are imposed on contributions to occupa-
tional pension plans. 
For the employer, contributions to occupational pension plans are 
tax-deductible to a certain amount. This deductibility is linked to the 
condition that the expected sum of statutory and occupational pensions 
does not exceed 80 percent of gross salary in the given year. For the 
employee, contributions to occupational pensions are not part of the 
employees’ taxable income. Income tax is only paid on the benefits re-
ceived at retirement. If the benefit is paid as a lump sum, it is subject 
to a flat-rate tax (10 or 16 percent). If the benefit is paid as an annuity, 
the annuity is taxed as normal income, but the actual tax is lowered by 
a special tax credit for retirees. 
Social plans. So-called social plans can be set up, either at the com-
pany or the industry level. Contrary to ordinary occupational pension 
plans, social plans are required to offer benefits for risks such as death, 
disability, or unemployment. In order to finance these risks, part of the 
contributions must be allocated in a “solidarity” fund. These so-called 
solidarity payments have to amount to at least 4.4 percent of contri-
butions. Other requirements include joint management, cost reduction, 
and profit sharing. Social plans are encouraged through special tax ad-
vantages, such as relief from the 4.4 percent insurance tax. 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about fnding the option.
Job Name: -- /331778t
  
154 De Witte 
Guaranteed investment return. From 2004 onward, Belgium has 
required a minimum rate of return guarantee for defined contribution 
pensions. The minimum guaranteed rate is 3.25 percent for contributions 
by employers and 3.75 percent for contributions paid by employees. 
These rates are considered to be set for an indefinite period, presumably 
lasting many years. If the employment contract ends, the employee can 
transfer his accrued reserves either to the occupational pension plan of 
his new employer or to a freely chosen insurance company. He can also 
opt for a further accrual within the occupational pension plan of his for-
mer employer. If the employee decides to leave the plan, the company 
is responsible for complying with the guaranteed investment return. If 
there is an accrual deficit, the gap has to be bridged immediately. 
Minimum retirement age. A beneficiary is prohibited from cash-
ing in accrued reserves or getting his or her benefits paid out before 
reaching the age of 60. Benefits can be paid out as an annuity or as a 
lump sum. The vast majority of occupational pensions are paid out as 
a lump sum. Therefore, indexation of occupational pension benefits is 
not an issue in Belgium. 
Individual pension plans 
Different forms of individual voluntary pension provision exist in 
Belgium. The main forms are life insurance, pension saving, individual 
pension commitments, and voluntary pensions for the self-employed. 
The common features of these different forms are the voluntary char-
acter of participation, the contributory character of funding, and the 
management of the assets by private actors, such as insurance compa-
nies or financial institutions (De Witte, Roels, and Stevens 2009). 
Individual life insurance. The main characteristic of individual 
life insurance agreements is the provision of an annuity or lump sum 
payment at the moment the insured person reaches a certain age or dies. 
Individual life insurance is accessible for everybody, irrespective of pro-
fessional status. An individual life insurance agreement is financed by 
premiums paid by the subscriber. The level of the premiums is agreed 
upon and stated in the insurance contract. The premiums are invested 
in insurance contracts that guarantee a capital value based on a fixed 
interest rate. The subscriber can also choose investment in real estate 
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through a tax incentive based on a mortgage loan and debt insurance 
that is linked to the mortgage loan. 
Pension saving. Pension saving is the generic term for three forms 
of tax-advantaged long-term savings that are accessible to everybody: 
1) pension saving insurance, 2) collective pension saving, and 3) in-
dividual pension saving. Pension savings are accessible to everybody. 
Pension savings accounts and individual pension savings are offered by 
financial institutions (mainly banks). Contributions to pension savings 
accounts are used to buy units in investment funds. These funds are 
popular because they allow a wide choice of assets and risks. Contribu-
tions to individual pension savings are invested in shares chosen by the 
individual. 
Individual (occupational) pension commitments. Individual 
pension commitments are strictly regulated. Individual pension 
commitments are only permitted in companies that have a collec-
tive occupational pension plan for all employees. This implies that a 
commitment can only be granted in addition to such a collective oc-
cupational plan. Measures to protect employees are included, such as 
the obligation to conclude a pension agreement, to finance it externally 
with a pension provider, and to obtain the explicit approval of the em-
ployee for personal contributions. 
Voluntary pensions for the self-employed. A specific individual 
voluntary pension provision for the self-employed was introduced in 
Belgium because statutory pensions for the self-employed are low (see 
below). Voluntary pension plans for the self-employed are very similar 
to individual life insurance. 
Adequacy of the Belgian Pension System 
In this section, we review the adequacy of the Belgian pension sys-
tem by focusing on three aspects: 1) coverage, 2) risk sharing, and 3) 
benefits. 
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Coverage 
Statutory pension plans. In Belgium, employees, the self-
employed, and civil servants are all compulsorily covered under statu-
tory public pension plans. These plans are part of the Belgian social 
security system. The payments are deducted from the employees’
regular pay, and the self-employed pay obligatory contributions on a 
quarterly basis. 
Occupational pension plans. According to the most recent figures, 
approximately 60 percent of employees are members of an occupa-
tional pension plan. Approximately the same number of white and blue 
collar workers are members of occupational pension plans (AON Con-
sulting 2007; Assuralia 2009; Belgian Parliament 2009; de Dessus les
Moustier and Masy 2007). The majority of occupational pension plans 
are organized at the company level, and these plans provide higher 
pension contributions than industry-wide pension plans. They involve 
primarily white collar workers and impose no solidarity mechanisms 
(Pierreux 2009). In 2009, the 27 existing industry-wide plans covered 
740,485 plan members (83 percent were men and 81 percent were 
blue collar workers, CBFA 2009). The number of industry-wide plans 
is increasing. Higher income workers benefit more from occupational 
pensions and the tax relief they offer than lower income workers.7 
Individual pension plans. According to Wuyts et al. (2007), 
participation in individual pension plans rose strongly during the last 
decade. In 2006, 37 percent of the people in Belgium between the ages 
of 15 and 64 participated in one or more individual pension plans. Un-
surprisingly, income is a very important factor for participation. The 
average income of individual pension plan members was €24,410 in 
2003. Only 9.1 percent of single people with a monthly income less 
than €750 participate in individual pension plans, whereas almost 50% 
of single people with a monthly income above €2,000 participate (De 
Witte, Roels, and Stevens 2009). Persons who participate in occupa-
tional pensions also participate markedly more frequently in individual 
pensions (Gieselink et al. 2003). Self-employed persons participate in 
and contribute more to individual pension plans, which in part could be 
due to their lower statutory pension (see below). 
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Benefits 
Statutory pension benefits. The GIE is €892.98 per month for 
singles and €595.33 per month for cohabitants (in 2009). Every person 
who meets the requirement of a defined link to Belgium and is at least 
65 years old is eligible for the GIE. The financial means of an individual 
is checked, and if the individual’s total income is lower than the guaran-
teed amount, the difference is paid monthly. 
Unlike the GIE, which has no link whatsoever with the contribu-
tions paid in the past, statutory pension benefits for employees, the 
self-employed, and civil servants are related to contributions (up to a 
certain level). Table 7.1 presents the average monthly statutory pension 
benefits. 
The average statutory pension benefit for employees is €891.42 per 
month for a single male and €631.47 per month for a single woman (as-
suming both have been employees during their entire careers). These 
benefits are considerably lower for the self-employed and considerably 
higher for civil servants.8 The average gross monthly wage in Belgium 
was €2,837 in 2007 (NIS 2007), so the difference between statutory 
pension benefits and average salary is considerable. Table 7.1 presents 
the average replacement rates in 2008,9 which are quite low, except for 
civil servants. 
Table 7.1 Average Statutory Old-Age Pension Benefits and Average 
Replacement Rates (in Parentheses) for Single Persons (Gross 














a National Pension Administration, monthly statistics, November 2009 (for civil 
servants: 2005). 
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Occupational pension benefits. Occupational pension benefits in-
crease statutory pension income by an average of 16 percent for men 
and 13 percent for women (Belgian Secretary of Pensions 2010). How-
ever, this average has to be put in perspective. Amounts spent for plans 
covering the highest income workers are four to five times higher than 
amounts spent for pension plans for lower income workers: 6.3 percent 
of salary is spent on the top plans, 3.4 percent on plans for white collar 
workers, and only 1.4 percent on plans for blue collar workers (AON 
Consulting 2007). Industry-wide pension plans in Belgium cover many 
employees, but the benefits paid out are exceedingly marginal (between 
0.75 and 1.75 percent of actual salary).10 
Individual pension benefits. The benefit amounts paid out by indi-
vidual pension plans are unknown because of a lack of necessary data. 
Data concerning the accrued reserves in individual pension plans do 
exist, but they are incomplete because they do not take into account the 
investments of households in real estate, which is stimulated with the 
same tax incentives as individual life insurance plans. 
Table 7.2 presents the evolution of accrued reserves in individual 
and occupational pension plans during the last decade. For the indi-
vidual pension plans, the value of real estate accrued with tax-driven 
incentives is not taken into account. Even without taking the invest-
ments in real estate into account, the reserves of individual pension 
plans have increased greatly since 1998. These reserves have tripled, 
whereas the reserves of occupational pension plans only doubled. 
Table 7.2  Evolution of Occupational and Individual Pension Reserves
(€ billion) 
Pension reserves 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Occupational 30 35 37 36 38 42 44 46 48 53 58 
pensions 
Individual 45 53 58 62 68 80 96 116 135 142 147 
pensions 
SOURCE: Belgian Secretary of Pensions (2010, p. 234). 
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Risk sharing 
Pension accrual often takes place over a period of decades. There-
fore, risk control is a key issue. The main risks that threaten pension 
accrual are: longevity, inflation, financial, bankruptcy of the pension 
provider, and political. These risks cannot be entirely avoided, but they 
can be shared within smaller or larger groups. Four different levels of 
risk sharing can be distinguished: 1) no risk sharing (the individual plan 
or plan member bears the risk), 2) risk sharing within a company, 3) risk 
sharing within the branch of industry, and 4) nationwide risk sharing. 
An overview of the scope of risk sharing within the different forms of 
pension accrual in Belgium is presented in Table 7.3. 
Risk sharing in statutory pension plans. Risk pooling in the 
statutory pension plans is based on a nationwide separation of employ-
ees, the self-employed, and civil servants (which have several different 
pools). Except for a few minor exceptions, the statutory pension plans 
are organized on a pay-as-you-go basis. The risk of inflation and finan-
cial turbulence in pay-as-you-go systems is very restricted. The other 
risks are present, but they are shared within a nationwide pool. Given 
the fact that statutory pension benefits are required to be paid out as an-
nuities, the longevity risk is shared within each nationwide pool. The 
risk of bankruptcy of the pension provider (i.e., the Belgian state) is 
not completely unimaginable, but the risk is also shared within each 
nationwide pool. Finally, statutory pensions are subject to the risk of 
changes in pension or social security regulations (i.e., political risk). 
However, retroactive changes are difficult to enforce, given the protec-
tion as property of state and social security pensions. 
Risk sharing in occupational pension plans. The longevity risk in 
occupational pension plans is borne by the individual plan member be-
cause occupational pension benefits are almost always paid out as lump 
sums. The inflation risk during the period of pension accrual is shared 
at the company level for defined benefit plans and borne by the indi-
vidual plan member for defined contribution plans. The risk of financial 
crises and bankruptcy of the pension provider are real and reside at the 
company level. Moreover, the law fixes a minimum guaranteed return 
on occupational pension contributions. This means that the employer 
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Table 7.3  Scope of Risk Sharing within the Different Forms of Pension Accrual in Belgium 
Individual pension plans Occupational pension plans Statutory pension plans 
Social 
Industry- industry-
Individual Company Company wide wide 
Pension life plan plan plan plan Statutory 
Scope of risk sharing saving insurance (DC) (DB) (DC) (DC) pensions GIE 
Longevity No risk sharing X X X X X X 
Company 
Branch of industry 
Nationwide X X 
Inflation No risk sharing X X X X X 
Company X 
Branch of industry 
Nationwide X X 
Financial No risk sharing X X 
risks Company X X 
Branch of industry X X 
Nationwide X X 










NOTE: DB = defined benefit; DC = defined contribution. 
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remains liable to the individual plan members concerning the payments 
of the pension benefits, including a minimum return, when the pension 
fund or insurance company fails to fulfill its obligations. With respect 
to the investment of pension funds, Belgium applies the prudent person 
principle, with some quantitative limits that are mainly diversification 
requirements. With respect to group insurance, the reserves are invested 
in the general investment portfolio of the insurance company, and the 
insurance company determines the investment policy. The effect of po-
litical changes on occupational pension promises seems very small. 
Risk sharing in individual pension plans. In individual pension 
plans, the longevity and inflation risks are borne by the individual plan 
member. The risks of financial crises and bankruptcy are shared at the 
company level. However, contrary to occupational pensions, the law 
does not require a guaranteed minimum return. The bankruptcy of the 
pension provider will mean the loss, in whole or part, of the pension 
reserves.11 The effect of political changes on individual pensions seems 
very small. 
Financing and Expenditure 
Financing 
Statutory pension plans. All employees and self-employed per-
sons in Belgium pay compulsory contributions for the statutory pension 
plans. Contributions for employees are just over 16 percent of gross 
salary. Self-employed persons pay much less.12 General government 
revenues subsidize approximately 10 percent of annual costs (Dellis, 
Jousten, and Perelman 2001). 
Occupational pension plans. In occupational pension plans, the 
contribution rate in percentage of annual salary is usually established 
in the plan rules. Most plans are predominantly employer financed with 
contribution rates usually ranging from 0.5 to 1 percent for lower in-
come workers and 4 to 5 percent for higher income workers. The total 
contributions paid in Belgium for occupational pension plans amounted 
to €5.1 billion in 2007. Total occupational pension reserves in Belgium 
amounted to €48.74 billion in 2007.13 
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Individual pension plans. No one knows exactly how important 
individual pension plans are in Belgium because of the previously 
mentioned lack of data for this form of pension accrual. According to 
the Social Policy Centre of the University of Leuven (CeSo), 2.63 mil-
lion residents participated in pension saving or life insurance in 2006. 
The total contributions and premiums paid amounted to €2.1 billion 
(Berghman 2009). However, considerable differences can be found 
depending on whether or not long-term savings linked to mortgage 
loans for investment in real estate are taken into account. As mentioned 
above, similar tax relief applies to the reimbursement of a mortgage 
loan for a dwelling as to the payment of premiums for an individual life 
insurance policy. Therefore, certain researchers classify this form of 
saving as an individual pension. According to Gieselink et al. (2003), 
total premiums and contributions to individual pension plans amounted 
to €10 billion in 2000 (i.e., 4.2 percent of GDP). Following the same 
approach as Gieselink, we calculated that total premiums and contribu-
tions to individual pension plans amounted to €16 billion in 2006 (i.e., 
5.4 percent of GDP).14 
Expenditure 
To compare the expenditures for the different types of pension 
accrual, Table 7.4 presents an overview of the weight of the various 
pension plans in Belgium from two perspectives. First, pension spend-
ing for the statutory pension plans is compared with pension provisions 
for the occupational and individual pension plans (statutory pensions 
are pay as you go and occupational and individual pensions are funded). 
Second, statutory pension entitlements are compared with occupational 
and individual pension reserves. 
In 2007, statutory pension spending (including prepensions and 
disability allowances) amounted to 10 percent of GDP.15 In the same 
year, occupational pension accrual amounted to 1.52 percent of GDP. 
In 2006, individual pension accrual amounted to 0.66 percent or 5.1 
percent of GDP, depending on whether or not pension accrual linked to 
a mortgage is taken into account. 
In 2007, statutory pension entitlements amounted to 250 percent of 
GDP, and occupational pension reserves amounted to about 14.5 per-
cent of GDP. Individual pension reserves amounted to 45.1 percent of 
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GDP in 2006 (pension accrual linked to a mortgage was not taken into 
account). No exact data are available concerning the real estate prop-
erty of the elderly, but the macroeconomic wealth of the country is well 
known. It grew from €200 billion in 1970 to €1,300 billion in 2002. Ap-
proximately half of this wealth (€650 billion) is estimated to be linked 
to real estate, mainly dwellings (Belgian Secretary of Pensions 2010). 
This represented 240 percent of GDP in 2002. 
Although the comparison is simplified and exact figures are lack-
ing in some categories, the overview gives an idea of the proportion of 
investment in the different forms of pension accrual in Belgium. The 
financial assets invested in statutory pensions are the most important 
(250 percent of GDP in 2007), whereas the financial assets invested in 
occupational pensions are clearly less important (14.5 percent of GDP
in 2007). The financial assets invested in individual pensions are con-
siderable (45.1 percent of GDP in 2006), even more so if tax-driven 
investments in real estate are taken into account (up to 240 percent of 
GDP in 2002). 
Projections 
In 2007, Belgium had 1.8 million residents older than 65. This 
number will increase to 2.2 million in 2020 (i.e., 20.6 percent of the 
total population), 2.65 million in 2030 (24.3 percent), 2.86 million in 
2040 (26.1 percent), and 2.90 million in 2050 (26.5 percent). In 1990, 
for every person older than 65, Belgium had four persons between 20 
and 65. In 2020, for every person older than 65, there will only be three 
persons between 20 and 65. By 2040, this proportion will be two per-
sons between 20 and 65 for every person older than 65.16 
Projections of the impact of demographic changes on pension 
spending are only available for statutory pensions. There are no pro-
jections for occupational and individual pensions because they are not 
mandatory (except for a few branches of industry, where an industry-
wide plan is installed). Table 7.5 presents the results of projections for 
expenditure for statutory pensions, as well as an estimate of the tax 
incomes on statutory pensions, both expressed as percentage of GDP. 
Expenditure for statutory pensions increases by 3.9 percent of GDP
between 2007 and 2030. Then, between 2030 and 2060, pension expen-
diture is projected to increase by another 0.8 percent of GDP. Employee 
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Table 7.4  Relative Weight of the Various Pensions in 2007 (2006 for Individual Pension Plans)a 
Pension spending/provisionsb Pension entitlements/reserves Plan members 
€ billion % GDP € billion % GDP Number % 
Statutory Total 33.51c 10.00 837.75 250.00d 4,681,394 100% of 
pensions active 
population 
Occupational Total 5.10e 1.52 48.47 14.46 2,492,679f 60% of 
pensions employees 
Insurance 4.13 1.23 NA NA 1,794,728 43% of 
companies employees 
Pension funds 0.97 0.29 NA NA 697,950 17% of 
employees 
Individual Total (excl. 2.10g 0.66 142.50 45.10 2,626,000g 37% of 
pensions mortgage) population 
aged 15–64 
Total (incl. 16.00h 5.10 NA NA NA NA 
mortgage) 
Individual 0.91 0.27 NA NA 1,465,000 20.1% of 
life insurance population 
aged 15–64 
Pension 1.20 0.35 NA NA 1,859,000 26.4% of 
saving population 
aged 15–64 
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NOTE: NA = not available. 
a In 2007 in Belgium, GDP was €335 billion, total population was 10,584,534, total population between 15 and 64 years of age was 
7,046,685, and the active population (people working plus people searching for a job) was 4,681,394. The activity rate (i.e. percentage 
of working population plus the unemployed) was 67.1 percent. In 2006 Belgian GDP was equal to €316 billion. 
b More recent figures concerning costs of the statutory pensions in Belgium are available. In 2010 the total costs of statutory pensions 
were €33.7 billion, broken down as follows: civil servants plan, €9.9 billion; employees plan, €18.2 billion; self-employed plan, €2.7 
billion; GIE, €0.4 billion; and others, €2.5 billion (Belgian Secretary of Pensions 2010, p. 124). 
c Belgian Secretary of Pensions (2010). 
d Capretta (2007), OECD (2006), and Dellis, Jousten, and Perelman (2001, p. 3). 
e Belgian Secretary of Pensions (2010), Hannes (2009), Sommerijns and De Bilderling (2009), and Belgian Parliament (2008–2009). 
f Belgian Parliament (2009). 
g Berghman (2009). 
h Data from the Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission, analyzed in De Witte, Roels, and Stevens (2009). 
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Table 7.5  Projected Gross Statutory Pension Spending (% GDP) 
Projected expenditures 2000 2007 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 Peak year 
166 
Statutory pension plans 
Total 10.0 10.0 11.8 13.9 14.6 14.7 14.7 2056 
Employee plan 5.1 4.9 5.9 7.1 7.6 7.7 7.7 2057 
Self-employed plan 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 2035 
Civil servants’ plan 2.9 3.1 4.0 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.2 2060 
GIE 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 2036 
Prepension 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 2000 
Disability 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 2018 
Taxes on statutory pension benefits — 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2057 
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and civil servant plans are jointly responsible for these increases. The 
other pensions remain stable or decline slightly. Together, the employee 
and the civil servant plans make up 80 percent of the total public pen-
sion expenditure, and this proportion increases to 87 percent in 2060. 
Because of the rising statutory pensions, tax income on these pension 
payments will also increase from 1.3 percent of GDP in 2007 to 2 per-
cent of GDP in 2060. 
PENSION REFORM PROPOSALS OF THE MAIN SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL ACTORS 
There is a consensus in Belgium with respect to the necessity of a 
pension reform. The main social and political actors refer to two prob-
lems of the Belgian pension system: budgetary sustainability and social 
sustainability. However, no consensus exists with respect to concrete 
pension reform proposals. In fact, very different and opposing ideas 
exist. This section summarizes the reform proposals of the main social 
and political actors. 
Federation of Enterprises in Belgium 
According to the Federation of Enterprises in Belgium (FEB), the 
insurance character of the statutory pension plan for employees should 
be enforced (FEB 2010). The FEB wants to change three mechanisms 
of the employee plan: 1) the early retirement age,17 2) the capped ben-
efits,18 and 3) the so-called free rights.19 The FEB proposes an increase 
in the actual and legal retirement age. To increase the actual retirement 
age, the FEB proposes the valuation of the labor period after the age 
of 60 at a higher rate (115 percent) and the valuation of periods of in-
activity before the age of 60 (unemployment, prepension, etc.) at less 
than 100 percent. The FEB refers to the Swedish pension system, where 
individual accounts within the first pillar were introduced, and rising 
life expectancy has been corrected for by decreasing pension benefits. 
According to the FEB, the statutory pension plan for civil servants is 
much too favorable compared to the pension plans of employees (in the 
public and the private sector) and the self-employed. The calculation of 
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the statutory pension for civil servants should be based on the principles 
of the statutory pension for employees. 
According to the FEB, occupational pension plans are necessary 
to increase replacement rates. The FEB proposes the facilitation of oc-
cupational pension accrual by allowing workers to invest more of their 
wages directly into their occupational pension plans. In addition, the 
FEB believes that tax relief for the individual pensions encourages peo-
ple to save, and it should therefore remain unchanged. 
Trade Unions20 
According to the trade unions, only statutory pension plans guarantee 
solidarity. Therefore, they should be strengthened. Trade unions claim 
that statutory pension benefits for employees are too low. Twenty-five
percent of the current pensioners in Belgium are poor according to 
the European poverty standard (i.e., 60 percent or less of the median 
wage). Increasing the benefits for employees with lower incomes is a 
priority for the trade unions. They support increasing the GIE to the 
European poverty standard and the minimum pension to 110 percent of 
the European poverty standard. In addition, the trade unions also want 
to increase statutory pensions for employees with higher incomes. The 
Socialist trade union (FGTB-ABVV) proposes an increase in the statu-
tory employee pension formula, from the current 60 percent of average 
income to 75 percent of average income. The trade unions do not agree 
with an increase in the legal retirement age, which will decrease pen-
sion benefits. Finally, the trade unions want automatic adjustment of 
statutory pension benefits to the CPI and real wages (for the moment, 
adjustment of statutory pension benefits is not automatic and is only 
related to CPI, not to real wage increases).21 
To finance the extra expenditures, the trade unions propose three 
measures: 1) the so-called General Social Contribution, which is an al-
ternative financing mechanism for the social security system (statutory 
pensions are embedded in this system) that includes social contribution 
on all types of incomes (instead of only labor income); 2) higher social 
security contributions for the self-employed; and 3) a phase-out of the 
tax relief for individual and occupational pension plans. 
The trade unions are not opposed to the further development of oc-
cupational pensions, as long as those pensions also benefit employees 
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with lower incomes.22 The Christian trade union (CSC-ACV) proposes a 
ban on risk-bearing investments in occupational pensions. The Socialist 
trade union proposes the development of more mandated occupational 
pensions with solidarity mechanisms (e.g., pension accrual during un-
employment and illness). With respect to individual pension plans, the 
trade unions are unanimous. They believe that tax relief should be aban-
doned, given the fact that this relief is clearly to the benefit of higher 
income persons, who do not need these incentives to invest in pensions. 
Pensioners 
The Advisory Committee for the Pension Sector was created to 
give recommendations with respect to the organization and reform of 
the pension system. This Committee covers about 40 pensioner asso-
ciations in Belgium. The Committee proposes that absolute priority 
must be given to statutory pension plans. The Committee argues for 
a minimum pension equal to the minimum salary and an upgrading of 
the current pension benefits. According to the Committee, current pen-
sion benefits have lost their purchasing power as a result of inadequate 
CPI adjustments. The extension of the occupational pensions is not a 
solution according to the Committee because these pensions increase 
inequality and insecurity. Moreover, the Committee says that 1 percent 
of salary invested in statutory public pensions provides a higher pen-
sion benefit than 1 percent of salary invested in occupational pensions.23 
In order to finance extra expenditures for statutory pensions, the 
Committee proposes the introduction of a wealth tax. Although the 
Committee did not make a concrete proposal, it refers to France where 
such a tax exists. In addition, the Committee proposes a phase-out of 
tax relief for occupational and individual pension plans. 
Government 
With an aging population set to put mounting pressure on the bud-
get in the decades ahead, in 2001 the Belgian government created the 
so-called Silver Fund, which is a budgetary trust fund that was supposed 
to cover a portion of future pension costs. The idea was to reduce the 
debt-to-GDP burden in the near term, leaving room for the government 
to run budget deficits as the population ages and statutory pensions and 
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health care costs rise. The fund was financed by privatization proceeds 
and budget surpluses. The government’s goal was to turn the projected 
budget deficit of 0.1 percent of GDP in 2001 into a surplus of 0.7 per-
cent of GDP in 2005 and 1.5 percent of GDP in 2010 and thereafter. 
However, these targets were never met. On the contrary, the recent fi-
nancial and economic crisis strongly increased the debt-to-GDP burden, 
and the Silver Fund remains fundamentally empty. 
In 2005, the Belgian government tried to increase the actual retire-
ment age. A new early retirement regulation, the “Generation Pact,” 
was enacted. The results thus far have been limited, however. Currently 
there are no concrete pension reform proposals from the government. 
Within most political parties, a consensus exists about the guidelines 
formulated by the EU in Stockholm in 2001, that is, decrease govern-
ment debt, increase employment and labor productivity, and decrease 
costs of public pension systems and health care. In the Green Paper: A 
Future for our Pensions (Belgian Secretary of Pensions 2010), the gov-
ernment refers to a series of possible reforms. The following reforms 
focus on the budgetary sustainability of the system: increased retirement 
age, decreased pension benefits, decreased tax relief for occupational 
and individual pensions, and increased taxes. In addition, two reforms 
that focus on social sustainability were introduced: increased minimum 
pension benefits and increased participation in occupational and indi-
vidual pension plans. Some of these proposals are discussed in the next 
section. 
EVALUATION OF THE VARIOUS PENSION 
REFORM PROPOSALS 
Many different reform options are available, and the choice between 
them is based on ideology and value judgments. To be clear about the 
evaluation criteria used, I first develop a set of evaluation criteria and 
then evaluate the various reform proposals discussed above in terms of 
these criteria. 
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Evaluation Criteria 
In this section, four types of pension accrual are defined: 1) long-
term savings, 2) private insurance, 3) social insurance, and 4) social 
security. These four types are then distinguished on the basis of their 
intrinsic features, using the following criteria: the degree of redistribu-
tive solidarity, the scope of risk sharing, and the degree of protection of 
pension rights. 
Degree of redistributive solidarity 
Various forms of pension accrual can be distinguished based on their 
degree of redistributive solidarity. The four degrees of redistributive sol-
idarity are as follows: 1) no redistribution at all, 2) redistribution based 
on “probability-solidarity,” 3) redistribution based on “risk-solidarity,”
and 4) redistribution based on “income-solidarity.” Redistribution 
based on probability-solidarity is present when different persons with 
similar risk profiles are pooled in one group and pay the same pen-
sion contributions or insurance premiums. Redistribution in this group 
is from those who do not actually experience the adverse event (e.g., 
death in the case of survivor’s benefits) to those who do, even though 
they all share a similar probability of experiencing it. Redistribution 
based on risk-solidarity is present when different persons with different 
risk profiles are pooled together and pay the same pension contributions 
or insurance premiums. In this system, persons with better risk profiles 
subsidize persons with inferior risk profiles. Redistribution based on
income-solidarity involves contribution or premium differentiation 
based on income, so that persons with higher incomes pay higher pre-
miums for the same benefits. In this system, direct income redistribution 
takes place, independent of risk profiles. The degree of reciprocity in a 
system based on income-solidarity can be higher or lower. If there is no 
link between entitlement to benefits and the payment of contributions in 
the past, the degree of reciprocity is nil (e.g., the GIE in Belgium). How-
ever, in many income redistributive systems, there is some connection 
between the entitlement to benefits and the payment of contributions 
in the past (e.g., the statutory pension plans in Belgium). Risk- and 
income-solidarity are necessarily linked to a certain degree of manda-
tory membership (Stevens 2002). 
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Scope of risk sharing 
Pension accrual often takes place over a period of decades. There-
fore, risk control is a very important issue. As discussed previously, 
there are five primary risks that threaten pension accrual and four scopes 
for distinguishing risk sharing (Table 7.3). 
Degree of protection of pension rights 
The protection of pension rights varies for different types of pen-
sion accrual. Protection can be granted on three fields: 1) protection 
of investment returns, 2) protection against bankruptcy of the pension 
provider, and 3) protection of the destination as pension (e.g., interdic-
tion of provisions on lump sum payments and early withdrawals). In 
the protection of the investment returns, three options are available: 
no guaranteed investment returns, guaranteed investment returns by 
contract (optional), and guaranteed investment returns by law (manda-
tory). In the protection against bankruptcy of the pension provider, four 
degrees of protection are possible: 1) no protection, 2) liability of the 
sponsor for the payment of the pension benefits, 3) pension protection 
funds, and 4) state guarantees. In the protection of the destination as 
pension, three degrees of protection can be distinguished: no prohibi-
tion of payout before pensionable age and no prohibition of payout as a 
lump sum after pensionable age; prohibition of payout before pension-
able age, but no prohibition of payout as a lump sum after pensionable 
age; and prohibition of payout before pensionable age and obligation of 
payout as an annuity after pensionable age. 
Four types of pension accrual 
Based on the above-mentioned features, we defined four types of 
pension accrual. These types are prototypes, which do not necessarily 
correspond to real forms of pension accrual in Belgium or other coun-
tries. We named these types long-term savings, private insurance, social 
insurance, and social security. Long-term savings is a type of pension 
accrual without any form of redistributive solidarity, no risk sharing, 
and no protection of pension rights. Private insurance is a type of pen-
sion accrual with redistributive effects based on probability-solidarity, 
risk sharing at the company level, and limited protection of pension 
rights. Social insurance is a type of pension accrual with redistributive 
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effects based on risk-solidarity, risk sharing at branch of industry level, 
and heavy protection of pension rights. Social security, finally, is a type 
of pension accrual with income-redistributive effects, nationwide risk 
sharing, and heavy protection of pension rights. A schematic overview 
of the distinguishing criteria of these four types of pension accrual is 
shown in Table 7.6. 
The various forms of actual pension accrual in Belgium are eval-
uated in Appendix 7A with respect to their degree of redistributive 
solidarity, scope of risk sharing, and degree of protection of pension 
rights. The results of this evaluation are reordered in Table 7.7 to show 
the various forms of pension accrual in Belgium relative to accrual pro-
totype. The table shows some interesting results. First, it shows that no 
form of actual pension accrual in Belgium corresponds entirely to one 
prototype. Each form of pension accrual presents features of different 
prototypes of pension accrual. 
The individual pension plans are entirely based on the long-term 
savings and private insurance prototypes. Their degree of redistributive 
solidarity, risk sharing, and protection of pension rights is very low. 
The occupational pensions, except for social industry-wide plans, 
also show many similarities with the long-term savings and private in-
surance types of pension accrual. This is remarkable, given the fact that 
occupational pensions are often referred to in Belgium as social insur-
ance systems. The only social insurance features of the occupational 
pension plans are the risk-solidarity in defined benefit survivor’s pen-
sions and social industry-wide pensions, the sharing of bankruptcy and 
financial risks at the branch of industry level for industry-wide plans 
(longevity and inflation risk are not shared, see Table 7A.1), and the 
liability of the sponsor in case of bankruptcy of the pension provider. 
Moreover, a social security feature is present—the mandatory guaran-
teed investment return. 
As might be expected, the statutory pension plans have the most 
properties of social security, and the GIE is clearly social security 
because income redistributive solidarity, without any reciprocity, is 
present (the entitlement to GIE benefits is not linked to the payment of 
contributions in the past). For the other statutory pensions, a certain de-
gree of reciprocity is present (benefits are calculated based on earnings 
in the past). This is a social insurance character of the statutory pension 
plans for employees, civil servants, and the self-employed. However, 
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Table 7.6  Four Types of Pension Accrual 
Type of pension accrual Features 
Long-term savings 1) No redistributive solidarity 
2) No risk sharing 
3) No protection of pension rights 
•	 No guaranteed investment returns 
•	 No protection against bankruptcy of the pension provider 
•	 Payment of pension benefits as a lump sum at any moment in time 
Private insurance 1) Redistributive effects based on probability-solidarity 
2) Risk sharing at company level 
3) Small protection of pension rights 
•	 Guaranteed investment returns by contract (optional) 
•	 No protection against bankruptcy of the pension provider 
•	 Payment of pension benefits as a lump sum at the date in the insurance contract 
Social insurance 1) Redistributive effects based on risk-solidarity 
2) Risk sharing at branch of industry level 
3) Medium protection of pension rights 
•	 Guaranteed investment returns by contract (optional) 
•	 Liability of the sponsor in case of bankruptcy of the pension provider 
•	 Payment of pension benefits in the form of an annuity at retirement age 
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Social security 1) Income-redistributive effects 
2) Nationwide risk sharing 
3) High protection of pension rights 
•	 Guaranteed investment returns by law (mandatory) 
•	 Pension protection funds or state guarantee in case of bankruptcy of the pension provider 
•	 Payment of pension benefits in the form of an annuity after retirement 
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No risk sharing X X X X X X 
No guaranteed 
investment return X 
No protection against 
bankruptcy 
Payment of pension 
benefits as a lump sum 
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Private Redistributive effects 
insurance based on probability- X 
solidarity 
Risk sharing at 
company level X X X X 
Guaranteed investment 
return (by contract) X X X 
Payment of pension 
benefits as a lump 





based on risk-solidarity X X 
Income-redistributive 
effects (with a certain X 
degree of reciprocity) 
Risk sharing at branch 
of industry level X X 
Liability of the sponsor 
in case of bankruptcy X X X X 
of the pension provider 
Payment of pension 
benefits as an annuity 
at pensionable age 
(continued) 
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Table 7.7 (continued) 
Individual Occupational Statutory 
pension plans pension plans pension plans 
Social 
Industry- industry-
Individual Company Company wide wide 
Pension life plan plan plan plan Statutory 
Types of pension accrual saving insurance (DC) (DB) (DC) (DC) pensions GIE 
Social Income-redistributive 
security effects (without X 
reciprocity) 
Nationwide risk 
sharing X X 
Guaranteed investment 
return (by law) X X X 
Protection fund or state 
guarantee in case of 
bankruptcy of pension X X 
provider 
Payment of pension 
benefits as an annuity X X 
after retirement 
NOTE: DB = defined benefit; DC = defined contribution. 
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the social insurance character is limited—persons with higher incomes 
pay higher contributions for, at a certain level, equal benefits. The risk 
sharing within statutory pensions is nationwide, and the protection of 
pension benefits is very high. 
The classification of the various forms of pension accrual in Bel-
gium, according to their intrinsic characteristics, allows us to evaluate 
the different reform proposals according to the type of pension accrual 
they promote. 
Evaluation of Reform Proposals 
When evaluating each proposal, I also briefly explain the type of 
reform (parametric or structural),24 the aim (budgetary or social sustain-
ability), and the cost bearer (government, employers, or employees). 
Changing tax relief for occupational and individual pensions 
Occupational and individual pensions in Belgium are strongly 
tax driven. A decrease in the tax relief for occupational and individ-
ual pensions is a parametric reform aimed to improve the budgetary 
sustainability of the Belgian pension system. If implemented, it would 
probably decrease the proportion of this kind of pension accrual 
within the Belgium pension system. An increase of the tax relief for 
occupational and individual pensions is a parametric reform aimed 
at improving the social sustainability of the pension system. It would 
probably increase the proportion of this type of pension accrual within 
the Belgium pension system. 
As shown above, individual and occupational pensions are mainly 
based on the long-term savings and private insurance prototypes (except 
for the social industry-wide plans). A decrease or increase of individual 
and occupational pensions will respectively decrease or increase the 
proportion of long-term savings and private insurance within the Bel-
gian pension system. 
Increased retirement age 
An increase of the retirement age can take place within statutory 
pensions, occupational pensions, and individual pensions. However, it 
will most likely occur primarily within statutory pensions. The increase 
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in the retirement age can be achieved by increasing the legal retirement 
age or the career length required to obtain full benefits. Increasing the 
statutory retirement age is a parametric pension reform aimed at im-
proving the budgetary sustainability of the pension system. This reform 
is at the expense of employees, civil servants, and the self-employed 
who, in one way or another, will have to work longer for the same statu-
tory pension benefits or receive lower benefits. 
Statutory pensions in Belgium are closest to the social security type 
of pension accrual. An increase in retirement age would mean that the 
proportion of this type of pension accrual within the Belgium pension 
system would decrease. 
Increased minimum benefits of statutory pensions 
An increase of the minimum benefits of statutory pensions (the GIE 
and minimum pension for employees and the self-employed) is a para-
metric pension reform aimed at improving the social sustainability of 
the pension system. Initially, this reform will be at the expense of the 
government, which will most probably recoup the increased expendi-
tures from taxpayers or decrease other statutory pension benefits. 
If the increase in minimum benefits of statutory pensions is com-
pensated for by a decrease in other statutory pension benefits, the 
proportion of the social insurance type of pension accrual in Belgium 
would probably decrease in comparison with the social security type. 
If the increase is financed with increased taxes, the proportion of social 
insurance and social security types of pension accrual would increase. 
Increased statutory pension benefits via a wealth tax 
The Advisory Committee for the Pension Sector proposes an in-
crease in statutory pensions by means of a wealth tax. The financing 
of statutory pensions by means of a wealth tax is a structural pension 
reform aimed at both the budgetary and social sustainability of the pen-
sion system. This reform is at the expense of the wealthiest citizens. 
To the extent that the extra tax revenues are used to strengthen the 
statutory pension plans in Belgium, the proportion of social insurance 
and social security types of pension accrual would increase within the 
Belgian pension system. 
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THE IDEAL PENSION SYSTEM FOR BELGIUM 
The Current Main Problem 
The benefits of the statutory pension plans are considered too low 
for employees and the self-employed. Occupational pensions cover 
only 60 percent of employees, and the benefits are too low, except for 
higher income persons. Individual pensions cover 37 percent of Belgian 
residents (15–64 years old), and their total reserves amounted to 45.1 
percent of GDP in 2007. This percentage is even higher if tax-driven 
investments in real estate are taken into account. The main problem of 
the Belgian pension system at present is not the total amount of invest-
ment in pension accrual. The main problem is the large proportion of 
investment in the long-term savings and private insurance prototypes. 
The degree of redistributive solidarity, the scope of risk sharing, and 
the protection of pension rights associated with these types of pension 
accrual are very low. As a consequence, groups with weak bargaining 
power (lower income workers, women, and those with atypical careers) 
are not covered or are inadequately covered. The question we have to 
ask, then, is which types of pension accrual do we want to promote in 
the future? 
Pensions as Social Goods 
In public economics, a distinction is made between three types of 
goods: public, private, and social. A public good is defined as a good 
that is non-rivaled and non-excludable. This means that consumption 
of the good by one individual does not reduce the amount of the good 
available for consumption by others and that no one can be effectively 
excluded from it (e.g., clean air, national defense, or public fireworks). 
A private good is the opposite of a public good. It is excludable, for 
example, to those who have not paid for it, and consumption by one 
consumer prevents simultaneous consumption by other consumers. A
social good is a private good for which consumption is stimulated by the 
government for various reasons, including social policy. A government 
decides that individuals should have a particular social good based on 
a norm other than responding just to consumer preferences. This norm 
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could be the public interest, common well-being, or general welfare. 
A social good would be under-consumed in a free market economy. 
Because of its positive externalities, the government stimulates con-
sumption through social policy measures.25 Pensions can be considered 
to be social goods insofar as they meet two conditions: 1) they have to 
show a certain degree of solidarity, risk sharing, and protection, and 2) 
they may not exceed a certain percentage of final salary. 
The Ideal Pension System for Belgium 
I have shown that individual and occupational pension plans in 
Belgium (except for social industry-wide plans) mainly show char-
acteristics of long-term savings and private insurance. They lack the 
necessary degree of solidarity, risk sharing, and protection of pension 
rights to qualify as pensions. If these pension plans are to maintain their 
tax incentives, they need to integrate more features of social insurance, 
for example, mandatory payment of annuities instead of lump sums, 
continued pension accrual during periods of illness or unemployment, 
risk sharing at the branch of industry level, and protection of pension 
rights in case of bankruptcy of the pension provider. Moreover, once 
a certain accumulated sum of total pension provisions is reached,26 no 
more tax incentives for individual and occupational pensions should be 
allowed. In an ideal pension system for Belgium, the statutory pensions 
would guarantee benefits of 60 percent of final salary. The individual 
and occupational pensions would cover the difference up to 75 percent 
of final salary. No tax incentives would be granted for pension provision 
above 75 percent of final salary. Individual and occupational pensions 
still would have an important role, but tax incentives would only be 
granted if minimum degrees of solidarity, risk sharing, and protection 
of pension rights are met. 
Type of Welfare Regime 
The underlying ideological matter with respect to the ideal pension 
system of a country is to what extent the government is responsible 
for the retirement income of individuals. Three different types of wel-
fare regimes can be distinguished: the liberal, the conservative, and the 
social democratic (Esping-Andersen 1990). In the liberal welfare re-
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gime, the pension system increases inequality. The limits of welfare 
equal the marginal propensity to opt for welfare instead of work. En-
titlement rules are strict and often associated with stigma. Benefits are 
modest. The government encourages the market, either by guaranteeing 
only a minimum benefit or by subsidizing private welfare plans. In the 
conservative welfare regime, the pension system preserves inequality. 
The redistributive impact of the pension system is negligible. Social 
insurance typically excludes nonworking wives. The principle of sub-
sidiarity serves to emphasize that the government will only interfere 
when the family’s capacity to service its members is exhausted. In the 
social democratic welfare regime, finally, the pension system decreases 
inequality. The government pursues an equality of the highest standards, 
not an equality of minimal needs. This implies, first, that services and 
benefits will be upgraded to levels commensurate with benefits of the 
middle classes. And, second, that equality is furnished by guaranteeing 
workers full participation in the quality of rights enjoyed by the better-
off. The Belgian pension system clearly shows characteristics of the 
conservative regime. An ideal pension system for Belgium should show 
more characteristics of a social-democratic welfare regime. 
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Main Features of the
Different Forms of Pension
Accrual in Belgium 
In this Appendix, I briefly evaluate the different forms of pension accrual 
in Belgium with respect to their degree of redistributive solidarity, risk shar-
ing, and protection of pension rights. The different forms of pension accrual 
in Belgium are individual pension plans (pension saving and individual life 
insurance), occupational pension plans (defined benefit or defined contribution 
plans at the company level, defined contribution plans at the industry level, and 
social industry-wide defined contribution plans), and statutory pension plans 
(social security pensions and guaranteed income for the elderly). An overview 
of the evaluation is presented in Table 7A.1. 
Individual Pension Plans 
Pension saving in individual pension plans includes no redistributive sol-
idarity, no risk sharing, and little protection of pension rights. In Belgium, 
the clear distinction between financial institutions and insurance companies 
or between long-term savings and private insurance has disappeared (special-
ists often speak of the “bancassurance” as the phenomenon where banks and 
insurance companies both offer products linked to savings and insurance). 
Consequently, pension saving in a bank is often linked to insurance products. A
guaranteed investment return can be agreed upon. Moreover, the first €100,000 
of pension savings in a bank account is covered by a state guarantee. Indi-
vidual life insurance as a form of individual pension includes no redistributive 
solidarity with respect to old-age pension accrual. With respect to survivor’s 
pensions, a redistribution based on probability-solidarity is present. Private in-
surance includes no risk-sharing whatsoever. With respect to the protection of 
pension rights, a guaranteed investment return is granted by contract (through 
the insurance mechanism), and pension benefits are paid at the date agreed 
upon in the insurance contract (early surrender of the policy may be possible). 
Occupational Pension Plans 
With respect to occupational pensions, defined contribution plans at the 
company level include no redistributive solidarity and no sharing of risks linked 
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to longevity and inflation. The risks linked to financial markets and bankruptcy 
are shared at the company level. A medium protection of pension rights is pres-
ent—there is a guaranteed investment return by law, liability of the sponsor in 
case of bankruptcy of the pension provider, and no payment of pension benefits 
before retirement age (early withdrawal of pension benefits is possible for the 
purchase or renovation of a plan member’s own dwelling). Defined benefit 
plans at the company level include no redistributive solidarity with respect to 
old-age pensions. With respect to survivor’s pensions, a redistribution based on 
risk solidarity is present (people with different risk profiles are pooled together 
in one group). The risk of longevity is not shared within defined benefit plans 
at the company level. The risks linked to inflation, financial markets, and bank-
ruptcy of the pension provider are shared at the company level. As for defined 
contribution plans, a medium protection of pension rights is present (because 
the issue is not applicable to defined benefit plans, a guaranteed investment 
return is provided by law only for defined contribution plans). Industry-wide 
plans include no redistributive solidarity and no sharing of the risks linked to 
longevity and inflation. Risks linked to financial markets and bankruptcy are 
shared at the industry level. The same protection of pension rights applies for 
both defined benefit and defined contribution plans at the company level. The 
social industry-wide plans differ from standard industry-wide plans only with 
respect to their degree of redistributive solidarity. Membership in these plans 
is mandatory and people with different risk profiles are pooled together. In case 
of illness, employment, pregnancy, and other circumstances, pension accrual 
continues, and therefore, redistribution based on risk solidarity is present (for 
old-age and survivor’s pensions). 
Statutory Pension Plans 
Social security pensions include income-solidarity, nationwide risk 
sharing, and full protection of pension rights. The difference between social 
security pensions and the GIE is the degree of reciprocity within the income 
solidarity. For the GIE there is no link between entitlement to benefits and pay-
ment of contributions in the past. For social security pensions, there is some 
proportional connection between the entitlement to benefits and the payment 
of contributions in the past. 
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Table 7A.1  Evaluation of the Different Forms of Pension Accrual in Belgium 
Individual Statutory pension 
pension plans Occupational pension plans plans 
Industry- Social 
Individual Company Company wide industry- Social 
Pension life plan plan plan wide plan security 
Criteria to evaluate pension accrual saving insurance (DC) (DB) (DC) (DC) pensions GIEa 
Degree of Old age 
redistributive pension 
No redistributive 
solidarity X X X X X 
solidarity Probability-solidarity 
Risk-solidarity X 






solidarity X X X 
Probability-solidarity X 
Risk-solidarity X X 
Income-solidarity (R) X 
Scope of risk Longevity No risk sharing X X X X X X 
taking Company 
Branch of industry 
Nationwide X X 
(continued) 
guarantee
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No protection X X
Liability of the 
sponsor X X X X
Pension protection 
funds or state X X X
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Table 7A.1 (continued) 
Individual Statutory pension 
pension plans Occupational pension plans plans 
Industry- Social 
Individual Company Company wide industry- Social 
Pension life plan plan plan wide plan security 








of pension of 
rights investment 
returns 
No risk sharing X X X X X 
Company X 
Branch of industry 
Nationwide X X 
No risk sharing X X 
Company X X 
Branch of industry X X 
Nationwide X X 
No risk sharing X X 
Company X X 
Branch of industry X X 
Nationwide X X 
No guaranteed Xinvestment return 
Guaranteed 
investment return by X X X 
contract 
Guaranteed 
investment return X X X X X 
by law 
provider Pension protection 
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Liability of the 
sponsor 
Pension protection 
funds or state 
guarantee 
Payment of pension 
benefits as a lump 
sum at any moment 
in time 
Payment of pension 
benefits as a lump 
sum on date in 
contract 
Payment of pension 
benefits in the form 
of an annuity at 
pensionable age 
Payment of pension 
benefits in the form 
of an annuity after 
retirement 
X X 
X X X X 
X X X 
X 
X X X X X 
X X 
NOTE: DB: defined benefit; DC: defined contribution; R: with a certain degree of reciprocity; NR: no reciprocity. 
aThere is no survivor’s pension linked to the GIE. 
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Notes 
1. For example, a single person who worked 35 years will receive an annuity equal to 
35/45 × average (capped) earnings × 60 percent. A married person with a depen-
dent spouse who worked 40 years will receive an annuity equal to 40/45 × average 
(capped) earnings × 75 percent. In 2008, the wage of 20.1 percent of full-time 
private sector employees was higher than the wage ceiling (Belgian Secretary of 
Pension 2010, p. 127). 
2. It is possible to retire at the age of 60, provided the person had a minimum career 
length of 35 years. To stimulate employees to work until the age of 65, a pension 
bonus has been granted for each working day after the age of 62 or after a career 
of 44 years. After retirement a person may continue to work, although his or her 
pension may be adjusted (i.e., reduced) for earnings above certain levels. 
3. The calculation of penalties in case of early retirement (before 65) and the absence 
of a minimum claim per year are examples of the differences. Legal retirement 
age, the pension bonus, price indexation, and the survivor’s pension are similar to 
the employee plan. 
4. Civil servants who have been declared permanently unfit to continue their careers, 
regardless of their age or seniority, are entitled to a disability pension. 
5. New legislation has severely restricted internal funding via book reserves. 
6. Belgium has an elaborate network of collective negotiation bodies. In labor mat-
ters, employee representatives and employer representative bodies meet at different 
levels to discuss collective measures. The National Labor Council supervises 200 
joint committees, organized by industry type. Therefore, for the companies in a 
particular industry, there is a body of representatives of both employers and em-
ployees that meets to conclude binding collective bargaining agreements or more 
politically engaging social agreements. 
7. According to the OECD, tax incentives for occupational pension plans cannot be 
preserved because they mainly benefit higher income workers, who have already 
enough savings for their retirement (OECD 2007, 2009). 
8. The maximum statutory pension benefit for a single person who has been an em-
ployee during his entire career is €1,800 per month (€2,200 for married persons 
with a dependent spouse). The maximum is €1,000 per month for a single person 
who has been self-employed during his entire career (€1,200 for married self-
employed persons with a dependent spouse). 
9. The replacement rate is the fraction of previous salary that the statutory pension 
benefits replace. In order to calculate these rates, previous gross salary (or the 
average of the 5 last years of net income of self-employed) is compared with gross 
statutory pension benefits, including holiday pay and other supplements. 
10. Industry-wide plans in Belgium are always defined contribution plans. 
11. Insurance companies can purchase a state guarantee for the first €100,000 of indi-
vidual pension reserves (Royal Decree of November 14, 2008). 
12. Statutory pensions are embedded in the social security system. The social security 
contributions for the self-employed are capped. The self-employed pay a maxi-
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mum of €3,664.49 per quarter (in 2009). This amount corresponds to 22 percent 
of the income up to €51,059.94 and 14.16 percent of the income above that up to 
the cap of €75,246.19. This system restricts redistributive solidarity because a self-
employed person with a net income of, for example, €80,000 pays the same social 
security contributions as one with a net income of €300,000. Employees pay social 
security contributions on their entire salary. 
13. About 80 percent of occupational pensions are managed by insurance companies 
and about 20 percent are managed by pension funds (Hannes 2009; Sommerijns 
and De Bilderling 2009). 
14. These estimates are based on data from the Banking, Finance, and Insurance Com-
mission. The accumulated reserves for voluntary pensions for the self-employed 
are very limited—they amounted to €28 million in 1996 and €72 million in 2000
(Gieselink et al. 2003). 
15. Half of total spending goes to the employee plan (4.9 percent of GDP), and one-
third goes to the civil servants plan (3.1 percent of GDP). The rest goes to disability 
pensions (0.8 percent of GDP), the self-employed plan (0.7 percent of GDP), pre-
pensions (0.4 percent of GDP), and the GIE (0.1 percent of GDP). 
16. This demographic evolution is mainly present in the Flemish region in Belgium. 
17. The average retirement age is 59.5 years for men and 58.2 years for women. 
18. Statutory pension contributions are calculated on the entire salary, whereas the 
benefits of statutory pensions are capped, taking into account a maximum salary 
of €47,282 (2009). The FEB proposes the introduction of more earnings-related 
benefits. 
19. According to the FEB, one-third of statutory pension benefits are attributed with-
out any social security contribution of the beneficiary. 
20. Trade unions play a very important role in Belgium. Seventy-five percent of em-
ployees and civil servants are members of a trade union. The two major unions 
are the Christian trade union (CSC-ACV) and the Socialist trade union (FGTB-
ABVV). The third major union is the Liberal trade union (ACLVB-CGSLB), 
which is much smaller. The pension reform proposal of each union can be found 
on their websites. 
21. According to the trade unions, one reason for low pension benefits in Belgium lies 
in the indexation rules used to calculate initial benefits. In the Belgian benefit for-
mula, wage histories are brought forward for averaging adjusted for prices rather 
than wage growth, the latter being the usual practice in most countries. This provi-
sion has the effect of gradually reducing per capita benefits relative to per capita 
wages over time. 
22. According to the trade unions, only 2 percent of the employees with the lowest 
statutory pensions benefit from an occupational pension as compared to 36 percent 
of the employees with the highest statutory pensions. 
23. A study at the University of Leuven, ordered by the Christian trade union, shows 
that the return or efficiency of statutory public pensions is higher than the return of 
occupational and individual pensions, as a result of the considerable administra-
tion costs of the latter (Pacolet and Strengs 2009). 
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24. Structural pension reforms are reforms that change essential features of the pen-
sion system, for example, the transformation from pay as you go to a funded plan, 
from defined benefit to defined contribution plans, or from average salary to fi-
nal salary plans. Parametric pension reforms are reforms that change the value of 
certain parameters, for example, career length, minimum pension, or the defined 
benefit percentage. However, some parametric reforms lead to structural changes 
in the overall pension system. For example, the further development of occupa-
tional and individual pensions will also lead to a change in the proportion between 
funded and pay-as-you-go financing. Obviously, the weight of funded pensions 
would increase in this situation. 
25. Musgrave (1957) introduced the concept of a merit good, but I prefer the notion 
social good, which is used here. According to Musgrave, different rationales can 
be found for the existence of merit goods. There may be more acceptance for 
income redistribution in the form of goods, rather than purchasing power. Con-
sumption of merit goods needs to be stimulated because when consumed, a merit 
good creates positive externalities (there is a divergence between private benefit 
and public benefit and most consumers only take into account private benefit) and 
most individuals are short-term utility maximizers and so do not take into account 
the long-term benefits of consuming a merit good. Examples of merit goods in-
clude education, subsidized housing, and health care. 
26. That is, an accumulated sum of statutory pension, occupational pension, and indi-
vidual pension. 
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System for France 
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The French pension system involves almost no funding. The 
French savings rate is high and bolstering retirement income is a ma-
jor motivation for savings, but French people rarely use savings plans 
that are dedicated to retirement. Public sector employees do not need 
supplementary pensions since replacement rates provided by the exist-
ing pay-as-you-go plans are quite high. In the private sector, the social 
security retirement plan does not provide an adequate replacement rate. 
However, all private sector employees are covered by mandatory na-
tionwide supplementary plans that function on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
Thus, even the main supplementary pension plans do not involve fund-
ing. In the private sector, employer-sponsored plans are rare. They exist 
for employees of a few publicly owned or formerly publicly owned 
companies, mainly the national railway and gas and electricity compa-
nies, but these plans are also run on a pay-as-you-go basis. In addition 
to mandatory plans, a few large private companies run their own pen-
sion plans, but most of these have been closed. 
A national pension system can be evaluated in the light of three cri-
teria: 1) the extent of coverage, 2) the degree to which risks are shared, 
and 3) the adequacy of benefits. The first two criteria, however, do not 
merit much discussion in the case of France. 
Coverage is not an issue—the French pension system provides uni-
versal coverage through employment-linked benefits for retired workers 
plus a means-tested minimum income (minimum vieillesse) for people 
195 
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age 65 and over who have worked little or not at all. Whenever workers 
are employed, they acquire pension rights. However, the unemploy-
ment rate is high, and underemployment is common. Therefore, while 
coverage by pension plans is not a problem, the capacity of workers to 
find employment at a decent wage is an issue. 
Since the French pension system is financed on a pay-as-you-go 
basis, the question of how financial risks are shared does not arise. Al-
though funded plans have been growing in importance in recent years, 
their overall contribution to retirement income remains very small. The 
main form of risk associated with the French pension system—as for 
most public pension plans in Europe—is “political” risk. Indeed, over 
the past 20 years, successive governments have implemented a series of 
reforms that have resulted in a decline in social security pension levels 
relative to earnings. Moreover, further decreases are currently being 
recommended by policymakers. Hence, adequacy of benefits has now 
become the main issue for the French pension system. 
The first part of this chapter briefly describes the organization of the 
French pension system, its main features, and trends in the level of pen-
sions since the 1980s. The second part outlines guiding principles that 
might be applied to reform the pension system for the better. Possible 
measures for improving the system are then discussed, including rein-
stating a target replacement rate, continuing to enable workers to retire 
at 60, redefining eligibility criteria for retirement that are coherent with 
the actual functioning of the labor market, and increasing the financial 
resources of the pension system. 
PRESENT SITUATION AND TRENDS 
As in many other developed countries, the present pension system 
started after World War II, with the creation of social security. Pen-
sions for civil servants were established much earlier, in the nineteenth 
century.1 Before 1945, there were attempts to set up retirement pen-
sion systems for private sector employees, with laws enacted in 1910 
and 1930. These arrangements were not successful, largely because the 
plans were funded and were therefore unable to guarantee benefits in 
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the face of great economic turbulence during the first half of the twen-
tieth century (apRoberts and Concialdi 2009). 
Early Development of the Retirement System: 1945 to 1982 
In 1945, the government planned to create a universal social secu-
rity pension plan for all workers, called the Régime général or General 
Plan. However, some categories of workers did not want to join this uni-
fied plan. Civil servants and employees of some large public enterprises 
(the electricity company, EDF; the gas company, GDF; the railroad 
company, SNCF; etc.) were already covered by occupational plans that 
were more generous than the new General Plan. They kept their oc-
cupational plans and stayed outside the General Plan. These separate 
occupational plans are called régimes spéciaux, or “special plans.” The 
self-employed also did not want to join the General Plan, which they 
felt would be dominated by trade unions representing employees; they 
succeeded in establishing their own pension plans, without joining the 
General Plan. 
Higher paid private sector employees were reluctant to join the new 
General Plan. These employees are referred to as “cadres,” a term that 
encompasses managers and highly skilled technical staff. The new Gen-
eral Plan was to collect contributions and pay out benefits on wages 
below a ceiling, known as the social security ceiling. Higher paid em-
ployees succeeded in keeping this ceiling rather low, well below the 
wages of most cadres. Therefore, the higher paid employees wanted to 
establish a supplementary plan, based on their wages above the ceiling. 
In 1947, when the General Plan began to function, cadres joined it. 
At the same time, they established a supplementary occupational plan, 
through a collective agreement, negotiated by employers’ associations 
and trade unions for cadres throughout the private sector. 
Supplementary occupational plans came to cover all private sector 
employees over the following decades.2 Plans for non-cadres were set 
up in the late 1950s and early 1960s. A law passed in 1972 made it com-
pulsory for every private sector worker covered by the General Plan 
to be covered by a supplementary plan. Today, employees contribute 
to the supplementary plans on total wages, but the contribution rate is 
higher on wages above the social security ceiling than on wages below 
it. This partially offsets the fact that the General Plan only takes wages 
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below the ceiling into account. These supplementary plans play an im-
portant role in the French pension system: they pay out about one-third 
of total private sector pension benefits. Unlike supplementary plans in 
most other countries, French supplementary plans are organized on a 
pay-as-you-go basis (for a history of their development, see apRoberts 
and Concialdi [2009] and Lynes [1985]). 
The French system also provides a means-tested minimum benefit 
for the elderly. This minimum was reformed and improved in 1956. 
Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, the minimum income for the 
elderly played an important role. Three-fourths of pensioners were re-
ceiving it in the late 1950s, versus fewer than 8 percent today. Its level 
increased considerably during the 1970s and the early 1980s. 
In the 1970s, the rules governing entitlement to and calculation of 
General Plan pensions were made more generous. Advantages were 
granted to specific categories of workers (manual laborers) or under 
specific circumstances (bonuses for women who had reared children). 
In the mid-1970s, a mechanism of transfers between separate plans was 
set up to compensate for demographic differences (the ratio of retirees 
to contributors). This system of transfers was possible because nearly 
all pension plans are organized on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
An important reform took place in 1983. A minimum contributory 
pension (minimum contributif ) was created for workers with a full ca-
reer at low wages. Also the age for retiring with a full rate basic pension 
was reduced from 65 to 60. Before this reform, workers could retire at 
age 60, but in that case, they got only half of the full rate. Since 1983, 
the General Plan has been organized around two key legal ages (for 
more information about the formula, see Appendix 8A). 
Sixty is the age at which workers can start claiming their pension. 
If they have a full career, they get the full rate of 50 percent of the 
reference wage. In the 1980s, the reference wage was the average of 
the highest 10 years of wages below the social security ceiling. If the 
worker’s career is less than full length, the rate of the pension is reduced 
in proportion to the shortfall in their insurance period. 
Sixty-five is the retirement age at which every worker can get the 
full rate, whether they have had a full career or not. If the worker’s ca-
reer is less than full, the pension is reduced in proportion to the shortfall 
in the insurance period. However, the pension rate of 50 percent is not 
reduced. 
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The improvements described above shaped the French pension 
system of today. Three main features characterize the current French 
pension system. 
First, pension plans are organized on an occupational basis. As a 
consequence, the system is fragmented by socio-professional status 
(making it a “Bismarckian” system in international comparisons). There 
has been a trend toward less fragmentation. In 1945, there were more 
than 200 different basic pension plans whereas there are only about 20 
today. 
Second, all mandatory plans, including the main supplementary 
plans, are organized on a pay-as-you-go basis. Funded plans—employer- 
provided or individual—play a very marginal role, providing less than 
3 percent of total pension benefits in 2008. Workers do not bear any 
financial risk. 
Finally, the system of compulsory pay-as-you-go plans provides a 
replacement rate that is among the highest in Europe. For retirees with 
a full career, average replacement rates (first pension benefit received 
divided by end-of-career wage level) were 76 percent for civil servants 
and 83 percent for private sector employees in the second half of the 
1990s (Direction de la recherche, des études, de l’évaluation et des 
statistiques [DREES] 2004).3 The difference between civil servants and 
private sector employees is mainly due to the fact that, on average, civil 
servants are more highly qualified and have higher wages than private 
sector employees. 
These replacement rates reflect the level of pensions achieved by 
the French pension system by the 1990s. Many changes have been en-
acted in the pension system, including major legislation passed in 1993, 
but their impact is not reflected in these replacement rates since the 
reforms have been implemented gradually. 
Reforms since the Late 1980s 
For decades, contribution rates rose as the level of pensions and the 
coverage of workers improved. Beginning in the 1980s, concerns were 
expressed that further rises in contribution rates would place an unbear-
able burden on French companies and handicap them in international 
competition. Received wisdom on the part of both right- and left-wing 
governments currently holds that contribution rates should not rise. 
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Occasionally, recourse to other sources of financing is proposed, for 
example, taxes on property or profits and eco taxes.4 Up until now, how-
ever, practically all pensions are financed by contributions levied on 
earnings, and it seems unlikely that there will be massive recourse to 
other sources of financing. 
The refusal to increase contribution rates, coupled with the stagna-
tion of real wages over recent decades, has led to the only alternative, 
namely, reduced benefits. This has been done through a series of changes 
in the rules governing the distribution and the level of pension benefits. 
Over the past two decades, four major changes can be identified: 
1) the introduction of social contributions levied on pensions, 
2) the 1993 reform of the General Plan for private sector 
employees, 
3) the 2003 retirement system reform, which concerned most 
mandatory plans, and 
4) agreements between social partners concerning supplementary 
pensions for private sector employees. 
In addition to these changes, the minimum income for people aged 
65 and over has dropped in relation to other sources of income since the 
mid-1980s. As a percentage of median income, the minimum income 
for retirees fell from 50.7 percent in 1984 to 40.2 percent in 2008. The 
2008 level is well below the European poverty threshold of 60 percent 
of median income. 
Furthermore, in 1980, General Plan pensions became subject to a 
social security health insurance contribution of 1 percent (the contribu-
tion rate was 2 percent for supplementary pensions and 2.25 percent for 
civil service pensions). The contribution rate was increased in 1987, 
1991, and 1997. Today, total social contributions levied on pensions 
amount to 7.1 percent of the gross pension. For retirees with low in-
comes, this rate is reduced to 3.8 percent. Those who are not subject 
to income tax are completely exempt from making these contributions. 
The increase in social contributions for retirees is tantamount to reduc-
ing net pensions. 
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The 1993 reform of the General Plan 
The 1993 reform changed the rules governing the calculation of 
benefits for the General Plan, which mainly concerns private sector em-
ployees. It was a so-called parametric reform. We do not go into all 
the details of this reform here, but the major changes are summarized 
below. 
The main mechanism by which pensions have been reduced was 
to slow down increases by changing the method of indexation. This 
mechanism was actually introduced in 1987 but it did not become law 
until 1993. Pensions in payment are now indexed to prices, whereas 
they used to be indexed to wages. In addition, past wages used to calcu-
late the pension level at the time of retirement under the General Plan 
are now indexed to prices instead of wages. Furthermore, the reference 
wage was changed from the average of the highest 10 years of wages to 
the average of the highest 25 years of wages. 
The other main mechanism by which pension levels have been re-
duced was to increase the number of years of contributions required 
for a full pension, without changing the age at which workers can start 
claiming their pension (60 years of age since the 1980s). This change is 
equivalent to an across-the-board decrease in pensions at all retirement 
ages, similar to the consequences of the rise in the full retirement age in 
the U.S. Social Security retirement system. 
The 1993 reform also created a public fund5 that is separate from all 
other pension plans and funded through various earmarked taxes. This 
fund pays for pension benefits that are considered “noncontributory.” 
Such benefits include means-tested minimum income for the elderly, 
bonuses for pensioners that have had at least three children, and pension 
credits for periods without contributions (unemployment, sickness, dis-
ability, military service, or child rearing). 
The 2003 retirement system reform: A further reduction 
in pensions 
After several months of protest demonstrations, a retirement reform 
law was passed on August 21, 2003. It is not possible to summarize 
the long and complex legal text in a few sentences. Instead, we focus 
here only on the rationale behind the reform, whose main goal was to 
increase work life and delay the effective retirement age. 
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The insurance period needed to qualify for a full rate pension had al-
ready been increased from 37.5 to 40 years in the private sector between 
1994 and 2003. The 2003 reform increased the number of years of em-
ployment required for a full pension for civil servants from 37.5 in 2003 
to 40 years by 2008. This insurance period will continue to increase 
in both sectors and reach 41 years in 2012. After that date it should 
increase in line with increases in life expectancy. It is consequently ex-
pected that the insurance period required for a full rate pension should 
be around 42 years by 2020 and approximately 44 years by 2040. 
The changes enacted in the pension system will reduce future pen-
sions. For this reason, the 2003 law encouraged the development of 
voluntary retirement savings through new exemptions on taxes and 
contributions. 
The 2003 reform applied to all pension plans, with the exception 
of the “special” plans of some large public enterprises, which were re-
formed in the second half of the 2000s. The main measures of these 
reforms were to increase the contribution period required for a full pen-
sion, to index pensions to prices, and to introduce penalties for workers 
retiring without a full career before a certain age. 
Changes in supplementary pension plans for private
sector workers 
On average, supplementary pension plans for private sector workers 
provide around one-third of total pensions. Changes in these supple-
mentary plans have a strong impact on the level of pensions. 
In the supplementary pension plans, an employee is awarded a 
number of points each year, which depends on the contributions paid. 
(The employee “earns” pension points at a certain “price” equal to the 
amount of contributions required to acquire one point.) When the em-
ployee retires, the plan adds up all the points acquired over the career 
and multiplies them by the value of the point at the time of retirement. 
The result is the amount of the pension benefit. In such a system, the 
key parameters are the price of the point while working and the value of 
the point during retirement. The value of a point and hence the pension 
can change during retirement. Agreements negotiated by employers’ or-
ganizations and labor unions in the 1990s have increased the price of 
the point and simultaneously decreased the value of the point. Hence, 
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supplementary pension plans for private sector workers have become 
less generous. This change will hit high wage workers the hardest, since 
supplementary pensions can amount to more than 60 percent of their 
total pension. If the current indexing arrangement were to be renewed, 
supplementary plan replacement rates would be halved over the next 
40 years. 
Trends and Current Proposals 
The main consequence of all the pension system “reforms” imple-
mented over the past 20 years in France is that the pension system has 
become less generous. As a result, more and more new retirees are get-
ting only the minimum contributory pension: 57 percent of women and 
26 percent of men retiring in 2005 were in this situation, whereas the 
proportions were 50 percent for women and 20 percent for men in the 
mid-1990s (Figure 8.1). The proportion of all General Plan retirees get-
ting the minimum contributory pension rose from 8 percent in 1985 to 
36 percent in 2005. It is expected that 40 percent of General Plan pen-
sioners will be receiving the minimum contributory pension in 2010. 
In 2004, 75 percent of pensioners receiving the minimum contributory 
pension had a total pension (including supplementary pensions) that 
was well below the minimum wage (DREES 2008). 
The growing incidence of low pensions will affect the youngest 
generations the most. The generosity of the pension system will de-
crease over time, but we do not have data on changes in replacement 
rates over time. In order to evaluate the generosity of the pension sys-
tem as a whole, we compare average pension expenditure per older 
person to per capita GDP, that is, to the average income of the whole 
population (Figure 8.2). This indicator measures the proportion of total 
income spent on public pensions in relation to the proportion of older 
people in the population. 
Over the next 40 years, the generosity of the pension system will 
decline in proportion to per capita GDP. In 2050, the ratio of average 
pension expenditure per older person to per capita GDP is projected 
to be about 45 percent, that is, the same level as in the mid-1970s. At 
that time, 35 percent of retirees were poor in France, versus less than 
10 percent today. If current legislation is left unchanged, the result will 
be future impoverishment of retirees. Nonetheless, the new reform pro-
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posal of the current government would worsen further the situation of 
future retirees. 
At the end of 2009, the government announced that a law on pen-
sions would be passed in 2010. The main objective of the new law, 
which was passed by Parliament in the autumn of 2010, is to further 
slow down pension expenditure through new cuts in benefits. The main 
measure is to raise the legal retirement age by 2 years, increasing the 
minimum age from 60 to 62 and the age at which people may retire 
without a penalty from 65 to 67. The increase is supposed to take place 
very quickly—the minimum age is to increase over the next 6 years so 
that people born in 1956 will have to wait until age 62 to retire in 2018.6 
Although the government is planning for a slight increase in the finan-
cial resources of pension plans, this will not be sufficient to cover future 
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Figure 8.2 Generosity of the Pension System (Average Pension 













NOTE: An older person is defined as age 60 or over. 
SOURCES: Reimat (2001), for the period 1900–1995; COR (2010) for the period 
1996–2050; Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE) for 
demographic projections. 
pension expenditure. The new law is not designed to finance future pen-
sions, but to reduce pension expenditure. As a result of the new law and 
previous reforms, by 2050, the ratio of average pension expenditure per 
older person to per capita GDP will fall to the same level as in the late 
1960s. 
There is no economic constraint that justifies such a dramatic de-
cline in the standard of living of retirees. According to official long-term 
projections, the total population should increase by 12 percent over the 
next 40 years. Over the same period, real GDP is expected to roughly 
double (projected growth ranges from 95 percent to 115 percent de-
pending on macroeconomic assumptions). There is thus ample leeway 
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to increase the standard of living of the entire population, in all age 
groups. The crucial issue behind the debate on pensions deals with how 
current output is shared between retirees and the rest of the population. 
Over the past 60 years, gains in labor productivity have been used 
to increase real wages, to finance social protection via increases in so-
cial contributions and to reduce the duration of work time (Table 8.1). 
However, we may distinguish two different periods, 1950–1979 and 
1980–2008. Productivity gains were much higher during the first period 
than the second one. During the first period, 75 percent of productiv-
ity gains were used to increase real wages, 15 percent to reduce work 
time, and a little more than 10 percent to finance social protection. The 
profit share, the share of factor income going to capital, remained fairly 
stable. Over the second period, productivity gains were used in about 
equal proportions to increase real wages (31 percent) and to reduce 
work time (29 percent). About 15 percent was used to finance social 
protection. Since the late 1970s, productivity gains have also fueled a 
rise in the profit share, as is also true in many other countries around the 
world (Ellis and Smith 2007). 
Table 8.1  Past and Projected Distribution of Productivity Gains (Annual 
Increase, %) 
Official retirement system 
1950–1979 1980–2008 projections 2009–2050 
Real net wage per 3.97 0.64 1.6 –1.8 
worker 
Reduction in 0.80 0.61 0 
average annual 
work time 
Increase in social 0.55 0.31 0 
contributions 
Change in profit −0.08 0.48 0 
share 
Hourly labor 5.24 2.04 1.6 –1.8 
productivity 
NOTE: Figures show average annual increase. For example, from 1950 to 1979, the 
real net wage per worker increased by 3.97 percent per year on average. 
SOURCE: INSEE, national accounts (authors’ calculations). 
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The French government’s scenario for the future in retirement pro-
jections is quite different from patterns of the past. The government 
claims that there will be no increase in social contributions and no 
reductions in work time, despite the persistence of massive unemploy-
ment. Since the profit share is at a historically high level, no one is 
suggesting future increases. The implicit assumption behind official 
retirement system projections is therefore that all productivity gains 
should translate into an increase in real wages. In the short run, it might 
be desirable to increase wages faster than other sources of income. 
However, such a policy is not sustainable, either politically or socially, 
over the medium or long run. Other approaches to distribution of pro-
ductivity gains might help in thinking about how to reform the French 
pension system for the better. 
REFORMING THE FRENCH PENSION SYSTEM 
FOR THE BETTER 
Changes made to the French pension system over the past 20 
years have gradually altered the way workers acquire pension rights. 
Researchers often classify France as a country that has carried out para-
metric pension reforms, a term which gives the impression that the 
fundamental principles that govern the distribution of pensions have 
not changed. However, if they stay in place, these reforms will result in 
drastic reductions in pensions, similar in scope to those that will result 
from the Swedish systemic reform. Therefore, we argue that the French 
pension system is in the midst of a fundamental change. We also argue 
that a reform of the French pension system is needed, not only to re-
store an adequate level of pensions, but also to modernize the French 
pension system in line with changes that have taken place in the labor 
market. Such a reform would provide an opportunity to strengthen the 
principles that have guided the construction of the French pension sys-
tem up to now. 
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Guiding Principles for the Pension System 
One of the principles underlying the French pension system up un-
til the late 1980s is that pensions are equivalent to continued payment 
of wages. Retirees received a periodic payment throughout their re-
maining lives, a payment that represented a proportion of their highest 
wages. This pension allowed retirees to maintain the position they held 
in the hierarchy of earnings before reaching retirement, not only upon 
retirement but also beyond, since the pension kept pace with current 
wages. In keeping with this principle, the pension was calculated on the 
basis of wages, not on the basis of savings or contributions, hence the 
importance of the replacement rate. 
A second principle is that pensions are financed through socializa-
tion of wages, which is the underlying rationale of a pay-as-you-go 
retirement system. The concept of socialization of wages refers to social 
protection systems in which contributions are paid to a common fund, 
so they are not the property of individual workers but rather belong 
collectively to contributing workers and beneficiaries. In the case of 
pensions, such a system does not involve a buildup of savings. Instead, 
it is based on the acquisition of pension rights by workers over the 
course of their careers. The financing of the pension system is geared 
to “paying for pensions,” the title Tony Lynes gave to his study of the 
French retirement system (1985), rather than saving for retirement. 
A pension system based on socialization of wages can attribute pen-
sion rights in many ways, as shown by the large variety of rules used 
under such systems in different countries. Pensions may be calculated 
on the basis of wages over the whole duration of working life, a portion 
of working life, or career end wages. The French system traditionally 
based pensions either on career end wages (as in the public sector) or 
the highest wages of the career (as in the private sector General Plan). 
The age at which the pension is first drawn may affect its amount, as 
does the number of years of contributions. Workers with high earnings 
may get a lower replacement rate than those with low earnings. Un-
der a system based on socialization of wages, pension rights can be 
attributed not only on the basis of earnings but also for periods spent 
outside employment, for example, during unemployment, child rearing, 
and schooling. Such a system may even attribute extra pension rights 
to workers who have been engaged in physically taxing occupations. 
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With the correct rules, a system based on socialization of wages can 
guarantee a high replacement rate for retirees. It can also ensure that 
retirees share in the gains in productivity achieved by active workers, 
as was the case for many years in France, before the reforms enacted 
since the 1980s. As national output increases, both retirees and active 
workers can share in the increase, both seeing the purchasing power 
of their remuneration—their wage or their pension—rise. The French 
system could be reformed in such a way as to guarantee a high level of 
pensions throughout retirement, with a high replacement rate and pen-
sions in payment indexed to current wages. 
Another way of sharing the results of gains in productivity is to cut 
back on the time devoted to employment over a lifetime. This can be 
done through a decrease in work time during the career (shorter work 
weeks, more vacation days, and increased use of sabbaticals or other 
forms of leave) and through a cutback in the number of years spent 
in employment, by increasing the age at which young people begin to 
work and/or decreasing the retirement age. Such a reform is economi-
cally feasible if labor productivity is increasing because fewer hours of 
work can produce the same or more output. 
Ways to Reform the Pension System for the Better 
We now turn to measures that could improve the French pension 
system. The first is to reinstate the replacement rate as the system’s 
main objective. The second is to ensure that the system continues to 
reduce work time over the life cycle. Finally, we examine ways to aug-
ment system finances. 
Reinstate the replacement rate as the main objective of the 
retirement system 
The retirement system should guarantee a clearly defined replace-
ment rate for people who have worked over a full career, along with a 
definition of a full career that is attainable for the majority of workers. 
Successive reforms have obscured changes in the effective replacement 
rate by changing the parameters used in the formula for calculating pen-
sions. This is especially true for the General Plan. It is also the case to 
some extent in the plan for public sector workers. The supplementary 
plans do not use a replacement rate to calculate pensions; however, until 
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the 1990s, their pensions more than kept pace with wages, resulting in 
a rise in replacement rates over time. 
In the General Plan, several key parameters—indexation of past 
wages, the number of years used to calculate the reference wage, the 
number of years of work required for a full pension, and indexation 
of pensions payments—have been changed in such a way as to lower 
replacement rates. However, the drop in replacement rates has been 
obscured by the fact that the rate of 50 percent of wages under the so-
cial security ceiling has been maintained in the formula for calculating 
pensions. 
The plan for public sector employees has maintained the same full 
replacement rate, namely 75 percent for a full career. The reference 
wage in the public sector has remained the wage of the last six months 
of the career. However, as in the General Plan, the number of years of 
work considered to constitute a full career has increased. Furthermore, 
indexation of pensions in payment has switched from indexation on 
current public sector wages to indexation on prices. 
The outlook for replacement rates guaranteed by supplementary 
plans is particularly bleak. If current trends continue, the replacement 
rate of supplementary plans will drop even further than that of the Gen-
eral Plan or the plan for public sector employees (Conseil d’orientation 
des retraites [COR] 2007, p. 64). If labor unions are unable to negotiate 
increases in contribution rates, supplementary pensions will decrease 
more quickly and more drastically than General Plan pensions. This 
implies a particularly large drop in overall replacement rates for pri-
vate sector workers whose wages are above the social security ceiling, 
which is equal to about 1.3 times the average wage. The only way to 
maintain overall replacement rates for private sector workers would be 
for the General Plan to compensate by raising its replacement rates. 
Labor unions sometimes call for a target replacement rate. In the 
case of private sector plans, the target includes both General Plan 
pensions and supplementary pensions. In the early 1980s, when the So-
cialist Party came to power, the labor union objective was 70 percent 
for workers with wages below the social security ceiling—50 percent 
from the General Plan plus 20 percent from the supplementary plans 
(Lynes 1985, p. 37), with more for low-wage workers. At the end of the 
1980s, the target replacement rate cited by one major labor union, the 
Confédération générale du travail (CGT), was 75 percent for a career of 
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37.5 years (Castel 2009, p. 88). In 1992, another major union, the Con-
fédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT), claimed that the 
replacement rate should be 75 percent of the wage over the 10 highest 
years for a full career for most workers, with a slightly higher rate for 
those with low wages (Castel 2009, p. 179). In recent years, there have 
been fewer calls for a target replacement rate, in part because succes-
sive reforms have obscured real replacement rates. Nonetheless, unions 
continue to demand a replacement rate of at least 75 percent for a full 
career. 
As the unions demand, the replacement rate is somewhat higher for 
those with wages close to the minimum. In 1984, just after the mini-
mum contributory pension was introduced, the replacement rate for 
workers who had always earned the minimum wage came to about 87 
percent—67 percent from the General Plan (the minimum contributory 
pension) plus 20 percent from the supplementary plan ARRCO. Sub-
sequently, the minimum contributory pension declined in relation to 
wages. The 2003 retirement system reform law promised a replacement 
rate (the minimum contributory pension plus a supplementary pension) 
of 85 percent for workers with a full career at the minimum wage. 
In recent statements on retirement policy, the administration has 
focused on the purchasing power of retirees, rather than on the relation-
ship between pensions and wages. A discussion document released in 
the spring of 2010 in preparation for the 2010 reform law states that 
pension levels will improve, since the average pension of all retirees 
is projected to outpace inflation. Indeed, official projections foresee a 
rise in pensions, net of social contributions, of about 20 percent above 
inflation between 2008 and 2030 (COR 2010, p. 30). The government 
discussion document states: “This improvement in pension levels re-
sults from the guarantee of purchasing power for retirees granted by 
law and from improvements in pension levels of future retirees due to 
increases in wage levels” (Government of France 2010, p. 5). The docu-
ment does not mention that the same projections foresee a rise over the 
same period of between 30 and 40 percent in real wages net of social 
contributions, depending on the assumptions used. This implies that the 
ratio of the average net pension to the average net wage will decline by 
between 7 and 14 percent. Far from enabling retirees to share in produc-
tivity gains, pensions are projected to drop steadily in relation to wages. 
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In keeping with the idea that a pension is a continued wage, we 
include in the notion of the replacement rate not only the initial pension 
paid out upon retirement but also pensions paid throughout the period 
of retirement. In the past, pensions in payment were indexed to current 
wages, but they are now indexed to prices. This policy will result in a 
lowering of pensions in relation to current wages for all categories of 
retirees. If continued, this policy will deprive retirees of a fair share of 
gains in labor productivity and increases in national output. 
The 2010 government discussion document states that the pur-
chasing power of retirees will be guaranteed, meaning that pensions 
in payment will keep pace with inflation: “pensions will not decrease 
in euros . . . their purchasing power will continue to be guaranteed, as 
is the case today, thanks to yearly indexing of retirement pensions to 
inflation. This guarantee of purchasing power despite price increases is 
. . . essential to maintaining confidence in our retirement system” (Gov-
ernment of France 2010, p. 5). The government thus explicitly puts 
forward constant purchasing power, rather than a constant replacement 
rate, as the norm for the retirement system. 
The quest for a new norm other than the replacement rate has mo-
tivated an interest among some members of Parliament in a radical 
transformation of the whole retirement system into one based either 
on accumulation of points, such as is done in the French mandatory 
supplementary plans, or on notional accounts, such as those used in the 
new social security pension system of Sweden. One attraction of such 
systems is that they entail no explicit reference to replacement rates. 
Gearing the pension system to wages implies that the means-tested 
minimum old-age income for people age 65 and over (as well as to 
those who have attained the age of 60 and are considered unable to 
work) should be indexed to wages. However, at present it is set to rise 
in line with prices, a policy that will leave more retirees in poverty 
(COR 2007, p. 98). Governments may enact exceptional increases to 
raise it more quickly, as the Sarkozy government has done. By 2012, af-
ter the exceptional increase, the minimum old-age income will be equal 
to only about 48 percent of median income, well below the poverty 
threshold of 60 percent of median income (Concialdi 2010, p. 163). It is 
essential that the minimum income for the elderly, like pensions, be in-
dexed to wages to prevent poverty and enable older people to enjoy the 
same general rise in the standard of living as the rest of the population. 
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As labor unions have demanded, the replacement rate should be 
about the same for the public sector and the private sector. Currently, 
debates on retirement policy for the two sectors tend to center on de-
creasing pensions for the public sector rather than improving pensions 
in both sectors. 
The 2003 reform launched an experiment in funded pensions for 
the public sector, a change that can hardly be considered to further con-
vergence with private sector plans. In the public sector, bonuses, which 
represent 20 percent of pay on average, are not included in pension-
able salary. The 2003 reform did not integrate bonuses into pensionable 
salary. Instead, the 2003 law created a mandatory funded defined 
contribution money purchase pension plan financed by employer and 
employee contributions levied on bonuses.7 The level of pensions un-
der this plan will vary with returns on pension fund investments. Since 
the plan is funded and defined contribution, public sector employees 
now close to retirement will receive very little from this arrangement. 
It will take many years for the new plan to pay out a full benefit. Rather 
than experiment with a mandatory funded plan, it would be preferable 
that bonuses be integrated into pensionable salary. If bonuses were rec-
ognized as part of wages in the context of the pay-as-you-go system, 
public sector workers would quickly see their pensions rise. 
Reduce work time over the life cycle 
In France, as in other wealthy industrialized countries, the duration 
of the average work week has been dropping ever since the industrial 
revolution. This trend affects the legal length of the work week, now 
35 hours for most French employees, the number of days in a year that 
employees work, and the number of years they work over a lifetime. 
Some of the reductions in work time take the form of unemployment or 
underemployment, which strikes individuals unequally. In an economy 
with productivity gains, a collective reduction in work time is one way 
to share the gains equally. Collective forms of work time reduction— 
reductions in the work week, increases in the number of days of leave, 
and increases in the duration of retirement—can further social justice 
and help to prevent unemployment (Concialdi 2010, pp. 155–158). 
Since 1993, the number of years of contributions required to 
receive a full pension has risen. The 2003 retirement reform law formu-
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lated a rule by which the requirement for the years of contributions is 
henceforth to be adjusted. The rule is ostensibly designed to maintain a 
constant ratio between work time and retirement time. The number of 
years of contributions required for a full pension is to increase in line 
with increases in life expectancy: for every three additional months of 
life expectancy at 60, the insurance period required for a full pension 
is to be extended by about two months (COR 2007, fiche 11). This rule 
for splitting gains in life expectancy between work and retirement is 
not the only possible norm. Gains in life expectancy could be entirely 
allocated to retirement. 
In any case, the length of a “full” career as defined by the retirement 
system does not necessarily correspond to actual work lives. Many 
people retire with less than a full career and some retire after working 
longer. As the requirement for a full career lengthens, people will not 
necessarily work longer or retire at a later age. Many may retire as early 
as possible, at 60, with less than a full career. The requirement for a full 
career does not determine how long employees will actually work and 
contribute to the retirement system. 
Why not lengthen the period of retirement still more, as has been 
the case historically? This is a question of social choice. Do people pre-
fer to devote more time to employment, which might contribute to an 
increase in total output and hence an increase in consumption of goods 
and services? Or do people prefer to spend more time in retirement, that 
is, free of the bonds of employment but receiving a continued wage? 
Up until now, most people retiring at 60 have reached a “full” ca-
reer for retirement purposes. However, the average age at which people 
begin to contribute is rising. A Ministry of Labor study examines the 
employment record of different birth cohorts at age 30. For the cohort 
born in 1942, more than 40 percent of men and more than 60 percent of 
women had not reached a full career of 40 years by age 60 (in 2002). For 
the cohort born in 1974, 75 percent of men and 80 percent of women
will not have reached a full career by age 60 (in 2034) (Concialdi 2010, 
p. 117). As the number of years of contributions required for a full 
pension increases, retirement with a full pension at 60 will become im-
possible for many people, mostly due to the fact that younger people 
devote more years to studies. As the requirement for a “full” career 
lengthens, many employees may find it difficult or impossible to meet. 
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The current administration has sponsored a legal increase in the age 
at which workers may begin to draw a pension, from 60 to 62. The same 
law will increase by the same increment of two years the age at which 
a full rate pension is awarded to people with short careers. That age is 
now 65 and it is scheduled to increase to 67. 
Currently, the vast majority of employees (about 80 percent) begin 
to draw a pension either at 60 or at 65. Those who begin to draw a 
pension at 60 have generally contributed over enough years to qualify 
for a full pension as of that age. Those who begin to draw a pension 
at 65 have generally not contributed long enough to qualify for a full 
pension; therefore, they wait to get their pension until age 65, since 
an incomplete career is less heavily penalized after that age. Most of 
the people in the first group are men, and most of those in the second 
group are women (Concialdi 2010, p. 111). An increase in the retire-
ment age would probably have a strong impact on retirement behavior: 
those with a sufficient insurance period would tend to retire at the new 
higher minimum age, and those with an insufficient insurance period 
would tend to wait until age 67. 
Pushing back the age at which an employee may begin to draw a 
pension from 60 to 62 would be particularly hard on those who began 
to work young enough to reach a full career by 60. It would also be hard 
on those whose life expectancy is low, since their “retirement expec-
tancy” (the length of time they can expect to spend in retirement) would 
be reduced. Retirement expectancy is correlated to gender, since women 
live longer than men on average, and to income level. An increase in the 
earliest retirement age would have a great impact on employees with 
relatively low incomes, whose life expectancy is generally low. 
What is the rationale behind increasing the retirement age? On the 
face of it, the objective is to increase the number of workers contribut-
ing to the retirement system and reduce the number of pensioners. Yet 
it could be argued that maintaining the age of 60 would enable older 
workers to profit from gains in productivity in the form of time free 
from employment. It could also help to contribute to full employment. 
Another issue at stake is simply the well-being of retirees. Retire-
ment should be a time when individuals are in sufficiently good health 
to take advantage of freedom from employment. In other words, it 
should be a period of true jubilación, as the Spanish say, rather than a 
period of retreat (retraite in French) from life. 
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One aspect of retirement that has given rise to ongoing controversy 
in France is the treatment of workers who have been subjected to physi-
cally demanding work conditions. Such conditions include carrying 
heavy loads, working at night, and exposure to excessive noise, extreme 
temperatures, and toxic materials. All of these conditions can lead to 
health problems, decrease life expectancy, and increase the incidence of 
physical handicaps. The 2003 reform law stated that physically harmful 
work conditions should be taken into account upon retirement, but the 
questions of the definition of such conditions and how they would be 
taken into account were left up to negotiations between national em-
ployers’ organizations and labor unions. Discussions broke off in 2008 
and no agreement was reached. 
The employers’ position is that, in order to qualify for retirement 
advantages, an employee must obtain a medical certificate attesting that 
past working conditions have caused the employee to suffer from health 
problems, a point of view the government currently supports. Labor 
unions demand a collective definition of physically harmful work condi-
tions and compensation in the form of early retirement for workers who 
have been exposed to such conditions. The unions focus on work condi-
tions rather than on individual employees’ health status. According to 
the unions, if a worker has been exposed over a certain length of time 
to physically harmful conditions, he or she should be entitled to retire 
early, whether or not the conditions have caused health problems prior 
to retirement. This is in keeping with the idea that retirement should be 
a period of freedom from the constraints of employment rather than a 
period of inactivity for people who are no longer capable of working. 
The French retirement system accords pension rights on the basis 
of periods devoted to certain activities other than employment, notably 
for mothers who have raised children. Pension rights are also awarded 
for periods of unemployment, which count as periods of insurance for 
the calculation of career length. However, a recent revaluation of the 
minimum contributory pension, enacted by the 2003 retirement reform 
law, excludes insurance periods that do not give rise to payment of con-
tributions, such as child care or unemployment. In other words, pension 
rights awarded for such activities are considered noncontributory. It can 
be argued that such periods are contributory in that they contribute to 
the economy and to the retirement system. The tradition of attributing 
pension rights for activities other than employment could be maintained 
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and even expanded. For example, pension rights could be attributed for 
periods devoted to studies. 
Increase pension system revenues 
A reform of the retirement system for the better is financially fea-
sible. Increases in national output due to gains in labor productivity 
could be used in part to finance higher pensions over a longer lapse of 
time. It would still be possible to increase consumption for the popula-
tion below retirement age. 
A number of specific measures could increase the revenues of 
the retirement system. Certain forms of remuneration for private sec-
tor workers are partially or totally exempt from contributions to the 
retirement system. This is the case for profit sharing (intéressement, 
participation), employer payments to employee savings accounts, in-
cluding employee retirement savings accounts (PERCO), stock options 
and company stock distributed to employees, employee retirement 
plans, and other employee benefit plans (e.g., supplementary health and 
disability insurance). If exemptions on all of these forms of remunera-
tion were abolished, the revenues of the General Plan would increase 
considerably.8 
Furthermore, the purpose of some of these exemptions is to en-
courage company retirement benefit plans, namely employee retirement 
savings plans and company pension plans. When such plans give rise 
to exemptions from contributions to mandatory plans, they undermine 
mandatory plans by depriving them of revenues. Abolition of such ex-
emptions would help to protect the finances of mandatory pension plans. 
Contribution rates could rise over time without causing hardship 
for current workers. The government’s 2010 discussion document on 
pension reform excludes the possibility of increasing workers’ con-
tributions. It states that an increase in contribution rates would be 
detrimental to the economy. It would reduce workers’ net income, and 
“such a reduction in households’ standard of living would affect growth 
and employment, through its impact on consumption” (Government of 
France 2010, p. 7). The document neglects to mention that pensioners 
also live in households whose consumption contributes to growth and 
employment. 
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CONCLUSION 
In France, employer-provided and individual pension accounts 
play a marginal role in the distribution of pension benefits, which are 
organized on a pay-as-you-go basis. However, income from property 
accounts for a large share of retirees’ incomes, around 30 percent. With 
such a system, the standard of living of French retirees is roughly the 
same today as that of other households, a result that can be considered 
fair. 
As in other countries, however, this picture will change over time. 
The reforms implemented over the past 20 years are due to dramatically 
reduce the generosity of pension benefits. One of the main consequences
of the downsizing of social security pensions is that market forces will 
become more powerful, subjecting workers to more market risk. Insofar 
as the main goal of social protection systems is to protect workers from 
these risks, an ideal pension system should counterbalance this trend. 
The French experience shows that pension systems can protect workers 
without prefunding, so that workers do not have to bear financial risks. 
Reinforcement of public pay-as-you-go plans should be one of the main 
goals of an “ideal” pension system. 
Employment is another key issue. Workers can acquire social se-
curity pension rights mainly by participating fully in the labor market. 
Whatever conception of social security we may have, full employment 
is a condition for providing economic security to workers. As stated by 
William H. Beveridge in 1944 in his book Full Employment in a Free 
Society, full employment is one “of the assumptions of Social Security: 
the assumption that employment is maintained and mass unemploy-
ment prevented.” Hence, when thinking about the ideal pension system, 
we also have to consider the functioning of the labor market as a whole. 
Pension systems can be seen as powerful tools for reducing work time. 
As such, they can promote full employment. 
The organization of pension systems raises crucial issues concern-
ing distribution of both incomes and paid work. Since the industrial 
revolution, productivity gains have allowed workers to achieve better 
living standards while working less over their lifetimes. It is impos-
sible to predict how large these productivity gains will be in the future. 
However, we can reasonably assume that trends observed over the past 
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20 or 30 years will not suddenly come to a stop. Hence, the question of 
how to share these gains will remain on the political agenda. In fact, it 
is possible to continue to improve standards of living, both for retirees 
and for the population as a whole. 
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Length of Insurance Period and
Calculation of the Pension 
In calculating the pension, the French General Plan for private sector em-
ployees takes into account both the age at which the pension is awarded and 
the number of years of contributions. This appendix describes the rules before 
application of the reform enacted in the autumn of 2010, which will gradually 
increase the age at which workers may begin to draw a pension and the number 
of years of contributions required for a full pension. Before this reform goes 
into effect, workers may begin to draw a pension as of age 60. If a retiree has 
contributed over the insurance period required for a full pension, the pension is 
equal to 50 percent of the reference wage. 
The formula for calculating the pension is T × W* × D/D*, where T is 
the pension rate, equal to 50 percent for retirement at age 60 with a full insur-
ance period. W* is the reference wage, currently the average of the highest 25 
years of wages under the social security ceiling, with past wages revalued in 
line with prices. D* is the insurance period required for a full pension at age 
60, currently 40 years for private sector workers turning 60 between 2003 and 
2008 (born between 1943 and 1948). D is the worker’s actual length of insur-
ance, limited to D* for the calculation. People who work more than the full 
insurance period get a separate pension bonus. The pension is reduced if the 
person has worked less than the duration required for a full pension. Whatever 
the age at which the person begins to draw a pension, the pension is reduced 
by a fraction equal to the number of quarters of contributions divided by the 
number of quarters required for a full pension (D/D*). 
If a person has worked less than the duration required for a full pension 
and begins to draw a pension before age 65, the pension is further reduced by 
reducing the pension rate. The reduction of the rate is equal to 1.25 percent 
multiplied by one of the following, whichever is smaller: the number of quar-
ters of contributions missing in relation to the full insurance requirement or the 
number of quarters by which the individual’s age is short of age 65. 
For example, the pension for a person born in 1944 and retiring in 2008 
at age 64 with 152 quarters of insurance would be calculated as follows:
D* = 160 quarters and therefore D/D* = 152/160 = 0.95. T = 0.50, but it must 
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222 apRoberts and Concialdi 
be adjusted, in this case, by the number of quarters the individual is short of 65 
years of age: 0.50 – (0.0125 × 4 quarters) = 0.45. The pension therefore is 0.45 
× W* × 0.95 = W* × 0.4275. 
Notes 
1. The main law establishing pension plans for civil servants dates back to 1853. 
2. The plan for cadres is AGIRC. Today, a second plan, ARRCO, covers all private 
sector employees. 
3. For private sector employees, on average, the General Plan provided a replace-
ment rate of 49 percent and the supplementary schemes provided an additional 
34 percent. 
4. Since the early 1990s, income from property has been taxed to some extent to 
finance health insurance. 
5. Called the Fonds de solidarité vieillesse or FSV. 
6. The age at which people may retire without a penalty is set to begin increasing in 
2016. People retiring in 2023 and after will have to wait until the age of 67. 
7. This plan is called the RAFP (Régime additionnel de la fonction publique). Con-
tributions are equal to 10 percent of bonuses, limited to amounts below 20 percent 
of salary. The employer and the employee each pay 5 percent. 
8. According to an official report published in 2007 (Cour des Comptes 2007), in 
2005, exemptions from contributions granted to various forms of employee re-
muneration (for low wages, profit sharing plans, employee savings plans, stock 
options and distribution to employees of shares, and company benefit plans for 
employees) resulted in a net loss for the social security system (retirement, family 
allowances, health insurance, etc.) of €13.5 billion. The same year, social con-
tributions paid to social security came to €152.2 billion; total revenues of social 
security amounted to about €244 billion (Commission des comptes de la sécurité 
sociale 2006). 
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Aging in the Shadow
of the Three Pillars 
A Generation of Pension Debates 
in Switzerland (1972–2010) 
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THE BEST PENSION SYSTEM IN THE WORLD? 
Since its consecration by the World Bank in its well-known report, 
Averting the Old Age Crisis (1994), as well as its adoption a decade 
later in an EU directive on pension funds, the three-pillar doctrine has 
been one of the potent metaphors of contemporary pension reform 
(Coron 2007; Tausch 2002). The principles underlying this model are 
well known: state pay-as-you-go pensions (first pillar) should remain a 
basic component, to which occupational (second pillar) and individual 
(third pillar) prefunded pensions should be added. This structure may 
seem at first a neutral and factual depiction of the inherent nature of 
modern pension systems. Yet, the pillar doctrine has a strong norma-
tive dimension: it aims both to contain the scope of pay-as-you-go state 
(social security) pensions and to favor funded solutions whose manage-
ment is devolved to private financial institutions. 
Switzerland occupies a special position in this reform discourse. 
Indeed, the country is a pioneer of the three-pillar doctrine, whose prin-
ciples have been anchored in the Federal Constitution since 1972. In 
early 2010, a leading pension consultancy firm even awarded Switzer-
land, and in particular its mandatory second occupational pillar, a gold 
medal, designating it as the “best pension system in the world” (Mercer 
2010).1 This ranking underscored the enthusiasm for the Swiss pension 
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system among the financial actors who are involved in its management. 
Consider this somewhat arrogant statement from a Swiss Re economist: 
“The Swiss pension system comes off rather well in comparison to the 
rotten social insurance systems of its European neighbors [and] rightly 
deserves the high esteem it receives from abroad: its foundations are 
properly laid” (Trauth 2000). More could be said of the international 
diffusion of the multi-pillar doctrine, notably on the role played by 
Swiss insurers in this process before the 1994 adoption of the doctrine 
by the World Bank (Leimgruber 2009). Moreover, as is often the case 
when foreign national examples are summoned and designated as mod-
els, accolades and rankings often remain silent on the controversies and 
struggles that structure these national systems. 
On March 7, 2010, a large majority (72.7 percent) of Swiss vot-
ers turned down a proposed reduction in the conversion rate that 
determines the calculation of second pillar benefits, which would have 
effectively reduced those benefits.2 This reduction, which had been pre-
sented as a necessity to ensure the long-term financing of occupational 
pensions facing demographic aging and uncertain financial returns, was 
supported by the Federal Council (the executive branch), right-wing 
parties—who enjoyed a comfortable majority in the Federal Parlia-
ment at that time—as well as business associations, the pension lobby, 
and the insurance industry. The main Swiss trade union (UNIA), the 
Socialist Party, and consumers’ associations strongly opposed the pro-
posed cut in pension benefits. As soon as the conversion rate had been 
accepted by Parliament in late 2008, these forces launched a popular 
referendum that gathered 125,000 signatures in 30 days, whereas only 
50,000 in 90 days were necessary.3 A stormy political debate preceded 
the March 2010 vote. The main Swiss business association, Econo-
miesuisse, allegedly spent 10 million Swiss francs (CHF) in favor of a 
“yes” vote (Wuthrich 2010).4 However, the well-oiled campaign of po-
litical power, mainstream media, and business associations floundered: 
the denunciation of “pension theft” and of the meddling of financial 
interests into pensions carried the day. 
The long-term impact of the referendum vote is still uncertain, but 
its importance cannot be underestimated. First, the referendum under-
scores the increasing polarization of occupational pension debates, 
after decades during which these had remained confined to experts. 
The March vote also has a historic dimension. It is the first time since 
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1972, when the three-pillar doctrine was added to the Constitution, that 
Swiss voters have expressed their views on the second pillar. After a 
generation of maturation, occupational pensions now occupy a central 
position in Swiss old age provision. This chapter analyzes these three 
aspects so as to place the March 2010 vote in a larger historical context 
and to highlight the antagonisms that currently agitate the discussions 
of the Swiss second pillar. 
THE TRAJECTORY OF THE THREE-PILLAR
DOCTRINE IN SWITZERLAND 
This chapter cannot retrace the century-long trajectory of Swiss oc-
cupational pensions (see Box 9.1 for a short summary). I will instead 
underline five key features that have shaped the pension system (see 
Table 9.1 for more information on the different pillars). 
First, the histories of the different pillars of the Swiss pension sys-
tem have always been deeply interconnected. The existence of a strong 
private pension lobby has contributed both to the belated introduction 
of the Old-Age and Survivors’ Insurance (AHV, the first pillar, intro-
duced in 1947) and to the moderate expansion of this pay-as-you-go 
basic social security pension during the postwar growth decades. This 
moderation favored the gradual and selective development of pension 
plans and enabled them to remain largely autonomous vis-à-vis the fed-
eral state. The 1972 vote on the three-pillar doctrine not only aimed to 
improve pensioners’ incomes by granting a supplementary benefit to 
almost all wage earners. It first and foremost aimed to contain (in the 
anticommunist meaning of the period) the development of the pay-as-
you-go AHV and to preserve funded pensions from being marginalized 
by the “people’s pensions” project. The three-pillar doctrine suc-
ceeded in blocking this alternative path and steered the pension system 
in another direction. From 1972 onward, all future improvements of 
pensions have been dependent on the expansion of funded occupational 
pensions (the second pillar). I will return below to the long-term con-
sequences of this crucial crossroads, but we can immediately grasp its 
importance by examining Figure 9.1. Since the 1970s, old-age pensions 
have represented about half of overall social expenditures. However, 
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Box 9.1 Origins of the Three-Pillar Doctrine in Switzerland5 
1918–1948: A divided pension system 
With the exception of a handful of pioneering firms and public ad-
ministrations, the “big bang” of occupational provision can be dated 
from 1916. A federal tax on war profits enacted that year introduced 
special deductions for firms that created a pension or welfare fund for 
their workers. By the end of World War I, life insurance companies sold 
their first group pension contracts and participated in the development 
of the pension market. By 1930, 18 percent of the nonfarm workforce 
was covered by funded plans with reserves that represented 26 percent 
of GDP in 1937. The development of occupational pensions was facili-
tated by the failure to enact state pensions at the federal level (old-age 
and survivors’ benefits, or AHV) in 1931. After slowing down during the 
economic depression of the 1930s, the expansion of pension plans ac-
celerated during World War II. The federal government also launched a 
new AHV project during the war, which was finally overwhelmingly ac-
cepted by the voters in 1947. The first AHV pension checks were modest 
(amounting to 10–15 percent of wages), so as neither to compete with 
existing pension plans nor hinder the creation of new ones. 
1948–1972: The three-pillar doctrine versus the people’s pensions 
During the postwar growth decades, an informal division of tasks 
was established between the AHV (the future first pillar) and occupa-
tional plans (the future second pillar). While the AHV provided a basic 
pay-as-you-go benefit, occupational plans increased their coverage 
from 20 percent (1955) to 30 percent (1970) of all wage earners, of-
fered very differentiated benefits, and played a key role in personnel 
management. The financial reserves of the occupational plans were 
already considerable and reached 40 percent of Swiss GDP by 1970. 
The three-pillar doctrine was elaborated during the 1960s. This concept 
was favored by the political right, business, and insurers and aimed to 
anchor occupational plans in the old-age retirement system and thus 
contain the expansion of the pay-as-you-go AHV. It was also supported 
by trade unions seduced by the idea that they might obtain a larger say 
in firm management through the boards of pension plans. The “people’s 
pensions” was an alternative proposal favored by the left wing of the 
Socialist Party and other far-left groups. Its aim was to expand the pay-
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as-you-go component (AHV) of the pension system to the detriment of 
its funded plans. The three-pillar doctrine, at the core of which is the idea 
of mandatory second pillar occupational pensions, was finally accepted 
by a large majority of voters in 1972. The leadership of the Socialist 
Party, as well as trade union secretaries, contributed to this victory by 
convincing their rank and file of the necessity to implement a state man-
date so as to guarantee pensions that would be both generous and partly 
co-managed by workers’ representatives. 
Unresolved issues on the scope and content of occupational plans 
were later addressed in the Federal Law on Occupational Pensions 
(BVG, 1982–1985), but this law did not address the demands made a 
decade earlier by the left and largely preserved the autonomy of occupa-
tional pension plans. 
the relative importance of each pillar has changed. While AHV expen-
diture (as a percentage of GDP) has remained stable since 1980, second 
pillar expenditures have more than doubled during the same period, and 
prefunded pension expenditures now exceed those of the AHV. These 
numbers do not tell us anything about the respective importance of each 
pillar in pensioners’ income, but they clearly illustrate the maturation 
of occupational provision. Today, as during the twentieth century, the 
pension pillars do not evolve in isolation. Unfortunately, the policy 
cycles followed by the AHV and the second pillar are seldom syn-
chronized, which may blur a proper understanding of their enduring 
interconnections. 
Second, despite state regulations, occupational provision remains a 
domain in which private interests retain a great deal of influence. De-
spite its institutional fragmentation (over 2,000 pension plans were in 
operation in 2010) and the existence of large pension plans in the public 
sector, occupational provision is dominated by a powerful lobby, com-
posed of large autonomous corporate plans, a handful of life insurance 
companies, and various pension experts and consultancies. Insurers in 
particular have nurtured an important pensions market since the 1920s 
and have played a key role in shaping business perspectives on old-age 
provision.6 By 2010, group insurance pension contracts covered about 
40 percent of wage earners affiliated with mandatory second pillar pen-
sions (BVG). Insurance companies also managed one-fifth of second 
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Table 9.1  The Swiss Three-Pillar Pension System (2010) 
Old-age and survivors’ Occupational pensions Individual savings







Pay as you go: payroll tax 
(8.4% levied on all wages 
without ceiling, provides 
75% of financing needs), 
state subsidies (20%), and 
AHV reserve fund (5%) 
2,430 pension plans: autonomous 
corporate plans, group contracts, 
and “collective foundations” 
(multi-employer plans) 
About 90 percent of the workforce 
Wage entry floor = CHF19,890 
of annual income or 75% of a 
maximum AHV pension 
Funded: payroll tax (8–10% of 
wages); the wage ceiling above 
which the BVG payroll tax is not 
levied is equal to three times the 
maximum AHV pension. 
Life insurance companies and 
banks 
Voluntary affiliation: 
approximately half of the 
working population subscribes 
to a “linked” 3rd pillar account 
(“3a account,” see below) 
Funded individual savings: 
voluntary contributions are 
capped. Wage earners with 
BVG coverage may contribute 
CHF6,566 per year, while 
self-employed without BVG 
coverage may contribute 
CHF32,832 per year. 
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Reserves and assets 
Replacement income 
Annuities or lump sums 
About CHF60 billion 
Negligible role in old-age 
provision, but key tax deduction 
for higher income population. 
Tax expenditure for 3rd pillar 
accounts cost CHF450 million to 
the Confederation each year. 
Ranging between 
CHF1,140–2,280 per month, 
mixed indexation (wages 
and prices) 




Approximately one year of 
expenditure (about CHF3 
billion) 
Benefits and indexation procedures 
vary among pension plans. 
Benefits can also take the form of 
lump sums. 
About CHF600 billion 
Combined AHV and BVG benefits should offer replacement rates 
of at least 60 percent of wages. 
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pillar pension reserves (about CHF125 billion). Occupational provision 
is the source for half of life insurance premiums levied in Switzerland.7 
Life insurers’ prominence has been, and is still, a source of tension 
among business interests. Small- and medium-size entrepreneurs often 
resent the conditions imposed on them by insurance actuaries. How-
ever, the main business associations and actors of the pension industry 
agree on defending the basic principles of the three-pillar doctrine. 
Third, the integration of trade unions into management of occupa-
tional pensions has led to ambivalent outcomes. Pension comanagement 
and workers’ participation on pension boards was a longstanding union 
demand and has constituted a major activity for union representatives. 
These boards have increased trade union acquiescence toward business 
personnel management goals while making impossible any genuine 
“workers’ control” of pension funds. Union participation in the three-
pillar doctrine has thus reinforced funded old-age provision to the 
detriment of more redistributive pay-as-you-go provision. 
Fourth, old-age benefits are only one facet of the second pillar. 
Since their inception, occupational plans have been used by employ-
ers to favor “labor peace” and facilitate personnel management. Tax 
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deductions for pension plans have always been an important incentive 
for business. Fifth, the funded reserves of the second and third pillar 
are considerable. The pillar structure thus offers a profitable business 
activity for the insurance companies and banks that participate in the 
management and investment of pension reserves. For the reasons men-
tioned above, life insurers are particularly well entrenched at the core of 
occupational pension provision. Unsurprisingly, this situation has been 
criticized by the left and trade unions, which underscores the contradic-
tions between the growing role of occupational provision in retirees’
incomes and insurers’ profit goals. 
Finally, it is important to consider the Swiss pension system in an 
international comparison. Switzerland belongs to the leading OECD 
countries in terms of private social expenditure for health and pensions 
(Table 9.2). The Swiss pension system bears little resemblance to its 
French and German neighbors, but is much more similar to those in 
the Netherlands as well as the United Kingdom and the United States. 
The decentralization of Swiss occupational provision and insurers’ in-
volvement in pensions is similar to the systems in the United Kingdom 
and the United States, but the post-1972 expansion of the mandatory 
second pillar has brought Switzerland closer to the Dutch system, with 
one important difference. Large multi-employer plans linked to collec-
tive bargaining are central to Dutch occupational provision, while such 
institutions play a marginal role in Switzerland. 
The elements enumerated above underscore the critical role of the 
mandatory second pillar in the Swiss pension system. After the 1972 
vote, the history of occupational provision can be divided into three 
periods. From 1972 to 1982, the outcomes of the political negotiations 
on BVG legislation favored the expansion of pension plans while main-
taining a mild regulatory framework. In a second phase, from 1982 to 
2000, occupational pension provision continued to expand among the 
workforce while the issue of its regulation remained off the political 
agenda. These first two periods are briefly analyzed in the next section, 
and as we will see in the fourth section of this chapter, the current radi-
calization of second pillar controversies from 2000 onward is a direct 
consequence of this long-term maturation process. 
Two opposing dynamics structure the post-1972 period. The first 
dynamic, fueled by demands from the political left and trade unions, 
has aimed to reinforce the collective and redistributive elements of the 
In order to view

























Table 9.2  Private Social Expenditure: An International Comparison 
234
Mandatory and voluntary private social Private social 
expenditure (% GDP, 2005) expenditure as a share of
Old age, health and total social expenditure Pension funds assets 
disability Only old age (%, 2005) (% GDP, 2007) 
United States 10.1 3.8 38.9 140.6 
Switzerland 8.4 5.3 29.3 151.9 
Netherlands 8.3 4.1 28.5 149.1 
United Kingdom 7.1 4.7 25.1 96.4 
OECD average (30 2.9 1.5 11.8 111.0a 
countries) 
France 3.0 0.2 9.3 17.9 
Germany 3.0 0.8 10.1  6.9 
SOURCE: Federal Office of Statistics (OFS), Federal Social Insurance Administration (OFAS), and Financial Market Authority (FINMA). 
a Pension fund assets as a percentage of overall OECD GDP. 
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second pillar, to bolster solidarity between their members, and to sub-
mit pension plans to stricter state regulation. Contrary to these aims, 
business forces and the pension lobby have fought to safeguard the au-
tonomy of pension plans, develop the pension market, and limit the 
solidaristic dimensions of the second pillar. These two antagonistic 
dynamics are riddled with internal contradictions. How indeed is it pos-
sible to increase “social solidarity” in a second pillar whose original 
aim was to limit solidarity and redistribution? At the same time, recent 
pension controversies underscore how it is difficult for proponents of 
pension funding to disentangle themselves from the growing social ob-
ligations linked to the maturation of the second pillar. 
THE THREE-PILLAR DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE (1972–2000) 
The decade that followed the 1972 vote witnessed the abandonment 
of the pursuit of a second pillar system that had universal cover-
age, offered benefits modeled on the best pension plans of the time 
(mostly public service defined benefits plans), and had extensive co-
management procedures and robust state regulation. These objectives, 
all of which had figured among the arguments presented in 1972 by the 
Socialist Party leadership as a substitute for the people’s pensions, faced 
considerable obstacles. Indeed, the political right, businesses, and the 
pension industry worked to safeguard the autonomy of existing plans 
and to allow plans to choose freely between defined benefit or defined 
contribution structures (which were then in the majority among private 
sector plans). These groups also downplayed the constraints of the state 
mandate by introducing into the Federal BVG law a wage floor under 
which low-wage workers would not be covered by the second pillar as 
well as a wage ceiling above which firms could freely organize supple-
mental benefits for handpicked categories of employees. 
The turn toward austerity that followed the economic crisis of the 
1970s, continued business determination to limit the scope of the state 
mandate, and the abandonment of the people’s pensions alternative all 
were factors in the legislative debate that led to the adoption of the 
1982 BVG law on the mandatory second pillar. The complexity of oc-
cupational provision also contributed to keeping these debates buried 
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in experts’ commissions and away from public scrutiny (Hafner 2004; 
Lusenti 1989; Rechsteiner 1984). In 1978, a first BVG draft failed to 
obtain a parliamentary majority. Even if they had pushed for the BVG, 
insurers were not dissatisfied by this outcome, which was the result of 
increased business resistance toward too much state regulation of pen-
sion plans. Considering this failure as “non-tragic,” the directors’ board 
of Winterthur Life, a leading group pension provider, underscored in 
December of that year that “efforts to simplify the law [were] in the 
interest of [our] company.”8 
The outcomes of the state mandate implemented in 1982 have 
remained ambiguous. The immense majority of wage earners were 
now covered by pension plans, but lower wage workers and tempo-
rary workers, primarily women, struggled to overcome the wage floor 
limiting participation in the mandatory pensions system. The consti-
tutional aim stating that AHV (social security) and BVG occupational 
pension benefits should reach a combined replacement rate of 60 per-
cent of former wages remained insufficient for those with low incomes. 
The level of BVG benefits, as well as their indexation, continued to 
vary considerably. Finally, the institutional decentralization of occupa-
tional provision, its opacity, the gradual phasing in of portability rights, 
and the absence of labor-management boards among the myriad of 
group pension contracts covering small- and medium-sized firms only 
reinforced the complexity of the pension system. In parallel to the im-
plementation of the BVG pension law, AHV social security benefits 
were de facto frozen. Their replacement rate (about one-third of wages) 
has not improved since the eighth AHV revision enacted in 1973–1975. 
The introduction of benefits indexation in 1978 has only maintained 
this level. The mandatory second pillar has acted as a Trojan horse by 
anchoring in the middle of the pension system institutional and funding 
mechanisms that counteract the redistributive and solidaristic dimen-
sions of social insurance. 
While the BVG pension law has had an ambivalent impact on the 
quality and level of benefits, notably for low-wage workers and women, 
it has spurred the pension market and notably life insurers’ activities. 
Between 1983 and 1985, or the time that elapsed between the final par-
liamentary vote on the BVG and its implementation, the annual profits 
of Rentenanstalt/Swiss Life tripled (Hafner 2004; Hepp 1993). The ex-
pansion of the second pillar mostly concerned small- and medium-sized 
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firms that instituted group pension contracts to comply with the manda-
tory requirement. Banks and insurance companies also benefited from 
the financial flows generated by the opening of individual third pillar 
savings accounts. The third pillar today plays an important, though 
mostly symbolic, role. The concept of personal responsibility and in-
dividual savings is included in the pension system, which offers tax 
deductions to people with higher incomes, while playing a negligible 
role in most pensioners’ overall incomes. 
In the end, the “constraints of obligation” introduced by the BVG 
pension law have remained mild and the law, according to econo-
mist Graziano Lusenti (1989), respected the “traditional framework” 
of occupational provision and limited itself to “minimal dispositions” 
and “half measures.” The number of persons receiving BVG manda-
tory pension benefits to supplement their AHV social security pension 
remained rather low until the 1990s. At the same time, the buoyant fi-
nancial markets of the 1980s and 1990s offered a favorable context for 
the maturation of the second pillar. Pension plans could easily comply 
with one of the framework regulations introduced in 1985, namely the 
obligation to guarantee a minimum 4 percent rate of return on invested 
BVG pension assets. During this period, pension funds consolidated 
their positions as key institutional investors (Theurillat, Crevoisier, 
and Corpataux 2006). The experience gathered by Swiss insurance 
companies in the domain of occupational provision also enabled them 
to participate in foreign markets (e.g., in Eastern Europe and Latin
America), where a transnational social security reform campaign or-
chestrated by financial international organizations was taking place 
(Lordon 2000; Orenstein 2008). Renewed demands from the parlia-
mentary left for an amelioration of the BVG pension law long remained 
without concrete impact, and until the late 1990s, the second pillar 
continued its development without enduring much political scrutiny. 
This below-the-radar evolution highlights the asynchronous nature of 
pension debates, which mainly focused on the AHV pension during the 
1990s. A brief overview of these controversies is useful as it reveals 
dynamics that are currently at play in the second pillar. 
Even though AHV pension benefits were frozen, attempts to im-
prove them continued and focused in particular on pension inequalities 
between men and women. In a context characterized by recurrent 
economic crises and continuing austerity pressures, these efforts culmi-
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about fnding the option.
Job Name: -- /331778t





nated in a tenth revision of the AHV, implemented in 1995. This revision 
introduced several improvements for women, including replacing “cou-
ple benefits” with individual ones and introducing pension bonuses that 
accounted for years spent raising children. It also inaugurated the first 
increase in the retirement age for women (from 62 to 64 years) as well 
as cuts in widowers’ benefits. A proposed eleventh AHV revision envi-
sioned annual cuts in benefits amounting to about CHF1 billion. The 
revision was condemned by the left and trade unions as antisocial and 
challenged through a strong referendum campaign, and floundered in 
early 2004. A new draft of the revision faced much controversy before 
being buried again in autumn 2010. This transition from compromise 
to clear-cut conflict underscores the hardening of pension debates in 
Switzerland and notably the resistance to austerity cuts presented as 
necessary consolidation measures. 
AHV social security benefit reform packages combining im-
provements and cuts have attracted the attention of political scientists 
(Bertozzi, Bonoli, and Gay-des-Combes 2005; Bertozzi and Gilardi 
2008; Bonoli 2004). Yet they have only recently integrated the second 
pillar in their analyses. This renewed interest is linked to the current 
maturation of occupational provision and attempts to reform the system 
in a period of demographic and financial uncertainty. 
While the number of pension plans has fallen steeply since the late 
1970s as a result of consolidation, the basic institutional structures of 
the second pillar have not fundamentally changed (Table 9.3). Despite 
the losses incurred during the dot com crash and the financial crisis that 
started in 2008, second pillar pension assets still exceed Swiss GDP. 
Occupational provision is still dominated by a few dozen large pension 
plans managed by leading firms and public administrations, as well as 
a few insurance companies. Leading pension providers, such as Swiss 
Life or AXA-Winterthur, cover about half of the 1.6 million persons 
covered by group contracts (FINMA 2009). By contrast, mandatory 
participation in the second pillar has led to a threefold increase in the 
number of pension beneficiaries and a resulting increase in benefit pay-
ments. This maturation constitutes an obvious source for the growing 
controversies that have characterized occupational pension provision 
in the recent period. Second pillar pension institutions have not been 
spared the challenges of rising life expectancy, especially in a period 
riddled with recurring financial crises and sluggish economic growth. 
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Table 9.3  The Maturation of the Second Pillar (1978–2008) 
1978 2008 
BVG pension plans >10,000 around 2,400 
Insured persons—millions (as a % of the workforce) 1.3 (50%) 3.6 (>85%) 
Of which: coverage by group pensions 40% 40% 
BVG pensioners—millions 0.3 0.9 
As a comparison: AHV pensioners—millions 1.0 2.0 
BVG benefits—CHF billions 4.0 28.4 
As a comparison: AHV benefits—CHF billions 9.8 33.5 
BVG assets—CHF billions (as a % of GDP) 82 (54%) 660 (123%) 
As a comparison; AHV reserve fund—CHF 9.7 38.3 
billions 
SOURCE : La prévoyance professionnelle en Suisse. Statistique des caisses de pension, 
various years, Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
Moreover, popular expectations of second pillar pensions have 
remained high. This is the case not only because mandatory BVG 
pensions play a growing role in pensioners’ benefits, but it is also the 
result of two decades of alarmism about the sustainability of AHV pen-
sions, which has shifted popular views of the alleged safe haven of 
occupational benefits. The hopes that people have in terms of pension 
provision from the second pillar may well contradict the priorities of 
the pension providers. This evolution sets business and life insurers in 
a tricky situation. They have successfully contained the AHV social 
security program and redirected pension development toward funded 
solutions, but after having cashed in on the expansion of occupational 
provision caused by the BVG pension law, the pension plans now have 
to face increasing obligations. 
Finally, the political left and trade unions have pursued their efforts 
to improve BVG pension benefits, which they consider as insufficient 
for many low-wage workers. These forces disapprove of financial con-
solidation measures to reduce pensioners’ incomes, underscore the 
hefty management costs of pension plans, and disapprove of their lack 
of transparency. The long-term maturation of the second pillar as well 
as the contradictory demands faced by the system have spurred a shift 
from a fragile political quid pro quo to open confrontation. The recent 
controversy on the BVG benefits conversion rate thus constitutes the 
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second act of an ongoing controversy that began a decade ago during 
the first BVG revision. 
FROM COMPROMISE TO DIRECT CONFRONTATION 
(2000–2010) 
Although the political rhythms of the first two pension pillars re-
main disjointed, debates focused on one of them have often, even if 
belatedly, been echoed in the other. Thus, in the wake of the tenth AHV
revision, proposals to improve the second pillar have also focused on 
the situation of women. From the end of the 1990s onward, the left 
has repeatedly demanded a better integration of low-wage earners in 
the BVG pension system through lowering the minimum wage require-
ment for pension coverage as well as an extension of joint management 
procedures to group pension contracts. The Federal Parliament finally 
acceded to these demands in 2003 but not without adding a reduction 
of the BVG conversion rate (from 7.2 percent to 6.8 percent by 2014, 
resulting in reduced pension benefits) to ensure long-term financing. 
This compromise enabled the passage of the first BVG revision and 
insulated it from a potential referendum campaign. During the same pe-
riod, the eleventh AHV revision faced heated controversies and failed 
to pass the referendum hurdle. 
The BVG pension law compromise reached in 2003 combined con-
tradictory evolutions. On one hand, the lowering of the BVG wage floor 
(from 100 percent to 75 percent of a maximum AHV pension) partially 
took into account atypical work situations (primarily temporary and 
part-time work) as well as women’s structural under-participation in 
pension plans (Leimgruber 2010). On the other hand, the reduction of 
the conversion rate constituted a first attack against a key feature de-
termining the level of BVG benefits. Moreover, while the argument of 
financial consolidation has been systematically used to frame pension 
debates for the last 20 years, the financial crises of the early twenty-first 
century have also weighed on reforms implemented outside the scope 
of the BVG. 
The dot com stock market crash of 2000–2001 caused the first losses
in overall BVG assets since 1985. This financial crisis also served as 
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the background for an intense campaign by insurers eager to disentan-
gle their companies from BVG constraints. In other words, the debate 
about the consolidation of the second pillar is also a battle led by pri-
vate interests to preserve their influence and autonomy in this domain. 
The 2003 compromise was thus accompanied by important measures 
that escaped the referendum mechanism. After sustained lobbying from 
insurers, the Federal Council lowered the guaranteed minimum BVG 
pension rate of return on investment from 4 percent (the level fixed in 
1985) to 3.25 percent in 2003; then it was allowed to fluctuate (reaching 
2.25 percent in 2004 and then 2.75 percent in 2008, before falling to 2 
percent in early 2010). Insurance companies also unilaterally lowered 
the conversion rate used for benefits above the BVG ceiling. Because 
of the complexity and institutional decentralization of the second pillar, 
resistance against these two measures has been largely ineffectual. In 
2004, the Federal Council granted insurance companies the controver-
sial right to keep 10 percent of the investment returns of BVG assets. 
This decision, which generates about CHF500 million annually in rev-
enues to insurers, has been denounced by pension experts who consider 
it to be contrary to the nonprofit goal of the BVG (Killer 2009; Molo 
2009). 
All of these measures enacted in parallel with the first BVG revi-
sion underscore the permeability of the second pillar to private interests 
that have extensive means to shape the pension system. By contrast, 
these measures also underscore the fragile position of trade unions. 
Forced to accept “realist” compromises that end up having a negative 
impact on pensioners, trade unions have less leverage to counteract 
such dynamics. 
Since 2000, public sector pension plans have faced increasing con-
solidation pressures as well. These pressures are part of the offensive 
against the few progressive dimensions of the second pillar. Because 
public sector plans tend to offer more generous benefits than those in 
the private sector, submitting them to financial consolidation require-
ments is a powerful weapon linked to fiscally conservative campaigns 
waged against public budgets. Derided as onerous privileges, public 
sector pension plans face recurrent attacks and relentless austerity 
drives (Guex 1998). 
Finally, the resurgence of radical reform proposals signals the hard-
ening of debates about pensions and their future. Left-wing critics of the 
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three-pillar doctrine have continued to argue in favor of an exit strategy 
from costly pension funding and a reinforcement of the pay-as-you-go 
AHV social security system. However, such positions remain minor-
ity opinions confined primarily to the left wing of trade unions (Swiss 
Trade Union Federation 2006). On the other side of the political divide, 
several free-market economists have repeatedly criticized the collectiv-
ist dimension of the second pillar and advocated the introduction of free 
choice in occupational pension provision. This option would lead to an 
individualization of the second pillar by severing the link between job 
contracts and pension plan affiliation (Gerber 2004). For the moment, 
this proposal has attracted only limited support among employers’ as-
sociations. Fearing that free choice might reopen the Pandora’s Box of 
alternative pension proposals and lead to endless conflicts with trade 
unions, employers’ associations recognize the pertinence of the idea but 
are loath to follow this path (Hasler 2003). Experts have also lambasted 
the option as inappropriate because it would disorganize and imbalance 
the present system (Pittet, Pittet, and Schneider 2005). In the meantime, 
individual retirement accounts have continued to expand—no less than 
2.7 million persons (out of a population of 8 million) have a third pillar 
individual account. However, contributions to these accounts (whose 
reserves are estimated at CHF60 billion) are very unequal. The first seri-
ous study on the subject done by the Federal Tax Administration in late 
2009 confirmed that the main beneficiaries of the system are the banks, 
which offer low rates of return while having access to a steady flow of 
contributions, and the upper middle class, who benefit the most from 
the tax deduction granted to individual retirement accounts. These tax 
subsidies represent annual losses of CHF450 million for the Confedera-
tion, while these individual third pillar accounts play only a minor role 
in pension provision, even among higher income retirees (Peters 2009; 
see also NZZ 2009). 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
In retrospect, the March 2010 vote should not be viewed as an iso-
lated event, but rather an important moment in a particularly turbulent 
phase of social policy development. As early as 2002, insurance com-
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panies had already argued in favor of a benefit conversion rate of 6.4 
percent. The fact that the first BVG revision settled at 6.8 percent was 
not considered sufficient, and pressures to further reduce the rate con-
tinued. The controversial decision to lower the rate in late 2009 had 
little to do with the financial crisis that began in 2008 even if propo-
nents of the decrease used the crisis to stress the urgency and necessity 
of lowering the conversion rate. In a context that witnessed costly state 
intervention in favor of Swiss banks such as UBS, business appeals 
to implement financial consolidation impacting pension benefits have 
caused resentment among the general public, even among the traditional
electorate of right-wing parties. 
While the unequivocal result of the March 7 vote represents a clear 
disavowal of the reform favored by the political right and business, its 
medium-term impact remains to be seen. Immediately after the vote, 
the political left and trade unions tried to capitalize on the referendum 
success to present a series of demands aiming both to improve pension 
benefits for low-wage earners (e.g., an increase in the combined re-
placement rate of the first and second pillar to 80 percent of past wages, 
compared to 60 percent today) and to more closely regulate life in-
surance companies offering group contracts. Pressure remains high on 
insurers, as illustrated by a recent parliamentary motion that demands 
their eviction from the BVG pension system and their confinement to 
supplemental benefits of higher paid employees. However, such pro-
posals will have much difficulty to get beyond the point of political 
gesturing. Less than two weeks after the March 7 vote, the left already 
had to focus its forces on a new referendum—this time to oppose cuts 
in unemployment insurance. While commentators briefly feared a re-
peat of the March vote, the unemployment insurance reform cleared the 
referendum hurdle in September. A few weeks after, the new version of 
the eleventh AHV revision floundered in the Federal Assembly, after 
failing to clear a final vote. The left had already announced its inten-
tion to oppose the revision, and its minority position was bolstered at 
the last minute by votes from the Swiss People’s Party. This important 
right-wing populist group was in favor of cuts in AHV pensions but 
preferred to vote down the revision rather than allow the left to launch a 
referendum campaign that might have been a distraction to the political 
right during the run-up to the federal elections of Autumn 2011 (NZZ 
2010c,d). 
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These contradictory outcomes show that the March referendum 
victory was not sufficient to block the long-term offensive against the 
level of pension benefits. As is often the case in Switzerland, the mul-
tiplication of referendum campaigns might drain and splinter left-wing 
forces in struggles against an agenda set by the political right and busi-
ness interests. Indeed, these forces have not abandoned the objective 
of the financial consolidation of the second pillar. They still dictate the 
agenda and rhythm of reforms, not only in old-age provision, but also 
in the other domains of social protection. Several elements hint that 
business forces and the right are not ready to disarm. Before prudently 
backtracking a few weeks before the March 7 vote, the Liberal-Radical 
party (the main center-right party) discussed the possibility of launch-
ing a popular initiative to demand automatic cuts in social insurance 
programs in case of budget deficits. The idea of a “deficit brake,” which 
might help disarm referendum campaigns and “depoliticize” social de-
bates, has also been taken up by the main business associations. In a 
similar vein, the Federal Council has spoken in favor of linking the 
evolution of the BVG benefit conversion rate to economic and demo-
graphic variables, which will also exert automatic downward pressure 
on the rate (NZZ 2010d). 
Whatever issues these ongoing debates might have, they confirm 
the increasing centrality of the second pillar provision in present and fu-
ture pension debates. Despite the controversies that may surround it, the 
three-pillar doctrine still remains the foundation of the Swiss pension 
system. In this context, submitting the core principles of the doctrine to 
a thorough critical analysis and untangling what is at stake in suppos-
edly technical reforms is absolutely necessary. 
Notes 
1. The 13 countries considered were all important pension markets. Switzerland 
topped the ranking, followed by the Netherlands, Australia, Sweden, and Can-
ada. Other countries mentioned were the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Chile, Singapore, Germany, China, and Japan. See http://www.mercer.com/
globalpensionindex and Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ 2010a). This preranking 
seems to have been leaked to the main Swiss financial newspaper to serve as an 
argument in the referendum campaign analyzed in this paper. In the final index, 
published on October 20, 2010, Mercer split the highest award between Switzer-
land and the Netherlands (see NZZ 2010b; Mercer, 2010). 
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2. The BVG conversion rate is used to calculate the annual BVG pension from the 
overall BVG assets accumulated during a work life. Let us consider an employee 
whose BVG assets amount to CHF600,000 at the age of 65. With a 7.2 percent 
conversion rate (the rate between 1985 and 2004), her annual pensions would have 
amounted to CHF43,200. With a 6.8 percent rate (the rate enacted in 2004 and 
to be implemented in 2014), her pension would be lowered to CHF40,800. The 
proposed new law would have further reduced the conversion rate to 6.4 percent. 
3. Feuille Fédérale (2009, p. 2937); see also http://www.swissvotes.ch. 
4. As of August 2010, CHF1 = $0.96 = €0.72. 
5. See Leimgruber (2008). 
6. The Swiss Pension Funds Association (Association suisse des institutions de pré-
voyance, ASIP) is the direct heir of the first pension funds association founded in 
1922. See also Leimgruber (2006). 
7. See Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) at http://www 
.finma.ch. 
8. Winterthur Directors’ Board, December 5, 1978, quoted in Jung (2000). 
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10 
The Role of Occupational
Pension Plans in an Optimal 
Polish Pension System 
Marek Szczepański 
Poznań University of Technology 
In spite of a radical and comprehensive reform of the public pension 
system in Poland that took place in 1999,1 an adequate and sustainable 
retirement income for Polish citizens remains a major challenge. 
This chapter focuses on occupational pension plans and their role 
in the current and in an optimal pension system in Poland. The current, 
relatively new pension system is analyzed and evaluated in terms of its 
three main goals: 1) improving coverage, 2) sharing risks, and 3) pro-
viding adequate benefits. The analysis of the current system then leads 
to conclusions about the role of employer-sponsored pension plans in 
an ideal Polish pension system. 
INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE NEW
PENSION SYSTEM 
The institutional architecture of the Polish pension system is com-
plicated. Since the implementation of pension reform in 1999, two 
statutory employee pension systems have been operating in Poland: 
the old one, which is organized on a pay-as-you-go defined benefit 
basis, and a new, multi-pillar pension system, organized on a defined 
contribution basis (Figure 10.1). The new multi-pillar pension system 
consists of 1) a state-run pay-as-you-go Notional Defined Contribution 
(NDC) first pillar, 2) a fully funded second pillar (so-called open-ended 
pension funds, or OFEs, managed by private, commercial institutions) 
249 
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with a financial defined contribution formula,2 and 3) a voluntary third 
pillar (employee pension plans, PPEs, and personal pension accounts, 
IKEs). The old system will cease to operate in 2034. 
The new pension system is based entirely on individual accounts, 
with annuitization of account values at retirement. It is financially neu-
tral and actuarially balanced and should be, according to the reform 
leaders, much more effective and fair than the old system. The new 
pension system is not redistributive across generations and will not re-
sult in hidden public debt. The reform package has been described as 
achieving “security through diversity.” 
In theory, the new statutory pension system in Poland looks very 
good. Twelve years after the implementation of this reform, some ad-
vantages are obvious, but there are also many shortcomings and risks 
connected with the new system. 
Barr and Diamond (2010, p. 26) stated that a pension system should 
accomplish two core purposes: 1) “offer a mechanism for consumption 
smoothing . . . and provide insurance against low income and wealth in 
old age” and 2) “relieve poverty and redistribute income and wealth.” 
A well-designed pension system should therefore not only guarantee 
protection from poverty, but also income maintenance. With an ex-
pected gross replacement rate of about 60 percent for men and 40 per-
cent for women in Poland, only relief from poverty can be achieved 
under the current system (Szumlicz 2005, p. 266; OECD 2011). The 
average earnings in Poland are only about 1/3 of the average earnings 
for EU-27,3 and the gross replacement rate of 40–60 percent does not 
guarantee a decent level of retirement income. 
According to the analysis prepared for the European Commission 
(2010), Poland belongs to the group of EU-27 members with the largest 
expected decline in net replacement rates from the public pension social 
security system. Also the benefit ratio (the average benefit from public 
and private pensions as a share of the economy-wide average wage) 
will fall from 56 percent in 2007 to 31 percent in 2060 (European Com-
mission and Economic Policy Committee 2009). 
The design of the new statutory pension system is favorable for 
people with long uninterrupted careers, but it is particularly poorly de-
signed for atypical workers and generally poor for women. The new 
statutory pension system increases the risk of social exclusion for many 
groups, including people who experience unemployment (the current 
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Minimum guaranteed pension 
(flat rate) 
a On March 25, 2011, the Polish Parliament (Sejm) decided to reduce contributions to 
the funded part of the public pension system from 7.3 percent to 2.3 percent and in-
crease pension contributions to the pay-as-you-go part of the system to 17.22 percent, 
starting May 1, 2011. The defined contribution pension formula remains unchanged 
for both parts of the system. 
unemployment rate in 2011 is 13 percent), part-time workers, freelance 
workers, and temporary workers. The system also increases the risk of 
inadequate pensions for a considerable number of workers with stable, 
long-term employment but with below average incomes. There is no 
intragenerational redistribution or solidarity between high-wage and 
low-wage workers (as used to exist in the old pay-as-you-go pension 
system through the defined benefit formula). Low levels of actuarially
strict mandatory defined contribution benefits inevitably will lead to 
low-wage workers receiving low or very low pensions, quite often 
the minimum guaranteed pension. Even entrepreneurs and the self-
employed can expect limited benefits from the new statutory pension 
system because most of them declare only the lowest level of pension 
contributions calculated for minimum wages. As a result, they also will 
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receive very low retirement benefits. But even average- or high-wage 
workers will not achieve acceptable income maintenance levels in re-
tirement without additional pension savings. 
PROBLEMS WITH THE VOLUNTARY THIRD PILLAR 
Both the individual and occupational voluntary pension plans are 
fully funded, defined contribution plans offered in various forms (see 
Table 10.1), but insufficient development of these additional plans (es-
pecially the occupational pension plans) appears to be one of the most 
important disadvantages of the Polish reform. The voluntary pension 
systems cover only a small percentage of the labor force: PPEs cover 
only 2 percent and IKEs about 6 percent. Thus, these voluntary pension 
options play only a minor role in pension provision. 
The development of occupational pension plans has been rather 
slow since 1999 (Figure 10.2). The only exception occurred in 2004, 
when many group life insurance programs were transformed into pen-
sion plans when the new Law on Occupational Pensions came into 
effect. But, even in 2004 and afterwards, the development of employer-
sponsored pension plans was not sufficient to improve coverage. 
In addition, participants in existing occupational pension plans 
organized on a Financial Defined Contribution (FDC) basis bear numer-
ous types of financial market risks, and there is no minimum guaranteed 
Table 10.1  Number of Occupational Pension Plans in Poland by Plan 
Type, 2010 
Life insurance 795 
Investment fund 285 
Company pension fund 33 
Foreign management companies 0 
Total 1,113 
SOURCE: Pracownicze programy emerytalne w 2010 roku [Occupational pension 
plans in 2010], Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF), available at http:// 
www.knf.gov.pl. 
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Figure 10.2 Development of Occupational Pension Plans in Poland, 
1999–2009 
1,200 











SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on data from the Polish Financial Supervision 
Authority (http://www.knf.gov.pl, accessed June 15, 2010). 
rate of return for the savers. There is also no mutual insurance fund in 
case of the bankruptcy of the plan sponsor. 
Barriers to the Development of Employee Pension Plans 
Key barriers to the development of employee pension plans in Po-
land can be divided into exogenous factors of an institutional nature, 
exogenous factors of a noninstitutional nature (primarily macro-
economic determinants), and endogenous factors attributable to the em-
ployer (Szczepański 2010, p. 179). Because employees generally show 
little interest in employee pension plans, the endogenous factors con-
nected with employees play a lesser role in practice and can be regarded 
as secondary factors influencing the development of employee pension 
plans. 
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Exogenous institutional factors 
The reformed pension system retained a high level of contributions 
to the obligatory system (the first and second pillars, which together 
receive nearly 20 percent of salaries), leaving limited space for the 
development of supplementary systems, including employee pension 
plans. 
In addition, insufficient economic and fiscal incentives are offered 
to employers to sponsor the plans and to employees to join them. Es-
pecially problematic are the lack of an income tax allowance for plan 
participants who pay voluntary supplemental premiums and an unat-
tractive capital gains tax allowance whose threshold is too high and 
inaccessible for employees with medium and lower incomes. 
There is also little flexibility and limited selection of institutional 
forms of administering employee pension plans. This includes the in-
ability to administer an employee pension plan as a defined benefit plan 
or a hybrid plan. Those types of plans allow a more balanced division 
of investment risk and other types of risks among employers, employ-
ees, and financial services suppliers than is available under the current 
Polish system. This has led to the phenomenon of institutionally driven 
nonoptimal risk allocation. A more flexible market-based system theo-
retically would reduce transaction costs. 
Plan participants are given insufficient legal and institutional dis-
closures about currently executed strategies in asset management and 
the levels of risks related to these strategies. This has led to information 
asymmetry, as described in agency theory, between plan participants 
and the financial institutions hired to manage employee pension plans. 
In addition, there is little institutional support for helping current and 
potential employee pension plan participants and employers to compare 
offers from financial services providers in terms of costs and investment 
results. 
There are no institutional solutions protecting the interests of 
participants in different age groups. Older and younger age groups (de-
mographic cohorts) have different needs in employee pension plans. 
One institutional solution could take the form of subfunds that invest 
in safe assets to which pension savings would be transferred in a speci-
fied time period, such as 5 years before the employee is 60 years old or 
is eligible to receive benefits. Another solution is the use of packages 
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of properly selected pension funds within employee pension plans, en-
suring an optimal allocation of premiums for participants in different 
life-cycle phases, taking into account individual needs and approaches
to risk. Such a role could be played by aggressive funds, aimed at 
younger people, that have a higher proportion of more risky but poten-
tially more profitable assets, balanced funds, and more conservative but 
potentially less profitable funds. Multi-fund solutions could play the 
role of automatic stabilizers, reducing the risk of erroneous selection of 
a fund by plan participants who generally have to select one of several 
investment funds available in employee pension plans or unit-linked 
insurance plans. This would be particularly helpful to people who do 
not want to choose a fund on their own. 
Other barriers to the development of employee pensions include: 
• An inability to differentiate the amount of the basic premium 
paid to employee pension plans by the employer for employ-
ees. This makes it difficult to use qualified pension plans as an 
efficient salary policy instrument or incentive factor. 
• Unresolved legal and institutional issues connected with the 
creation of employee pension plans in institutions belonging to 
public finance. 
• The lack of regular and wide-scale educational activities about 
employee pension plans managed by state institutions. 
• A lack of requirements for financial results of institutions ser-
vicing employee pension plans. Such requirements could be 
modeled after solutions used in other countries, where a mini-
mum return rate is specified (e.g., with reference to the inflation 
rate or other external macroeconomic parameters). 
• An insufficient level of coordination of transferability of ben-
efits or pension entitlements between employee pension plans 
existing in different countries, at least within the EU. 
• An insufficient level of coordination related to the security of 
employee pension plan participants in the EU. For example, 
there are no unified requirements of financial service providers 
for such plans and the requirements specified in EU directives 
are too general and interpreted in different ways in different 
countries. 
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Exogenous noninstitutional factors 
Poland has a high unemployment rate, and most employers are not 
interested in taking on additional financial obligations aimed at retain-
ing employees. One such obligation would be creation of an employee 
pension plan. 
In general high costs have been associated with the adaptation ac-
tivities connected with the transformation of Poland’s economic system. 
Entrepreneurs have been focused on gaining and maintaining market 
share and face ever-increasing competition connected with Poland’s 
entry into the EU. Other issues, including supplementary employee 
benefits such as an employee pension plan, have presumably been of 
secondary importance. Workers in Poland already have a significantly 
lower average salary as compared to the EU average, which has resulted
in relatively low levels of average disposable income and average 
household savings. 
Finally, the global financial crisis negatively influenced the invest-
ment results of financial institutions that service employee pension 
plans as well as the value of assets accumulated in the plans. 
Endogenous employer-related factors 
In general there is little competitive pressure for employers to 
provide pensions because most businesses do not offer these types of 
nonwage benefits to their employees. Therefore, employers do not feel 
obliged to bear the additional costs of creating employee pension plans. 
There is also insufficient pressure from employees and their organiza-
tions to force employers to create pension plans. 
Employee pension plans are nonwage long-term incentives that do 
not directly influence labor productivity growth. Instead, they improve 
the working environment and relations between employers and em-
ployees, help build loyalty and employee attachment to the company, 
but they do not, at least in the short and medium term, increase finan-
cial benefits (e.g., profits or growth in company market value) for the 
employer. 
The employee pension plans are also inflexible in terms of employee
compensation and administration. As stated previously, employers do 
not have the flexibility to shape the amount of the employer’s contribu-
tion so that premiums can be individualized, depending on the appraisal 
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of a given employee. In addition, the employer is obligated to register 
plans with a national supervisory body, which especially discourages 
small- and medium-sized companies with a small staff base. Plan ad-
ministration also poses additional accounting, financial, and human 
resource obligations. 
There is an agency problem in the relationship between employers 
financing a plan and the financial institutions managing it, including in-
formation asymmetry and transaction costs connected with sometimes 
suboptimal choices in the plan and the provider. 
Endogenous employee-related factors 
The level of pension awareness is generally low, although recent 
research has shown it to be slowly increasing. In general, people still 
prefer current consumption over savings, particularly people with lower 
incomes. Most employees perceive existing incentives to participate in 
employee pension plans (highlighted above in the discussion of institu-
tional barriers) as too weak, and for many individuals, participation is 
simply unaffordable.4 
The awareness of the risk connected with investing in financial mar-
kets has grown as has awareness of the differences in interests between 
plan participants and the financial institutions managing the plans. To 
date, these factors have not had a significant influence on the develop-
ment of employee pension plans, but they may become a barrier in the 
development of employee pension plans in Poland unless new solutions 
to limit risk to employees are introduced to the plan structure. 
Variables Stimulating the Development of Employee
Pension Plans 
Exogenous institutional factors 
Legal, institutional, and administrative factors related to employee 
pension plans have evolved in the past decade and helped with plan 
formation. Employers were allowed limited engagement in plans and 
to exit them in the case of deterioration of a company’s financial stand-
ing. Restrictive penalties were lifted for failing to observe formalities 
connected with the registration and administration of a plan. The legal 
changes made in 2004 were particularly profound and stimulated em-
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ployee pension plan development. One factor, the expansion of available 
institutional forms of running employee pension plans to permit their 
management from abroad, has not yet helped develop employee pen-
sion plans because no such program has yet been registered. During 
the same period, regulations were adopted governing the operations of 
financial institutions providing employee pension plan services to meet 
EU legal requirements, which increased the security of the financial 
operations and asset management. 
Tax relief was withdrawn for unqualified pension plans, which had 
been run in the form of group life insurance programs or payments into 
investment funds. This was an incentive for some companies to convert 
them into qualified employee pension plans. 
At the same time, the base portion of the reformed pension system 
was defined. The new system uses different methods of financing and 
pension capital accumulation in the base portion (both the pay-as-you-
go and the funded systems). The system assumes that future benefits 
should come from at least two obligatory segments and that benefits 
should be supplemented by additional savings accumulated in the third 
pillar (i.e., in employee pension plans and in individual retirement ac-
counts). Understood narrowly, the third pillar is limited to systems of 
supplementary pension savings covered by systemic fiscal and social 
incentives offered by the state, but the third pillar is an integral part of 
the new system. 
Exogenous noninstitutional factors
A factor that might have contributed to the creation of employee 
pension plans at least in some sectors of the economy (e.g., in con-
struction and transportation) was the increased possibility of economic 
migration to other EU states (particularly after Poland’s entry into the 
EU in 2004) and the desire to keep employees in Poland by offering 
them additional benefits. However, analyses show that there is no clear 
positive correlation between periodic economic migration and an in-
crease of employee pension plan participants (Szczepański 2010, p. 
377). Entrepreneurs that wanted to retain current or recruit new employ-
ees to replace the ones who went abroad seemed to use other methods, 
particularly salary increases. 
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European integration, which included the creation of jobs in Po-
land in companies with foreign capital or in international corporations, 
contributed slightly to the creation of company pension plans (both 
qualified and nonqualified plans). Foreign employers running em-
ployee pension plans were mainly driven by non-economic motivations 
(e.g., organizational culture, corporate social responsibility, and image)
rather than by fiscal or cost incentives because the latter in Poland are 
very modest as compared to other countries. Because of the low level 
of flexibility and an inability to individualize base premiums paid by the 
employer, many domestic and foreign employers preferred to start non-
qualified plans,5 which gave them more freedom in shaping this form of 
nonwage employee benefits. 
Finally, competition among financial institutions providing finan-
cial services for employee pension plans was stronger than in the capital 
segment of the public pension system. There was a much higher num-
ber of competing entities, leading to more differentiation of premiums 
and investment results. 
Endogenous employer-related factors 
Employers generally had an overall positive assessment of many 
aspects of employee pension plans, including their structure, legal limi-
tations, and relaxed administrative oversight. The general structure of 
employee pension plans as defined by statute was viewed positively, as 
was the quality of service provided by financial institutions servicing 
employee pension plans. Also viewed positively were legal and insti-
tutional changes that allow premium limits, temporary suspension of 
the payment of premiums, and the possibility of plan liquidation if the 
company’s financial standing deteriorates. Employers also supported 
the reduced supervision by state institutions. 
The awareness of nonwage remuneration elements has gradually 
grown, as have the opportunities to use them as an instrument in human 
resource management policy. The concept of corporate social respon-
sibility in company management has also become stronger. Many 
employers stated that their desire to ensure supplementary pension se-
curity for employees as an element of this social responsibility was a 
decisive factor when starting a plan. 
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Endogenous employee-related factors 
The fact that the base premium in the plan is paid by the employer 
is viewed positively by employees. There has been a high participation 
rate (70–80 percent) in employee pension plans in the few companies 
that have plans. Awareness of the need for pensions and of the need to 
accumulate supplementary savings for old age has grown, especially 
among younger and better educated people. Although it generally oc-
curs too late for individuals to accumulate sufficient supplementary 
savings, the fear of a decline in one’s financial standing after retirement 
can contribute to an employee’s desire to be part of a pension plan. 
Since the implementation of pension reform in Poland in 1999, 
there generally have been more barriers than stimulants to the devel-
opment of employee pension plans. It is therefore not surprising that 
development has been slow and limited and that such a small share of 
employees is covered. 
THE IDEAL PENSION SYSTEM IN POLAND 
The ideal, or at least the optimal, Polish pension system should 
guarantee more secure and adequate income for future retirees. But an 
adequate income should also be combined with the long-term sustain-
ability of the system and better protection of pension rights, especially 
for women and people with atypical work careers. 
The general idea of the 1999 pension reform, risk diversification 
between the labor and the financial markets (Security Through Di-
versity), should be retained. The institutional architecture of the new 
statutory pension system, consisting of two separate, individual pension 
accounts with defined contribution formulas (in the pay-as-you-go first 
pillar and the fully funded second pillar) also should be retained. This 
multi-pillar approach should ensure long-term sustainability, and the 
defined contribution formula should guarantee actuarial adjustment of 
the pension system. A separate issue is the insufficient development of 
the voluntary pension plans in the third pillar. 
The new statutory pension system in Poland is actuarially balanced, 
and this is an important achievement that should neither be disregarded 
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nor discarded. Nevertheless, many changes should to be introduced 
to improve adequacy and risk sharing in that system. The following 
changes should enable the Polish pension system to achieve the fol-
lowing goals: improved coverage, improved adequacy, and greater 
mitigation of financial market and cohort risks. 
Improved Coverage 
The ideal Polish pension system should be based not only on a com-
pulsory (statutory) pension system (divided into two pillars), but also 
on occupational pension plans for the majority of workers, especially 
low-wage workers. The extremely low coverage rates for voluntary 
occupational and individual pension plans in Poland (the third pillar) 
illustrate the need for a new approach to the design of old-age pension 
plans. Attractive tax incentives, especially personal income tax exemp-
tions, could be too expensive and create negative microeconomic side 
effects. Therefore, automatic enrollment of workers into occupational 
pension plans with an opt-out option seems to be a more promising 
solution. High-wage workers should have more opportunities to engage 
in individual pension savings. The existing individual savings accounts, 
which typically are in the form of separate bank accounts, investment 
funds, life insurance, or brokerage accounts should be supplemented 
with new financial products dedicated to long-term savings for older 
persons. For lower income individuals and those with atypical working 
careers, a zero pillar should be created that is tax financed, with benefits 
at a higher level than the current minimum guaranteed pensions. 
Improved Adequacy 
To improve the adequacy of future pensions without increasing 
pension benefits, the statutory retirement age of women (currently 
60) should be equalized with that of men (currently 65). To stimulate 
competition and better performance in the funded second pillar of the 
statutory pension system, fees and charges should be capped and the use 
of internal benchmarks should be eliminated. Fees and charges should 
be connected to investment results. The best-performing pension funds 
should be rewarded with a “success” fee. In addition, OFEs should not 
have the right to aggressively advertise for participants. 
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Mitigation of Financial Market and Cohort Risks 
The risks connected with the investments of pension plans should 
be mitigated, especially in the statutory pension system. The oldest co-
horts of participants in the OFEs should be enrolled into sub-funds that 
invest in less risky financial assets (e.g., participants within 5 to 10 
years of retirement age). Young participants in OFEs should be offered 
more investment options, with more or less aggressive and potentially 
profitable financial asset portfolios. Participants who do not want to 
make their own investment choices should be enrolled into low-risk, 
age-appropriate funds. All participants should be provided with more 
information than is currently available regarding investment strategies, 
risks, and potential profits and losses connected with particular funds. 
Participants in occupational pension plans should also have more 
influence on investment choices and strategies of the financial institu-
tions that provide the services for workplace pensions. The participants 
should receive comprehensive, up-to-date information about risks 
and potential profits and losses connected with different kinds of in-
vestments. A special guarantee fund should be created in case of the 
bankruptcy of the employer sponsoring the plan. Because of the pro-
posed quasi-obligatory status of the occupational pension plans, the 
cost of insurance against employer bankruptcy would be limited. 
An Alternative Approach
An alternative and more drastic approach would involve the liq-
uidation of the compulsory fully funded second pillar and a return to 
a one-pillar statutory pay-as-you-go pension system with more incen-
tives for additional pension plans (occupational and individual savings 
for retirement). Such a modified statutory pension system, with pay-
as-you-go financing of a notional defined contribution benefit as the 
first pillar, fully funded defined contribution occupational pension 
plans as the second pillar, and voluntary fully funded defined contri-
bution personal pension plans as the third pillar, would be safer for 
participants because such a system would reduce the financial market 
risks in the statutory pension system. Such a solution would be dif-
ficult to implement, however, and very expensive. The institutions that 
currently manage OFEs would most likely sue the Polish government 
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and demand compensation for the lost profits that would result from 
implementation of this scheme. In addition, opinion polls show that 
most Polish citizens prefer a multi-pillar pension system with a fully 
funded component over a one-pillar statutory pension system with vol-
untary additional plans. Bad experiences with unfavorable changes in 
pension rights and entitlements in the old pension system and different 
indexation rates of individual accounts in the state-managed first pillar 
of the new system have provoked this lack of confidence. A multi-pillar 
system with a funded component and a mechanism to reduce financial 
market risks would generally be much better perceived and accepted 
in Poland than a one-pillar system with a high degree of political risk. 
From the Polish perspective, it seems to be more aligned with the Polish 
mentality and experiences, and closer to the ideal system design. 
Generally, Poles do not trust policymakers, prefer to accept finan-
cial market risks rather than political risk in the pension system, and 
do not want to be entirely dependent on state institutions for their re-
tirement income. When imaging the ideal Polish pension system, one 
should take these preferences into consideration. 
Notes 
1. In March 2011, 12 years after the implementation of pension reform, some im-
portant elements of pension design have been changed. The amount of pension 
contributions to the funded part of the new system has been reduced from 7.3 
percent to 2.3 percent, and the amount of pension contributions paid to the pay-
as-you-go part of the system has been increased (see note to Fig. 10.1). New 
incentives for additional, voluntary pension savings will be offered beginning
January 1, 2012. 
2. The old pay-as-you-go pension plan applies to people older than 50 on the first 
day of the enforcement of the reform (January 1, 1999), and the new one applies 
to those who were 50 or younger as of that date. Participants in the new pension 
system are subdivided into two groups: 1) people below the age of 30, who have 
compulsory coverage in both public and private plans, and 2) people aged 30–50, 
who can choose whether to remain in the NDC plan only or to take part in both 
tiers. 
3. According to Eurostat, the average monthly full-time equivalent gross earnings in 
EU Member States in 2006 was €1,695, whereas it was €573 in Poland. Annual 
income data presented in OECD (2011) confirm this relation. 
4. There was an exemption from capital gains tax of supplementary premiums paid 
into employee pension plans up to PLN12,000 in 2008. The average disposable 
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264 Szczepański 
income per person in a household was about PLN1,000 (monthly) during the 
same period, and average spending was PLN900 (monthly). So an average earner
clearly gains little benefit from the capital gains tax exemption. That tax incentive 
is much more favorable for high-income workers who are much more likely to 
save more and make full use of this tax incentive. 
5. It is difficult to give the exact number of nonqualified employee pension plans 
because there is no nationwide register of such plans. Qualified plans are listed in 
a register maintained by a central state administration body. 
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How to Establish a Better
Corporate Pension System in Japan 
Noriyasu Watanabe 
Rissho University and 
International Pension Research Institute 
BACKGROUND 
In 2010, Japan had 22,219 private sector companies that had been 
in operation for more than 100 years, the largest number of any country. 
Of these, 39 companies had been in operation for at least 500 years, 435 
companies for at least 300 years, and 1,191 companies for at least 200 
years. The Kongou-Gumi Company, the oldest continuously operating 
company in Japan, was established in the year 578 as a construction 
company of temples and shrines. 
There are two primary reasons that so many companies have been 
able to remain in operation for so long in Japan: 1) Japanese compa-
nies have traditionally respected Wa (harmony) more than profits not 
only with their customers, but also with society and their employees, 
and 2) according to historical documents, they established severance 
lump-sum payment systems for the highly paid staff beginning in the 
seventeenth century. Because of these two features, they have been able 
to overcome many economic, social, and technological changes and 
have enjoyed long prosperity. 
Following the Meiji Revolution in 1868, the Japanese government 
opened Japan to the western world. Along with many other concepts, 
ideas about western corporate systems and corporate pension systems 
were introduced. The Kanebou Cotton Spinning Company voluntarily 
established the first western-style occupational pension plan in Japan in 
1905. Soon after, the Mitsui Company, a trading company, and many 
other companies established pension plans for highly paid and middle-
income employees. 
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266 Watanabe 
Development of Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans 
In 1962, the corporate tax law and income tax law were amended, 
and the Tax-Qualified Pension (TQP) Plan was introduced to provide 
defined benefit plans to employees. Many large- and mid-sized em-
ployers changed all or some of their pension contributions from the 
severance lump-sum payment system to a TQP plan, which is a corpo-
rate pension contract between employers and financial companies. To 
receive favorable tax treatment, the content of the TQP contract must be 
approved by the Commissioner of the National Tax Agency. 
The postwar period of high inflation decreased the real value of 
pension benefits of the Employees’ Pension Insurance (EPI), which is 
Japan’s social security plan. Therefore, in 1965, the Employees’ Pen-
sion Fund (EPF) plan was established by amendment of the EPI law to 
allow employers to increase pension benefits. In 1967, the Employees’
Pension Fund Association (EPFA) was also established. 
Because the increase in EPF plan benefits increased costs for em-
ployers, sponsoring employers and their employees are exempted from 
paying a portion of EPI plan contributions to the government, and in-
stead pay them to their EPF plan. The EPF plans also provide additional 
benefits on top of the portion that replaces EPI (social security) benefits. 
Compared with the TQP, EPF plans have received more favorable 
tax treatment because EPF plans act as a substitute for part of the EPI. 
EPF plans were mainly established by large employers (1,000 or more 
employees) to provide lifetime benefits. TQP plans were mainly estab-
lished by medium and small employers, typically paying benefits for a 
limited number of years. Many employers that hoped to establish higher 
quality employee benefit systems established both plans, each of which 
is a defined benefit plan that played a major role in providing retirement 
income for private sector employees until 2001. 
As of April 2011, Japan had not enacted a basic corporate pension 
law establishing fiduciary responsibility, such as ERISA in the United 
States and Die Alter Renten Gesetz in Germany. Because of the collapse 
of Japan’s “bubble” economy in the 1990s and changes in the Japanese 
economy resulting from changing world economic conditions, how-
ever, the New Corporate Pension Amendment was established in 2001, 
which amended the EPF and TQP systems, which had huge deficits 
(20 trillion Japanese yen [¥]). In addition, the Defined Benefit Corpo-
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rate Pension Law and the Defined Contribution Pension Law, the first 
law governing defined contributions in Japan, were enacted. Before the 
2001 laws, many pension scholars had recommended the development 
of defined contribution plans, using terms such as “self responsibility,” 
but the recommendations did not include full disclosure of the financial 
risks associated with these types of plans. The Employers’ Association 
and the Conservative government at the time accepted this idea, and the 
Confederation of Labor did not oppose it, so the new laws were enacted. 
Although the defined contribution plans were necessary, the laws 
regulating them suffered from several weaknesses because they were 
enacted too early with too few protections. The weaknesses included 
the following: 
• Defined contribution plans should be marketed and managed 
under strict fiduciary responsibility, but there were no such reg-
ulations in the basic corporate pension act. 
• Defined contribution plans require fair and transparent finan-
cial markets—the financial markets in Japan are neither fair nor 
transparent, and many financial organizations have sustained 
large losses or declared bankruptcy. 
• Defined contribution plans require enhanced tax regulations 
and accounting rules, but these were not established. 
• Participants of defined contribution plans need to receive finan-
cial information and education, but these types of information 
and education were never provided. 
• The act does not contribute to retirement income security for 
participants—it only helps employers decrease costs and finan-
cial corporations increase gains. 
In this reform, EPF plans were allowed to stop acting as a substi-
tute or replacement for the EPI plan by returning the corresponding 
EPF money that would have been paid into the EPI plan to the govern-
ment. No new TQP contracts were allowed after April 2002. Existing 
TQPs had to be converted to another form of occupational pension by 
the end of March 2012 because they would no longer receive favor-
able tax treatment starting in April 2012. In March 2001, TQPs had 
9.9 million members and assets of ¥22.3 trillion. The government in-
tended to change TQPs to another type of corporate pension because of 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about fnding the option.








the huge deficits and weaker economy. Because there are no pension 
benefit guarantees for TQPs, it is not clear whether these participants 
will receive another corporate pension in the current weaker economy.
　
With these reforms, corporate and personal defined contribution 
plans were first introduced in Japan. Employees who have no occupa-
tional pension plan from their employer can establish a personal defined 
contribution plan using their own contributions. 
CURRENT SOCIAL SECURITY AND CORPORATE 
PENSION SYSTEMS 
Social Security 
The National Pension Insurance (NPI) is a flat-rate pension that 
is part of the Japanese social security system. Self-employed, “non-
regular” employees (e.g., part-time or temporary workers), unemployed, 
and nonworking spouses of insured workers in the earnings-related 
public pensions (the EPI in the private sector and the Mutual Aid As-
sociations’ Pension Insurance [MAAPI] in the public sector) pay a fixed 
monthly contribution (¥15,020 in 2011, increasing to ¥16,900 in 2017) 
to the NPI and receive a fixed monthly pension benefit (¥65,741 with 40 
years of contributions as of 2017) starting at 65 years of age. In addition 
to the NPI, employees in the private and public sectors participate in the 
earnings-related EPI and MAAPI, respectively. 
Corporate Pension System 
In the private sector, the Japanese pension system is composed 
of defined benefit and defined contribution pensions. The defined 
benefit corporate pensions are the EPF plans, the defined benefit 
corporate pension plans (established by the 2001 law), and the soon-to-be- 
discontinued TQP plans. As discussed previously, the 2001 reform also 
introduced corporate and personal defined contribution pension plans. 
The composition of pension plans has shifted tremendously in the 
past decade. The occupational pension system had its largest amount of 
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assets, ¥63.3 trillion (present value), at the end of March 1998. The EPF 
system had 1,884 plans, 12.2 million participants, and pension fund 
assets of ¥44.9 trillion. The TQP system had 90,243 plans, 10.6 mil-
lion participants, and pension fund assets of ¥18.4 trillion. By the end 
of March 2010, however, the EPF system only had 608 plans (a 67.7 
percent decline), 4.6 million participants (a 62.3 percent decline), and 
pension fund assets of ¥29.0 trillion (a 35.4 percent decline). The TQP
system had 17,184 plans (an 81.0 percent decline), 2.5 million partici-
pants (a 76.4 percent decline), and pension fund assets of ¥6.4 trillion 
(a 65.2 percent decline). 
The corporate defined benefit system, which did not even exist in 
the late 1990s, had 7,405 plans, 6.5 million participants, and pension 
fund assets of ¥39.0 trillion at the end of March 2010. At the same 
time, corporate defined contribution plans had 13,222 plans, 3.6 mil-
lion participants, but incomplete pension fund asset information was 
available. Personal defined contribution plans had only 0.1 million par-
ticipants, and pension fund information was also not available. At the 
end of March 2008, however, the total fund amount for corporate and 
personal defined contribution plans was only ¥3.7 trillion. 
According to official statistics as of the end of March 2010, the 
number of participants in all defined benefit plans (EPF, TQP, and 
corporate defined benefit) decreased from 22.8 million at the end of 
March 1998 to 13.6 million (40.4 percent decline). Pension fund as-
sets increased slowly from ¥63.3 trillion at the end of March 1998 to 
¥74.4 trillion (17.5 percent increase), and per participant pension fund 
assets increased from ¥2.8 million to ¥5.5 million. The total number of 
participants of corporate and personal defined contribution plans was 
3.5 million, fund assets totaled ¥3.9 trillion, and the per participant 
fund amount was ¥1.1 million. At the end of March 2007, the average 
monthly contribution was ¥11,400. 
This means that small- and mid-sized employers have quit offering 
defined benefit plans and that almost all employees working for these 
companies are not covered by any type of pension, whether defined 
benefit or defined contribution. 
Only employees of large companies and good mid-sized companies 
have sustainable pensions with good benefits. Many employees in large 
companies have not only a variety of defined benefit plans but also cor-
porate defined contribution plans. 
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Because of the recent unstable financial markets and weak earning 
power of financial institutions, corporate pension funds suffered aver-
age investment losses of 9.8 percent in FY2007 and 17.2 percent in 
FY2008. They gained 13.8 percent in FY2009, but lost 6.2 percent in 
April–August FY2010. 
Because of the weak economy, underfunding of corporate pensions 
increased to ¥13 trillion as of March 2009, and it was no doubt even 
higher in March 2010. A government accounting committee has dis-
cussed strengthening regulations for reporting unfunded liabilities on 
the balance sheet of employers beginning in 2012. 
Many employers with underfunded pension plans have gone bank-
rupt. In September 2010, Japan Air Line Co. Ltd (JAL) reorganized 
under the Corporate Reorganization Act with the infusion of ¥350 bil-
lion of public money, a debt waiver of ¥522 billion (87.5 percent) by 
financial corporations, and personnel reductions of 16,000 employees 
(19.3 percent). Prior to the reorganization, former employees had been 
receiving EPF, TQP, corporate defined benefit, and corporate defined 
contribution plans with total pension benefits of more than ¥200,000 
per month after retirement. 
But JAL had a huge underfunded liability of ¥331.4 billion for its 
corporate pension plans as of March 2010. Unlike the EPF pension 
plans, the TQP and corporate defined benefit plans have no pension 
benefit guarantee system. After difficult negotiations, the decision was 
made to cut future benefits of active employees by 53 percent with the 
required consent of at least two-thirds of employees and to cut benefits 
to current beneficiaries by 30 percent with the required consent of at 
least two-thirds of beneficiaries. 
The Board of Directors of JAL’s pension funds has an equal number 
of members representing the employer, active employees, and benefi-
ciaries. The board maintained a projected investment return rate of 4.5 
percent even in the recent period when a more reasonable long-term 
rate would have been 1.0 percent. They did not adequately perform 
their fiduciary duties, but no pension law clearly establishes strict pen-
sion fiduciary responsibility in Japan. 
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CURRENT PENSION CONDITIONS 
Establishing a better, sustainable retirement income security sys-
tem is one of the biggest political and social problems in Japan. This 
better and sustainable system should be established harmoniously as a 
three-pillar retirement income system: a public pension system (first 
pillar), corporate pension systems (second pillar), and individual finan-
cial products (third pillar). The focus here is primarily on the structure 
and poor governance of the second pillar. 
The OECD (2009) reported that “private pensions are an important 
part of retirement-income provision in Japan, covering 45 percent of 
the workforce.” According to the official employment report, the num-
ber of active workers in Japan was 62.7 million in July 2010, and the 
unemployment rate was 5.2 percent. In 2009, the number of active non-
farm workers totaled 49.1 million, excluding 5.0 million public sector 
employees. Participants of all corporate pension plans numbered 17.2 
million at the end of March 2009, or 35.0 percent of active nonfarm 
workers. The coverage rate of 45 percent in the OECD report may have 
been correct in 1998, but it certainly is incorrect in 2009 and later. 
Because of the weaker economy and the cost-oriented employment 
policy in Japan, the use of non-regular employees (i.e., part-time or 
temporary workers) has been increasing. The number of non-regular 
workers increased from 8.7 million in 1990 to 16.9 million in 2010. 
Over one-third of the workforce is now considered to be non-regular. 
At the same time, the number of regular workers decreased from 34.7 
million to 33.3 million, mainly because of the weaker economy. 
According to Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare statistics, 
the average monthly earnings of regular male employees in 2008 was 
¥345,300 compared with ¥224,000 for non-regular employees. The 
average for women was ¥243,900 for regular workers and ¥170,500 
for non-regular workers. Contrary to the basic principles of equal op-
portunity and treatment, part-time employees cannot participate in 
earnings-related EPI plans or other corporate pension plans, only in the 
flat-rate NPI plan. As a result of an amendment of the labor law in 2006, 
companies can employ non-regular employees for up to three years. 
According to a survey on people’s knowledge of financial matters 
conducted by the Bank of Japan in 2008, 71.8 percent of people said 
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that they have little knowledge about stocks and bonds; only 4.9 percent 
answered that they have sufficient knowledge about stocks and bonds. 
Approximately 83.6 percent of those surveyed answered that they have 
not heard about defined contribution plans (50.8 percent) or have heard 
about them but do not know what they are (32.8 percent). It is clear that 
seven years after the Corporate Pension Reform in 2001, the govern-
ment, financial organizations, and employers had not done a good job 
informing people about defined contribution plans. 
In September 2010, the government and the Japan Pension Service 
revealed that the Japan Pension Service had mismanaged basic data, in-
cluding the name, date of birth, basic salary, and years of membership, 
to the extent that about 2.6 million EPF members are at risk of losing at 
least part of their EPF benefits. 
NECESSARY POLICY CHANGES 
The Japanese corporate pension system has many fundamental 
problems. The following sections examine policies that should be es-
tablished to address these problems. 
General Reforms 
In general, employers and employees need to understand that the 
harmonization of corporate profits and the employee welfare system is 
necessary. Employers, in particular, need to exercise corporate respon-
sibility and develop a better employee welfare system, particularly with 
respect to their corporate pension plans in Japan’s current aging society. 
In political terms, pension regulations are quite complicated and 
cause management inefficiencies in the huge social security and cor-
porate pension funds in Japan. Many high-ranking pension-related 
governmental staff members take high-ranking positions with finan-
cial institutions or financial-related corporations after their retirement, 
which increases the political risks for the retirement income system in 
Japan. It is a main reason why pension policies are not fair, transpar-
ent, or efficient as compared with western countries. New laws should 
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be enacted to regulate the movement of former high-ranking pension 
bureaucrats into high-paying jobs in related financial fields. 
The government in Japan has established many committees, par-
ticularly in the pension field. Pension scholars are generally eager to 
be members of the committees because they can gain access to detailed 
government information and are well paid. Newspapers have reported 
that members of these committees are paid from ¥4 to 17 million to at-
tend 5 to 10 meetings a year. The Salary Act enacted in 1949 regulates 
the salaries of some members of government committees, and the limit 
in 2011 was ¥936,000. Some scholars are members of several com-
mittees, so the work is very lucrative. Members of these committees 
generally accept policy proposals from bureaucrats with little opposi-
tion—they are really nothing more than well-paid “shadow bureaucrats” 
and are not independent from the government. Pension policymaking in 
general could be strengthened by strictly and reasonably regulating the 
pay structure of government committees.　
In the labor field, we should observe the basic principles of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO 1951) concerning equal oppor-
tunity and treatment and amend related laws to strictly regulate salaries 
for similar types of labor. 
Reforms in the Corporate Pension System 
Several reforms need to be made in the corporate pension system. 
• A minimum mandatory corporate pension system should be 
established to supplement the earning-related social security 
pension system and establish a better and more stable retire-
ment income security system. 
• A Basic Corporate Pension Act should be enacted to include 
enhanced fiduciary responsibilities and a pension benefits guar-
antee system. 
• Taxation of pension investment income should be abolished. 
• To improve accounting regulations, rules from the International 
Financial Reporting Standards and the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board should be introduced in Japan, particularly 
present value accounting. 
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• To improve financial gains, the financial markets should be 
reformed to become more transparent and more efficient. Fi-
nancial corporations should establish higher profit-gaining 
powers and lower fee structures. 
• The government, financial corporations, and employers should 
provide more and better financial information and education to 
employees and the general public. 
CONCLUSION 
Japanese corporate pension policy has not been successful in terms 
of coverage or creating a sustainable pension system. There has been a 
focus on small technical subjects and a general neglect of basic prob-
lems in Japan’s aging society in the twenty-first century. 
Employers and employees need to understand the importance of 
better and more stable employee welfare systems, particularly regard-
ing corporate pension plans, as a way of increasing corporate profits 
and supporting the social security pension system. The social security 
and other pension systems need to be reviewed and restructured with 
a mutual understanding of the importance of public and corporate pen-
sion governance and to establish fair, transparent, and efficient markets 
and regulations in pension-related fields. An ongoing evaluation of pol-
icies, government agencies, pension funds, and financial corporations 
should be conducted to ensure excellent performance. 
Japan should return to a basic guiding principle—there should be 
no long-term development of a company without a stable employee 
welfare system, particularly in terms of corporate pension plans in the 
twenty-first century. 
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